This case has been cited 21 times or more.
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2014-07-02 |
BRION, J. |
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| The petitioner's allegation that the court asked insinuating and leading questions to Florida fails to persuade us. A judge may examine or cross-examine a witness. He may propound clarificatory questions to test the credibility of the witness and to extract the truth. He may seek to draw out relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to support or rebut the position taken by one or the other party. It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory questions he propounds happen to reveal certain truths that tend to destroy the theory of one party.[28] | |||||
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2011-12-14 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| The failure of the police officers to use ultraviolet powder on the buy-bust money is not an indication that the buy-bust operation was a sham. "The use of initials to mark the money used in [a] buy-bust operation has been accepted by this Court."[38] In People v. Rivera,[39] we declared: It was x x x the prerogative of the prosecution to choose the manner of marking the money to be used in the buy-bust operation, and the fact that it was not dusted with fluorescent powder did not render the exhibit inadmissible. Indeed, the use of initials to mark the money used in the buy-bust operation has been accepted by this Court in numerous cases.[40] | |||||
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2011-11-23 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| The foregoing are especially true in that class of cases where the offense is the kind that is habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnished evidence of a course of conduct. Mere deception by the police officer will not shield the perpetrator, if the offense was committed by him free from the influence or the instigation of the police officer.[29] | |||||
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2011-01-26 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| That no test buy was conducted before the arrest is of no moment for there is no rigid or textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations. For the same reason, the absence of evidence of a prior surveillance does not affect the regularity of a buy-bust operation, especially when, like in this case, the buy-bust team members were accompanied to the scene by their informant. The Court will not pretend to establish on a priori basis what detailed acts police authorities might credibly undertake and carry out in their entrapment operations. The selection of appropriate and effective means of entrapping drug traffickers is best left to the discretion of police authorities.[43] | |||||
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2009-06-22 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Equally without merit is accused-appellant's contention that the failure of the operatives to record the buy-bust in the police blotter and their failure to apply fluorescent powder to the buy-bust money are signs of irregularities. Firstly, a prior blotter report is neither indispensable nor required in buy-bust operations.[19] Secondly, there is no rule requiring that the police must apply fluorescent powder to the buy-bust money to prove the commission of the offense. The failure of the police operatives to use fluorescent powder on the boodle money is not an indication that the buy-bust operation did not take place. The use of initials to mark the money used in the buy-bust operation has been accepted by this Court.[20] Similar to a prior blotter report, the use of fluorescent powder is not indispensable in such operations, for the prerogative to choose the manner of marking the money to be used in the buy-bust operation belongs exclusively to the prosecution. | |||||
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2008-07-28 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Having been caught in flagrante, appellant's identity as seller and possessor of the shabu can no longer be disputed. Against the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellant's plain denial of the offenses charged, unsubstantiated by any credible and convincing evidence, must simply fail.[62] Frame-up, like alibi, is generally viewed with caution by this Court, because it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove. Moreover, it is a common and standard line of defense in prosecutions of violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.[63] For this claim to prosper, the defense must adduce clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that government officials have performed their duties in a regular and proper manner.[64] | |||||
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2008-06-27 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| We are not swayed. In the case at bar, the evidence clearly shows that appellants were involved in the buy-bust operation. Having been caught in flagrante delicto, appellants Alfredo and Henry's participation cannot be doubted. Against the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellants' plain denial of the offenses charged, unsubstantiated by any credible and convincing evidence, must simply fail.[48] Frame-up, like alibi, is generally viewed with caution by this Court, because it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove. Moreover, it is a common and standard line of defense in prosecutions of violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.[49] For this claim to prosper, the defense must adduce clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that government officials have performed their duties in a regular and proper manner. [50] | |||||
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2008-04-23 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| In the case at bar, the evidence clearly shows that appellant was the subject of a buy-bust operation. Having been caught in flagrante delicto, his identity as seller of the shabu can no longer be doubted. Against the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellant's plain denial of the offenses charged, unsubstantiated by any credible and convincing evidence, must simply fail.[28] Frame-up, like alibi, is generally viewed with caution by this Court, because it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove. Moreover, it is a common and standard line of defense in prosecutions of violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.[29] For this claim to prosper, the defense must adduce clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that government officials have performed their duties in a regular and proper manner.[30] This, appellant failed to do. The presumption remained unrebutted because the defense failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the police officers did not properly perform their duty or that they were inspired by an improper motive. | |||||
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2007-11-28 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Moreover, appellant's defense of denial is nothing new. The defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been viewed with disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. [28] For this claim to prosper, the defense must adduce clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that government officials have performed their duties in a regular and proper manner.[29] This, appellant failed to do. Appellant could have strengthened his case by presenting as witnesses his supposed two playmates in the card game, but he did not. Instead, he relied solely on his bare allegations unsubstantiated by competent and credible evidence. | |||||
