This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2002-07-30 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| experience. As a matter of common observation and knowledge, the reaction or behavior of persons when confronted with a shocking incident varies. Persons do not necessarily react uniformly to a given situation, for what is natural to one may be strange to another. Hence, placed under emotional stress, some people may shout, some may faint, and some may be shocked into insensibility, while others may openly welcome an intrusion.[16] Further, accused-appellant assails the trial court's declaration that his absence for nine years was indicative of flight and concealment, hence, an implied admission of guilt. He claims that he had no knowledge of his implication in a shooting incident. Neither was he | |||||
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2001-07-06 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| It is settled that unless the trial judge overlooked certain facts of substance and value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, appellate courts will not disturb the credence, or lack of it, accorded by the trial court to the testimonies of witnesses.[36] We see no reason to depart from the general rule in this case. | |||||
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2001-05-31 |
PARDO, J. |
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| At the time of the commission of the offense of murder,[37] the penalty imposable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death.[38] There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance that attended the murder, the proper imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.[39] | |||||