This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2011-08-10 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Moreover, considering that CSMC's interest is limited only to the operation of the subject machineries pursuant to its lease contract with SSC, its intervention would not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of SSC and IEB. CSMC's intervention should be treated as one pro interesse suo which is a mode of intervention in equity wherein a stranger desires to intervene for the purpose of asserting a property right in the res, or thing, which is the subject matter of the litigation, without becoming a formal plaintiff or defendant, and without acquiring control over the course of a litigation, which is conceded to the main actors therein.[38] | |||||
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2009-04-02 |
BRION, J. |
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| We find no merit in this argument for two reasons. First, the cited Sandiganbayan resolution is a mere interlocutory order - a ruling denying a motion to quash[23] - that cannot be given the attributes of finality and immutability that are generally accorded to judgments or orders that finally dispose of the whole, of or particular matters in, a case.[24] The Sandiganbayan resolution is a mere interlocutory order because its effects would only be provisional in character, and would still require the issuing court to undertake substantial proceedings in order to put the controversy to rest.[25] It is basic remedial law that an interlocutory order is always under the control of the court and may be modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds shown at any time before final judgment.[26] Perez v. Court of Appeals,[27] albeit a civil case, instructively teaches that an interlocutory order carries no res adjudicata effects. Says Perez:The Decision in CA-G.R. No. 10415 having resolved only an interlocutory matter, the principle of res judicata cannot be applied in this case. There can be no res judicata where the previous order in question was not an order or judgment determinative of an issue of fact pending before the court but was only an interlocutory order because it required the parties to perform certain acts for final adjudication. In this case, the lifting of the restraining order paved the way for the possession of the fishpond on the part of petitioners and/or their representatives pending the resolution of the main action for injunction. In other words, the main issue of whether or not private respondent may be considered a sublessee or a transferee of the lease entitled to possess the fishpond under the circumstances of the case had yet to be resolved when the restraining order was lifted.[28] | |||||
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2008-10-06 |
BRION, J. |
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| Second, they do not have the effect of res adjudicata in the same manner that pre-judgment interlocutory orders do not.[6] They do not involve any final "ruling on the merits" as they only implement the court's judgment strictly according to the terms of that judgment. No "finality" is involved since, subject to the time limits prescribed by the Rules,[7] the matter of execution is always open for as long as the implementation of the judgment remains incomplete. For this reason, there is no provision in the Revised Rules of Court for the entry of judgment of supposedly final interlocutory orders and execution stage orders, and no such orders are accepted by any court for entry under Section 2, Rule 36 of the Revised Rules of Court - the provision on Entry of Judgments and Final Orders - which provides:SEC. 2. Entry of judgments and final orders. - If no appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed within the time provided in these Rules, the judgment or final order shall forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgments. The date of finality of the judgment or final order shall be deemed to be the date of its entry. The record shall contain the dispositive part of the judgment or final order and shall be signed by the clerk, with a certificate that such judgment or final order has become final and executory. (2a, 10, R51). | |||||
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2004-11-24 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| This is not to say though that petitioner is left without any remedy under the law as res judicata does not apply in this case considering that a dismissal on the ground of petitioner's failure to furnish copies of her formal offer of evidence to the city prosecutor and the solicitor general does not constitute an adjudication on the merits. The case was dismissed not on the merits, but on a technicality -- the petitioner's failure to comply with an order of the court.[19] It was not an order or judgment determinative of an issue of fact pending before the Court. It was an interlocutory order, because it required the parties to perform certain acts for final adjudication of awards.[20] A judgment on the merits is one rendered after a determination of which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical point.[21] The decision having resolved only an interlocutory matter, res judicata cannot be applied.[22] | |||||