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2007-11-28 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The presence of conspiracy among the accused can be proven by their conduct before, during or after the commission of the crime showing that they acted in union with each other, evincing a common purpose or design.[39] It is clear from the testimony of Inspector Cortez that appellants were of one mind in selling shabu to Inspector Cortez as shown by their acts before, during and after the transaction, to wit: (1) Vladimir asked Inspector Cortez to show him the money; (2) Vladimir fetched Edgardo and Vicente; (3) Edgardo brought out three plastic bags containing shabu; (4) Vicente brought out a digital weighing scale; (5) appellants assisted each other in weighing the three plastic bags of shabu; and (6) Vladimir received the money from Inspector Cortez.[40] Conspiracy having been established, appellants are liable as co-principals regardless of their participation.[41] | |||||
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2007-02-08 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Frame-up, like alibi, is generally viewed with caution by this Court, because it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove. Moreover, it is a common and standard line of defense in prosecutions of violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.[39] For this claim to prosper, the defense must adduce clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that government officials have performed their duties in a regular and proper manner.[40] In the case at bar, the presumption remained uncontradicted because the defense failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the police officers did not properly perform their duty or that they were inspired by an improper motive. | |||||
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2004-05-19 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| In the face of Chief Inspector Muksan's inconsistent testimony, the testimony of the informant is indispensable. More so in this case where the police engaged the informant's services for the first time in a buy-bust operation.[55] The prosecution did not present as witness the informant who apparently was the only eyewitness to the entire transaction. The testimony of a police informant in an illegal drug case is not essential to convict the accused since the testimony would be merely corroborative and cumulative.[56] However, where the informant is the only eyewitness to the illegal transaction, his testimony is essential and non-presentation of the informant is fatal to the prosecution's cause.[57] As held in People v. Zheng Bai Hui:[58] | |||||
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2004-02-17 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Appellant also denies that a buy-bust operation ever took place. According to appellant, the alleged buy-bust operation is improbable because appellant and the poseur-buyer are total strangers to each other. This Court has stated that the sale of prohibited drugs to complete strangers, openly and in public places, has become a common occurrence.[16] Drug peddlers have become exceedingly daring and openly defiant of the law.[17] Moreover, large drug transactions, such as in this case, do take place under the cover of common places.[18] | |||||
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2004-02-05 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| The use of fluorescent powder and fingerprinting are neither indispensable nor required in buy-bust operations.[13] There is no law or rule of evidence requiring the use of fluorescent powder or the taking of the culprit's fingerprints from the bag containing the shabu. | |||||
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2004-01-22 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| Appellant's contention is unmeritorious. The trial judge is accorded a reasonable leeway in putting such questions to witnesses as may be essential to elicit relevant facts to make the record speak the truth. Trial judges in this jurisdiction are judges of both the law and the facts, and they would be negligent in the performance of their duties if they permitted a miscarriage of justice as a result of a failure to propound a proper question to a witness which might develop some material bearing upon the outcome. In the exercise of sound discretion, he may put such question to the witness as will enable him to formulate a sound opinion as to the ability or the willingness of the witness to tell the truth. A judge may examine or cross-examine a witness. He may propound clarificatory questions to test the credibility of the witness and to extract the truth. He may seek to draw out relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to support or rebut the position taken by one or the other party. It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory questions he propounds happen to reveal certain truths which tend to destroy the theory of one party.[15] | |||||
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2003-09-26 |
TINGA, J. |
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| "What is that?" the man asked.[46] Tudtud replied that he did not know.[47] Without even unwrapping the cellophane, the man said it was marijuana and abruptly handcuffed Tudtud.[48] | |||||
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2002-03-06 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| Trial judges may examine some of the witnesses for the defense for the purpose of ferreting out the truth and getting to the bottom of the facts. That they do so would not justify the charge that they assist the prosecution with the evident desire to secure a conviction, or that they intimidate the witnesses.[46] | |||||
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2001-09-27 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| On the contrary, a trial judge may examine some of the witnesses for the defense for the purpose of ferreting out the truth and getting to the bottom of the facts. That he does so would not justify the charge that he assisted the prosecution with the evident desire to secure a conviction, or that he intimidated the witnesses.[21] | |||||
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2001-07-31 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| The right of the accused to cross-examine a witness is, however, not without limits but is subject to the rules on the admissibility and relevance of evidence. Thus, in People v. Zheng Bai Hui,[29] this Court upheld the ruling of the trial judge disallowing the questions propounded by the accused's counsel on the ability of the arresting officer to distinguish between tawas and shabu without a laboratory examination, the academic degree of his training instructor, and the officer's authorship of books on drug identity and analysis for being irrelevant, improper, and impertinent. | |||||
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2001-07-26 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| The defense of frame-up or denial, like alibi, has invariably been viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.[4] For such a defense to prosper, the evidence must be clear and convincing.[5] | |||||
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2001-03-26 |
KAPUNAN, J. |
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| We are not persuaded by the claim of accused-appellants that in order for them to be convicted of selling 2,800 grams of marijuana, the whole specimen must be tested considering that Republic Act 7659 impose a penalty dependent on the amount or the quantity of drugs seized or taken. This court has ruled that a sample taken from one of the packages is logically presumed to be representative of the entire contents of the package unless proven otherwise by accused-appellant.[64] This ruling was reiterated in People vs. Zheng Bai Hui,[65] thus:To recall, appellants sold the NARCOM operatives a substance weighing 992.3 grams. This amount is more than the minimum of 200 grams required by the law to warrant the imposition of either reclusion perpetua or, if there be aggravating, circumstances, the death penalty. Appellants however foist the probability that the substance sold could contain additives or adulterants, and not just methamphetamine hydrochloride. Thus, the actual weight of pure shabu could be less than 992.3 grams, thereby possibly reducing the imposable penalty. | |||||