This case has been cited 4 times or more.
|
2013-02-20 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
||||
| However, we cannot end without a discussion of PPI's contention that it was denied due process when its accreditation was suspended "without due notice and hearing." It is undisputed that during the October 27, 2000 meeting, Undersecretary Galon directed representatives of pharmaceutical companies, PPI included, to submit their comment and/or reactions to the Report on Violative Products furnished them within a period of 10 days. PPI, instead of submitting its comment or explanation, wrote a letter addressed to Undersecretary Galon informing her that the matter had already been referred to its lawyer for the drafting of an appropriate reply. Aside from the fact that the said letter was belatedly submitted, it also failed to specifically mention when such reply would be forthcoming. Finding the foregoing explanation to be unmeritorious, Undersecretary Galon ordered the suspension of PPI's accreditation for two years. Clearly these facts show that PPI was not denied due process. It was given the opportunity to explain its side. Prior to the suspension of its accreditation, PPI had the chance to rebut, explain, or comment on the findings contained in the Report on Violative Products that several of PPI's products are not fit for human consumption. However, PPI squandered its opportunity to explain. Instead of complying with the directive of the DOH Undersecretary within the time allotted, it instead haughtily informed Undersecretary Galon that the matter had been referred to its lawyers. Worse, it impliedly told Undersecretary Galon to just wait until its lawyers shall have prepared the appropriate reply. PPI however failed to mention when it will submit its "appropriate reply" or how long Undersecretary Galon should wait. In the meantime, PPI's drugs which are included in the Report on Violative Products are out and being sold in the market. Based on the foregoing, we find PPI's contention of denial of due process totally unfair and absolutely lacking in basis. At this juncture, it would be trite to mention that "[t]he essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain one's side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met. What is offensive to due process is the denial of the opportunity to be heard. The Court has repeatedly stressed that parties who chose not to avail themselves of the opportunity to answer charges against them cannot complain of a denial of due process."[50] | |||||
|
2012-10-22 |
MENDOZA, J. |
||||
| The record shows that petitioners were accorded a fair trial in the RTC. In fact, they were properly represented by a counsel who was able to confront and cross-examine the witnesses presented by RHAI. They had ample opportunity to substantiate their claim that they were not expelled as members and to present witnesses. Unfortunately, petitioners did not present their own evidence to bolster their defense. Thus, they cannot feign denial of due process where they had been afforded the opportunity to present their side.[17] Petitioners, having chosen not to avail of the opportunity to present evidence to rebut the charges against them, cannot complain of denial of due process. As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met. What is offensive to due process is the denial of this opportunity to be heard.[18] | |||||
|
2012-08-15 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
||||
| We have ruled that dismissal of a criminal action does not foreclose institution of an administrative proceeding against the same respondent, nor carry with it the relief from administrative liability.[30] It is a basic rule in administrative law that public officials are under a three-fold responsibility for a violation of their duty or for a wrongful act or omission, such that they may be held civilly, criminally and administratively liable for the same act. Administrative liability is thus separate and distinct from penal and civil liability.[31] | |||||
|
2012-07-24 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
||||
| Since the case filed before the IAD-ODESLA is an administrative disciplinary case for grave misconduct, petitioner may not invoke the primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to prevent the IAD-ODESLA from proceeding with its investigation. In any event, the Ombudsman's authority to investigate both elective and appointive officials in the government, extensive as it may be, is by no means exclusive. It is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies.[28] | |||||