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GR No. 189171

2014-06-03

SERENO, C.J.

The right to a speedy disposition of cases is guaranteed by the Constitution. The concept of speedy disposition is flexible. The fact that it took the CSC six years to resolve the appeal of petitioner does not, by itself, automatically prove that he was denied his right to the speedy disposition of his case. After all, a mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient, as the facts and circumstances peculiar to the case must also be considered.[84]

GR No. 171427

2011-03-30

STERLING SELECTIONS CORPORATION v. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

NACHURA, J.

Thus, this Court has previously held that it necessarily conveys the very idea of non-exclusivity of the enumeration.[54] The principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius does not apply where other circumstances indicate that the enumeration was not intended to be exclusive, or where the enumeration is by way of example only.[55] The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius does not apply when words are mentioned by way of example.[56] Said legal maxim should be applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest.[57]

GR No. 181851

2010-03-09

CAPT. WILFREDO G. ROQUERO v. CHANCELLOR OF UP-MANILA

PEREZ, J.

The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or even without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant is weighed, and such factors as the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.[12]

GR No. 168859

2009-06-30

UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK v. E. GANZON

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

It bears stressing that Section 9(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, on the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, generally refers to quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or commissions. The use of the word "including" in the said provision, prior to the naming of several quasi-judicial agencies, necessarily conveys the very idea of non-exclusivity of the enumeration. The principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius does not apply where other circumstances indicate that the enumeration was not intended to be exclusive, or where the enumeration is by way of example only.[28]

GR NO. 166038

2007-12-04

TRINIDAD v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

CARPIO MORALES, J.

Violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, like attempted murder, is a public offense. Social and public interests demand the punishment of the offender, hence, criminal actions for public offenses can not be waived or condoned, much less barred by the rules of estoppel.[23]

GR Nos. 137355-58

2007-09-25

EUGENIO U. CABALLERO v. SANDIGANBAYAN

GARCIA, J.

The case of Binay v. Sandiganbayan[12] has finally settled the question of whether or not municipal mayors are excluded from the Sandiganbayan's exclusive original jurisdiction. There, the Court held that violations of RA No. 3019 by a municipal mayor come within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because under RA No. 6758, otherwise known as the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, municipal mayors are local officials classified as Grade "27." They thus fall under the catch-all provision of Section 4a(5) of PD 1606 which speaks of "national and local officials classified as Grade `27' under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989." More accurately, municipal mayors fall under Section 4a(1) of PD 1606 as they are "officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade `27' and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989."

GR NO. 142762

2005-03-04

LILANY YULO Y BILLONES v. PEOPLE

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

SEC.16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. Under the foregoing provision, any party to a case has the right to demand on all officials tasked with the administration of justice to expedite its disposition. However, the concept of speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.[5] A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient.[6] In applying the Constitutional guarantee, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances of each case.

GR Nos. 147814-15

2003-09-16

RAUL ZAPATOS Y LEGASPI v. PEOPLE

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

Significantly, while petitioner had already pleaded "not guilty" before the RTC, jeopardy did not attach as it did not acquire jurisdiction. There can be no double jeopardy where the accused entered a plea in court that had no jurisdiction.[67]

GR No. 149453

2003-04-01

PEOPLE v. PANFILO M. LACSON

CALLEJO, SR., J.

Soon thereafter, the SC in early 1999 rendered a decision declaring the Sandiganbayan without jurisdiction over the cases. The records were remanded to the QC RTC: Upon raffle, the case was assigned to Branch 81. Petitioner and the others promptly filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause (Annex B). He asked that warrants for his arrest not be issued. He did not move for the dismissal of the Informations, contrary to respondent OSG's claim.[21] The respondent's admissions made in the course of the proceedings in the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive on him. The respondent is barred from repudiating his admissions absent evidence of palpable mistake in making such admissions.[22]

GR No. 109271

2000-03-14

RICARDO CASTILLO v. SANDIGANBAYAN

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

In the case Binay v. Sandiganbayan and Magsaysay v. Sandiganbayan,[17] this Court has held that:A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be sufficient. In the application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken o the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.

GR Nos. 122297-98

2000-01-19

CRESCENTE Y. LLORENTE v. SANDIGANBAYAN

PARDO, J.

