This case has been cited 5 times or more.
2011-03-14 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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It bears emphasizing that an oral order has no juridical existence until and unless it had been reduced into writing and promulgated, i.e. delivered by the judge to the clerk of court for filing, release to the parties and implementation.[41] In fact, even if it had been written and promulgated, or even if it had already been properly served on the parties, it is still plainly within the power of the judge to recall it and set it aside because every court has the inherent power, among others, to amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice.[42] | |||||
2007-01-25 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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In Echaus v. Court of Appeals,[11] we held:Time honored and of constant observance is the principle that no judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory, has juridical existence until and unless it is set down in writing, signed, and promulgated, i.e., delivered by the Judge to the Clerk of Court for filing, release to the parties and implementation, and that indeed, even after promulgation, it does not bind the parties until and unless notice thereof is duly served on them by any of the modes prescribed by law. x x x[12] (Emphasis supplied) | |||||
2006-03-31 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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As to the argument of Judge Floro that his Orders for the release of an accused on recognizance need not be in writing as these are duly reflected in the transcript of stenographic notes, we refer to Echaus v. Court of Appeals[50] wherein we held that "no judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory, has juridical existence until and unless it is set down in writing, signed and promulgated, i.e., delivered by the Judge to the Clerk of Court for filing, release to the parties and implementation." Obviously, then, Judge Floro was remiss in his duties as judge when he did not reduce into writing his orders for the release on recognizance of the accused in Criminal Cases No. 20384, 20371, 202426 and 20442 entitled, "People v. Luisito Beltran," "People v. Emma Alvarez, et al.," "People v. Rowena Camino," and "People v. John Richie Villaluz."[51] From his explanation that such written orders are not necessary, we can surmise that Judge Floro's failure was not due to inadvertence or negligence on his part but to ignorance of a procedural rule. | |||||
2004-11-25 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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Time-honored and of constant observance is the principle that no judgment, or order, whether final or interlocutory, has juridical existence until and unless it is set in writing, signed, and promulgated, i.e., delivered by the Judge to the Clerk of Court for filing, release to the parties and implementation, and that indeed, even after promulgation, it does not bind the parties until and unless notice thereof is duly served on them by any of the modes prescribed by law. This is so even if the order or judgment has in fact been orally pronounced in the presence of the parties, or a draft thereof drawn up and signed and/or a copy thereof somehow read or acquired by any party.[30] | |||||
2003-04-03 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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In Echaus vs. Court of Appeals,[6] we held:"Time-honored and of constant observance is the principle that no judgment or order, whether final or interlocutory, has juridical existence until and unless it is set down in writing, signed, and promulgated, i.e., delivered by the Judge to the Clerk of Court for filing, release to the parties and implementation (Sec. 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Court; cf., Qua v. Republic, 122 Phil. 1083), and that indeed, even after promulgation, it does not bind the parties until and unless notice thereof is duly served on them by any modes prescribed by law (Secs. 3, 5, 7, Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Court). This is so even if the order or judgment has in fact been orally pronounced in the presence of the parties, or a draft thereof drawn up and signed and/or copy thereof somehow read or acquired by any party (Sec. 2, Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court). x x x." |