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MAYOR ALVIN B. GARCIA v. ARTURO C. MOJICA

This case has been cited 6 times or more.

	GR No. 169694 2015-12-09	MEGAWORLD PROPERTIES v. MAJESTIC FINANCE BERSAMIN, J.
Apart from the provisional remedies expressly recognized and made available under Rule 56 to Rule 61 of the Rules of Court, the Court has sanctioned only the issuance of the status quo ante order but only to maintain the last, actual, peaceable and uncontested state of things that preceded the controversy.[32] The eminent Justice Florenz D. Regalado,[33] an authority on remedial law, has delineated the nature of the status quo ante order, and distinguished it from the provisional remedy of temporary restraining order, as follows: There have been instances when the Supreme Court has issued a status quo order which, as the very term connotes, is merely intended to maintain the last, actual, peaceable and uncontested state of things which preceded the controversy. This was resorted to when the projected proceedings in the case made the conservation of the status quo desirable or essential, but the affected party neither sought such relief or the allegations in his pleading did not sufficiently make out a case for a temporary restraining order. The status quo order was thus issued motu proprio on equitable considerations. Also, unlike a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, a status quo order is more in the nature of a cease and desist order, since it neither directs the doing or undoing of acts as in the case of prohibitory or mandatory injunctive relief. The further distinction is provided by the present amendment in the sense that, unlike the amended rule on restraining orders, a status quo order does not require the posting of a bond.
	GR No. 179261 2008-04-18	OMBUDSMAN v. BEATRIZ S. PELIÑO YNARES-SATIAGO, J.
However, there is a need to make a determination as to whether the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed order of preventive suspension. To do this, we must resolve the issue of whether the evidence of PELIÑO's guilt is strong as to justify the issuance of a preventive suspension order against her. In Garcia v. Mojica,[25] the Court held that the strength of the evidence to warrant preventive suspension may be properly raised in a petition for certiorari and prohibition, advancing the view that the equitable remedies under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court exist to provide prompt relief where an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
	GR No. 159883 2008-03-31	DR. PEDRO F. GOBENCIONG v. CA VELASCO JR., J.
There can be no question in this case as to the power and authority of respondent Deputy Ombudsman to issue an order of preventive suspension against an official like the petitioner, to prevent that official from using his office to intimidate or to influence witnesses or to tamper with records that might be vital to the prosecution of the case against him.[26]
	GR NO. 171901 2006-12-19	FIRST UNITED CONSTRUCTORS CORPORATION v. CA TINGA, J.
Such action by the Court should have prompted the appellate court to make its own independent evaluation of FUCC's allegations in support of its prayer for TRO instead of perfunctorily denying the same. The factual antecedents of this case should have made it obvious to the Court of Appeals that the preservation of the status quo is both desirable and essential.[23]
	GR No. 164250 2005-09-30	OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN v. ATTY. GIL A. VALERA CALLEJO, SR., J.
While R.A. No. 6770 accords the Special Prosecutor the same rank as that of the Deputy Ombudsmen, Section 24 thereof expressly grants only to the Ombudsman and the Deputy Ombudsmen the power to place under preventive suspension government officials and employees under their authority pending an administrative investigation.[43]
	GR No. 141336 2004-06-29	RODOLFO G. VALENCIA v. SANDIGANBAYAN YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Moreover, one of the grounds for the dismissal of the administrative case against petitioners is the fact that they were reelected to office. Indeed, a reelected local official may not be held administratively accountable for misconduct committed during his prior term of office. The rationale for this holding is that when the electorate put him back into office, it is presumed that it did so with full knowledge of his life and character, including his past misconduct. If, armed with such knowledge, it still reelects him, then such reelection is considered a condonation of his past misdeeds.[37]