On February 23, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8249, an act redefining the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan.[16]

	GR No. 189171 2014-06-03	EDILBERTO L. BARCELONA v. DAN JOEL LIM SERENO, C.J.
The right to a speedy disposition of cases is guaranteed by the Constitution. The concept of speedy disposition is flexible. The fact that it took the CSC six years to resolve the appeal of petitioner does not, by itself, automatically prove that he was denied his right to the speedy disposition of his case. After all, a mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient, as the facts and circumstances peculiar to the case must also be considered.[84]
	GR No. 171427 2011-03-30	STERLING SELECTIONS CORPORATION v. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY NACHURA, J.
Thus, this Court has previously held that it necessarily conveys the very idea of non-exclusivity of the enumeration.[54] The principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius does not apply where other circumstances indicate that the enumeration was not intended to be exclusive, or where the enumeration is by way of example only.[55] The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius does not apply when words are mentioned by way of example.[56] Said legal maxim should be applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest.[57]
	GR No. 181851 2010-03-09	CAPT. WILFREDO G. ROQUERO v. CHANCELLOR OF UP-MANILA PEREZ, J.
The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or even without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant is weighed, and such factors as the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.[12]
	GR No. 168859 2009-06-30	UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK v. E. GANZON CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
It bears stressing that Section 9(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, on the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, generally refers to quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or commissions. The use of the word "including" in the said provision, prior to the naming of several quasi-judicial agencies, necessarily conveys the very idea of non-exclusivity of the enumeration. The principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius does not apply where other circumstances indicate that the enumeration was not intended to be exclusive, or where the enumeration is by way of example only.[28]
	GR NO. 166038 2007-12-04	TRINIDAD v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN CARPIO MORALES, J.
Violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, like attempted murder, is a public offense. Social and public interests demand the punishment of the offender, hence, criminal actions for public offenses can not be waived or condoned, much less barred by the rules of estoppel.[23]
	GR Nos. 137355-58 2007-09-25	EUGENIO U. CABALLERO v. SANDIGANBAYAN GARCIA, J.
The case of Binay v. Sandiganbayan[12] has finally settled the question of whether or not municipal mayors are excluded from the Sandiganbayan's exclusive original jurisdiction. There, the Court held that violations of RA No. 3019 by a municipal mayor come within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because under RA No. 6758, otherwise known as the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, municipal mayors are local officials classified as Grade "27." They thus fall under the catch-all provision of Section 4a(5) of PD 1606 which speaks of "national and local officials classified as Grade `27' under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989." More accurately, municipal mayors fall under Section 4a(1) of PD 1606 as they are "officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade `27' and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989."
	GR NO. 142762 2005-03-04	LILANY YULO Y BILLONES v. PEOPLE SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
SEC.16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. Under the foregoing provision, any party to a case has the right to demand on all officials tasked with the administration of justice to expedite its disposition. However, the concept of speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.[5] A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient.[6] In applying the Constitutional guarantee, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances of each case.
	GR Nos. 147814-15 2003-09-16	RAUL ZAPATOS Y LEGASPI v. PEOPLE SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
Significantly, while petitioner had already pleaded "not guilty" before the RTC, jeopardy did not attach as it did not acquire jurisdiction. There can be no double jeopardy where the accused entered a plea in court that had no jurisdiction.[67]
	GR No. 149453 2003-04-01	PEOPLE v. PANFILO M. LACSON CALLEJO, SR., J.
Soon thereafter, the SC in early 1999 rendered a decision declaring the Sandiganbayan without jurisdiction over the cases. The records were remanded to the QC RTC: Upon raffle, the case was assigned to Branch 81. Petitioner and the others promptly filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause (Annex B). He asked that warrants for his arrest not be issued. He did not move for the dismissal of the Informations, contrary to respondent OSG's claim.[21] The respondent's admissions made in the course of the proceedings in the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive on him. The respondent is barred from repudiating his admissions absent evidence of palpable mistake in making such admissions.[22]
	GR No. 109271 2000-03-14	RICARDO CASTILLO v. SANDIGANBAYAN YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
In the case Binay v. Sandiganbayan and Magsaysay v. Sandiganbayan,[17] this Court has held that:A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be sufficient. In the application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken o the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
	GR Nos. 122297-98 2000-01-19	CRESCENTE Y. LLORENTE v. SANDIGANBAYAN PARDO, J.
On February 23, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8249, an act redefining the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan.[16]

BINAY v. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION)