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ROBERN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. JUDGE JESUS V. QUITAIN

This case has been cited 9 times or more.

	GR No. 169263 2011-09-21	CITY OF MANILA v. MELBA TAN TE PERALTA, J.
This motion to dismiss was not covered by Rule 15 which governed ordinary motions, and was then the required responsive pleading, taking the place of an answer, where the plaintiff's right to expropriate the defendant's property could be put in issue.[42] Any relevant and material fact could be raised as a defense, such as that which would tend to show that the exercise of the power to condemn was unauthorized, or that there was cause for not taking defendant's property for the purpose alleged in the petition, or that the purpose for the taking was not public in character. With that, the hearing of the motion and the presentation of evidence would follow. The rule is based on fundamental constitutional provisions affecting the exercise of the power of eminent domain, such as those that seek to protect the individual property owner from the aggressions of the government.[43] However, the rule, which was derived from the practice of most American states, proved indeed to be a source of confusion because it likewise permitted the filing of another motion to dismiss, such as that referred to in Rule 16, where the defendant could raise, in addition, the preliminary objections authorized under it.[44]
	GR No. 156684 2011-04-06	SPS. ANTONIO v. CA BERSAMIN, J.
Verily, there can be no prohibition against a procedure whereby the immediate possession of the land under expropriation proceedings may be taken, provided always that due provision is made to secure the prompt adjudication and payment of just compensation to the owner. [20] This bar against prohibition comes from the nature of the power of eminent domain as necessitating the taking of private land intended for public use,[21] and the interest of the affected landowner is thus made subordinate to the power of the State. Once the State decides to exercise its power of eminent domain, the power of judicial review becomes limited in scope, and the courts will be left to determine the appropriate amount of just compensation to be paid to the affected landowners. Only when the landowners are not given their just compensation for the taking of their property or when there has been no agreement on the amount of just compensation may the remedy of prohibition become available.
	GR NO. 162779 2007-06-15	HEIRS OF MATEO PIDACAN v. AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE QUISUMBING, J.
Eminent domain or expropriation is the inherent right of the state to condemn private property to public use upon payment of just compensation.[10] A number of circumstances must be present in the taking of property for purposes of eminent domain: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.[11]
	GR No. 157882 2006-03-30	DIDIPIO EARTH-SAVERS MULTI-PURPOSE ASSOCIATION v. ELISEA GOZUN CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
The power of eminent domain is the inherent right of the state (and of those entities to which the power has been lawfully delegated) to condemn private property to public use upon payment of just compensation.[17] On the other hand, police power is the
	GR No. 154614 2004-11-25	CITY OF ILOILO v. JUDGE EMILIO LEGASPI CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
On 09 May 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying that the lower court reconsider its order of 15 April 2002, and to consider its Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession submitted for resolution after the filing of its Reply to private respondents' Opposition to the motion. Citing the case of Robern Development Corp. v. Judge Jesus V. Quitain, et al.,[19] it maintains "there is no need for a hearing before the Honorable Court can grant [its] Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession."[20]
	GR No. 158311 2004-11-17	HUNTINGTON STEEL PRODUCTS v. NLRC QUISUMBING, J.
Anent petitioners' contention that the Labor Arbiter did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for failure to include the certificate of non-forum shopping in the complaint, this contention finds no support in law and in jurisprudence. Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94 is mandatory but not jurisdictional, as jurisdiction over the subject or nature of the cause of action is conferred by law.[26]
	GR Nos. 139927 and 139936 2000-11-22	SALVADOR BIGLANG-AWA v. JUDGE MARCIANO I. BACALLA MENDOZA, J.
As clearly enunciated in Robern Development Corporation vs. Judge Jesus Quitain[9]: "Expropriation proceedings are governed by revised Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which took effect on July 1, 1997. Previous doctrines inconsistent with this Rule are deemed reversed or modified. Specifically, (1) an answer, not a motion to dismiss, is the responsive pleading to a complaint in eminent domain; (2) the trial court may issue a writ of possession once the plaintiff deposits an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property, pursuant to Section 2 of said Rule, without need of a hearing to determine the provisional sum to be deposited; and (3) a final order of expropriation may not be issued prior to a full hearing and resolution of the objections and defenses of the property owner." (Emphasis Ours)
	GR No. 131214 2000-07-27	BA SAVINGS BANK v. ROGER T. SIA PANGANIBAN, J.
Consistent with this rationale, the Court en banc in Robern Development Corporation v. Judge Jesus Quitain[8] has allowed even an acting regional counsel of the National Power Corporation to sign, among others, the certificate of non-forum shopping required by Circular 28-91. The Court held that the counsel was "in the best position to verify the truthfulness and the correctness of the allegations in the Complaint" and "to know and to certify if an action x x x had already been filed and pending with the courts."[9]
	GR No. 137537 2000-01-28	SMI DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. REPUBLIC PANGANIBAN, J.
In Robern Development Corporation v. Judge Quitain,[21] the Court stated:"In the present case, although the Complaint for expropriation was filed on June 6, 1997, the Motion for the Issuance of the Writ of Possession was filed on July 28, 1997; thus, the issuance of the Writ is covered by the 1997 Rules. As earlier stated, procedural rules are given immediate effect and are applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time they are passed; new court rules apply to proceedings that take place after the date of their effectivity. Therefore, Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is the prevailing and governing law in this case."