This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2012-11-21 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| The present case does not fall under the said exceptions. In Amil v. Court of Appeals,[15] the Court held that "to fall within the exceptional circumstance relied upon x x x, it must be shown that the negligence of counsel must be so gross that the client is deprived of his day in court. Thus, []where a party was given the opportunity to defend [its] interests in due course, [it] cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process." To properly claim gross negligence on the part of the counsel, the petitioner must show that the counsel was guilty of nothing short of a clear abandonment of the client's cause.[16] | |||||
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2012-11-12 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| But the rule admits of exceptions. In several rulings, the Court held the client not concluded by the negligence, incompetence or mistake of the counsel. For instance, in Suarez v. Court of Appeals,[28] the Court set aside the judgment and mandated the trial court to reopen the case for the reception of the evidence for the defense after finding that the negligence of the therein petitioner's counsel had deprived her of the right to present and prove her defense. Also, in Legarda v. Court of Appeals,[29] the Court ordered restored to the petitioner her property that had been sold at public auction in satisfaction of a default judgment resulting from the failure of her counsel to file an answer and from counsel's lack of vigilance in protecting her interests in subsequent proceedings before the trial court and the CA. Lastly, in Amil v. Court of Appeals,[30] the Court declared that an exception to the rule that a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel is when the negligence of the counsel is so gross that the client was deprived of his day in court, thereby also depriving the client of his property without due process of law. | |||||
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2008-10-29 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| A client is generally bound by the mistakes of his lawyer, otherwise, there would never be an end to a suit as long as a new counsel could be employed who could allege and show that the prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent or experienced or learned.[38] While it is true that excusable negligence is one of the recognized grounds for a motion for new trial or reconsideration,[39] there can be no excusable negligence when ordinary prudence could have guarded against it.[40] | |||||
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2004-07-21 |
DAVIDE JR., J. |
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| Moreover, the petitioners assert that since technical rules are intended to serve, not to frustrate, the ends of justice, their case calls for bending the rules in their favor. To bolster their claim, they invoke the Court's pronouncements in Amil v. Court of Appeals,[12] which applied the exception to the principle that a client is bound by the gross negligence of his lawyer; thus: In the instant case, petitioner was likewise declared in default because of the failure of his former counsel, Atty. Piñero, to file within the reglementary period an answer to private respondents' petition for consolidation of ownership. Atty. Piñero likewise failed to take any action to protect the interests of petitioner in subsequent proceedings before the trial court, such as by filing an opposition to the motion to declare him in default or by moving to set aside the order of default. It was Atty. Saleto J. Erames, the present counsel of petitioner, who filed the motion for new trial after a judgment by default had been rendered against him. As a consequence of his former counsel's gross negligence, petitioner was deprived of his day in court. | |||||
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2004-07-21 |
DAVIDE JR., J. |
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| Thirdly, petitioner appears to have a meritorious defense. Indeed, it would appear that the contract between petitioner and private respondents is an equitable mortgage rather than a pacto de retro sale.[13] Based on the foregoing, the petitioners argue that their case is similar to Amil because they have a meritorious defense sufficient to justify the relaxation of procedural rules. | |||||