This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2004-05-20 |
PER CURIAM |
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| It is not disputed that the crime was committed in Aurea's house. However, dwelling may not be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in the consideration of his criminal liability as it is not alleged in the Information.[40] | |||||
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2004-02-23 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Appellant insists that Mylene failed to disclose the name of the person who raped her to her parents or to the barangay officers, so that his identification later should be considered dubious.[65] Identification of a person, however, is not solely through knowledge of his name. In fact, familiarity with physical features, especially those of the face, is the best way to identify a person, for one may be familiar with the face but not necessarily the name.[66] It does not follow, that to be able to identify a person, one must necessarily know his name.[67] | |||||
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2004-01-21 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| In rape with the use of a deadly weapon, the presence of an aggravating circumstance increases the penalty to death.[48] In the present case, appellant raped Rowena in her dwelling, which is an aggravating circumstance under Article 14 (3) of the Revised Penal Code.[49] However, the Information did not specifically allege dwelling as an aggravating circumstance. In People v. Gallego,[50] the Court ruled that where the information did not allege the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, dwelling could not raise the penalty to death. The Court held:xxx The accused must thence be afforded every opportunity to present his defense on an aggravating circumstance that would spell the difference between life and death in order for the Court to properly "exercise extreme caution in reviewing the parties' evidence." This, the accused can do only if he is appraised of the aggravating circumstance raising the penalty imposable upon him to death. Such aggravating circumstance must be alleged in the information, otherwise the Court cannot appreciate it. The death sentence being irrevocable, we cannot allow the decision to take away life to hinge on the inadvertence or keenness of the accused in predicting what aggravating circumstance will be appreciated against him.[51] | |||||
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2001-08-09 |
DE LEON, JR., J. |
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| This ruling was subsequently affirmed in People v. Payot,[16] People v. Floro,[17] People v. Jose,[18] and People v. Gallego.[19] Even a distance of one-and-a-half kilometers, as in the present case, was not deemed insuperable.[20] It bears noting that accused-appellant had a tricycle which he could have used to go to Barangay San Roque II. Failing that, he could have hailed any of the numerous tricycles plying that route.[21] | |||||
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2001-07-11 |
PARDO, J. |
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| As to the aggravating circumstance of nighttime, the same could not be considered for the simple reason that it was not specifically sought in the commission of the crime. "Night-time becomes an aggravating circumstance only when (1) it is specially sought by the offender; (2) the offender takes advantage of it; or (3) it facilitates the commission of the crime by insuring the offender's immunity from identification or capture."[9] In the case at bar, no evidence suggests that accused purposely sought the cover of darkness to perpetrate the crime, or to conceal his identity. | |||||
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2001-01-25 |
PUNO, J. |
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| In view of the positive identification made by Roxanne, the accused's defense of denial and alibi must fall. Well-settled is the rule that positive identification of the accused will prevail over the defense of denial and alibi.[30] Furthermore, for alibi to prosper, it must be shown that there was physical impossibility for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime. The defense has failed to satisfy this requirement. The trial court took judicial notice of the fact that Gayaman where the accused supposedly was at the time Joyce Ann disappeared is only about five to six kilometers away from the plaza where Joyce Ann was playing. | |||||
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2000-12-15 |
PUNO, J. |
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| In light of the positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses, the accused's defense of denial and alibi must fall. The running case law is that positive identification of the accused will prevail over the defense of denial and alibi.[41] Furthermore, for alibi to prosper, it must be shown that there was physical impossibility for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime. The defense has failed to satisfy this requirement. The scene of the shooting incident and the hospital where accused claims he was at the time Antonio was shot are both in Ilagan, Isabela. | |||||