This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2014-06-04 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| In this case, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals adjudged the accused-appellant guilty of rape by having carnal knowledge of AAA without her consent using force or intimidation. The courts a quo relied on the testimony of AAA and her positive identification of the accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the sexual abuse. After thoroughly reviewing the records of this case, the Court finds that AAA was indeed categorical and consistent in her testimony that the accused-appellant was the one who pointed a gun to her mouth and forcibly had sexual intercourse with her. We, thus, see no reason to disturb the lower courts' appreciation of the credibility of AAA's testimony. People v. De Guzman[18] teaches that: In the resolution of the factual issues, the court relies heavily on the trial court for its evaluation of the witnesses and their credibility. Having the opportunity to observe them on the stand, the trial judge is able to detect that sometimes thin line between fact and prevarication that will determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. That line may not be discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal record by the reviewing court. The record will not reveal those tell-tale signs that will affirm the truth or expose the contrivance, like the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply. The record will not show if the eyes have darted in evasion or looked down in confession or gazed steadily with a serenity that has nothing to distort or conceal. The record will not show if tears were shed in anger, or in shame, or in remembered pain, or in feigned innocence. Only the judge trying the case can see all these and on the basis of his observations arrive at an informed and reasoned verdict. | |||||
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2011-07-27 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| In the case at bar, the RTC gave more weight to the testimony of Carmela Tagpis in establishing the presence of treachery in the manner with which the accused-appellant carried out the violent killings of Felipe and Ranil. In this regard, we reiterate the established doctrine articulated in People v. De Guzman[49] that: In the resolution of the factual issues, the court relies heavily on the trial court for its evaluation of the witnesses and their credibility. Having the opportunity to observe them on the stand, the trial judge is able to detect that sometimes thin line between fact and prevarication that will determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. That line may not be discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal record by the reviewing court. x x x.[50] | |||||
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2006-01-24 |
AZCUNA, J. |
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| The record will not reveal those tell-tale signs that will affirm the truth or expose the contrivance, like the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer of the forthright tone of a ready reply. The record will not show if the eyes have darted in evasion or looked down in confession or gazed steadily with a serenity that has nothing to distort or conceal. The record will not show if tears were shed in anger, or in shame or in remembered pain, or in feigned innocence. Only the judge trying the case can see all these on the basis of his observations arrive at an informed and reasoned verdict.[21] After a thorough review of the evidence on record, this Court finds no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court. | |||||
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2003-09-03 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| "In the resolution of the factual issues, the Court relies heavily on the trial court for its evaluation of the witnesses and their credibility. Having the opportunity to observe them on the stand, the trial judge is able to detect that sometimes thin line between fact and prevarication that will determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. That line may not be discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal record by the reviewing court. The record will not reveal those tell-tale signs that will affirm the truth or expose the contrivance, like the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply. The record will not show if the eyes have darted in evasion or looked down in confession or gazed steadily with a serenity that has nothing to distort or conceal. The record will not show if tears were shed in anger, or in shame, or in remembered pain, or in feigned innocence. Only the judge trying the case can see all these and on the basis of his observations arrive at an informed and reasoned verdict."[14] For another, complainant never wavered in her assertion that appellant raped her. Her testimony is clear, positive, and convincing. Indeed, the fact of rape and the identity of appellant as the malefactor were sufficiently and convincingly established by the prosecution through her straightforward narration, thus: "Q. Why did you file the case against your Kakang Muling or Mauricio Watiwat? A. Because I was raped, sir. | |||||