This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2009-10-02 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Public respondent Ombudsman likewise argues that petitioner has taken the wrong mode of appeal, citing the rule as laid down by this Court in Tirol v. del Rosario, [114] which states: Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 provides that orders, directives and decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases are appealable to the Supreme Court via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, in Fabian v. Desierto, we declared that Section 27 is unconstitutional since it expanded the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, without its advice and consent, in violation of Article VI, Section 30 of the Constitution. Hence, all appeals from decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases may be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. | |||||
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2004-12-09 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Petitioner postulates that the Court of Appeals has concurrent jurisdiction with this Court in original actions for certiorari concerning dispositions made by the Office of the Ombudsman of criminal cases that underwent preliminary investigation. In support thereof, petitioner argues that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), which was made the basis by the Court of Appeals in dismissing his petition, is unconstitutional as it allegedly provides for direct appeal to this Court in contravention of Section 5(2), Article VIII of the Constitution which contains an exclusive list of cases falling under the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Following the ruling in Fabian v. Desierto,[9] petitioner concludes that Section 14 has effectively increased the appellate jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and concurrence in violation of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution. Petitioner then went on to state that the proper recourse from an adverse decision of the Ombudsman in criminal cases is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals pursuant to Tirol, Jr. v. Del Rosario[10] where we declared that a party aggrieved by a resolution of the Ombudsman in criminal cases may avail himself of such remedy. Petitioner contends that as the doctrine of hierarchy of courts precludes the immediate invocation of this Court's power of review, he correctly filed his petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. | |||||
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2004-03-04 |
VITUG, J. |
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| Parenthetically, R.A. 6770 is silent on the remedy of annulment of judgments or final orders and resolutions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. In Tirol, Jr. v. Del Rosario,[9] the Court has held that since The Ombudsman Act specifically deals with the remedy of an aggrieved party from orders, directives and decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases only, the right to appeal is not to be considered granted to parties aggrieved by orders and decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal or non-administrative cases. The right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provisions of law.[10] There must then be a law expressly granting such right.[11] This legal axiom is also applicable and even more true in actions for annulment of judgments which is an exception to the rule on finality of judgments. | |||||
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2003-02-20 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| In ruling that the loans obtained by plaintiff Vida Delfin were not restructured since they had already been settled, the trial court reasoned that "a comparison of rural bank receipt no. 35905 dated 10 January 1983[12] x x x will readily show that while the receipt "Annex L" is clean on its face, receipt "Exh. 5" has stamp across it the word 'RESTRUCTURED.' In the same manner is official receipt No. 35913. Only in the duplicate copy held by the defendant rural bank, 'Exh. 5-7,' does the word 'RESTRUCTURED' appear stamped across but not in the original receipt (Annex 'P,' xerox copy). The notation 'RESTRUCTURED' also appeared in the 'ledgers' submitted to the court.'" | |||||
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2000-08-03 |
DAVIDE JR., C.J. |
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| Desierto[22] for increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in the Constitution without its advice and consent. Moreover, even if said provision had not been declared unconstitutional, it still does not grant a right of appeal to parties aggrieved by orders and decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases[23] as in fact said Section mentions only appeals from "all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman." Even if we were to brush aside technicality which action we would ordinarily reserve for cases having transcendental importance to the public[24] and considered the instant petition one for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, it | |||||
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2000-08-03 |
DAVIDE JR., C.J. |
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| Desierto[22] for increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in the Constitution without its advice and consent. Moreover, even if said provision had not been declared unconstitutional, it still does not grant a right of appeal to parties aggrieved by orders and decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases[23] as in fact said Section mentions only appeals from "all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman." Even if we were to brush aside technicality which action we would ordinarily reserve for cases having transcendental importance to the public[24] and considered the instant petition one for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, it | |||||