This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2012-06-19 |
REYES, J. |
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| However, courts will not hesitate to set aside such executive interpretation when it is clearly erroneous, or when there is no ambiguity in the rule, or when the language or words used are clear and plain or readily understandable to any ordinary reader.[13] This case falls within the exceptions. | |||||
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2008-11-27 |
TINGA, J. |
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| Indeed, when an administrative agency enters into the exercise of the specific power of implementing a statute, it is bound by what is provided for in the same legislative enactment[28] inasmuch as its rule-making power is a delegated legislative power which may not be used either to abridge the authority given by the Congress or the Constitution or to enlarge the power beyond the scope intended.[29] The power may not be validly extended by implication beyond what may be necessary for its just and reasonable execution.[30] In other words, the function of promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of a law, inasmuch as the power is confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect.[31] Therefore, such rules and regulations must not be inconsistent with the provisions of existing laws, particularly the statute being administered and implemented by the agency concerned,[32] that is to say, the statute to which the issuance relates. Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by such a body, as well as with respect to what fields are subject to regulation by it.[33] | |||||
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2008-09-26 |
REYES, R.T., J. |
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| The rule is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that the interpretation given to a rule or regulation by those charged with its execution is entitled to the greatest weight by the courts construing such rule or regulation.[74] While this Court has consistently yielded and accorded great respect to such doctrine, it will not hesitate to set aside an executive interpretation if there is an error of law, abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with the letter and spirit of the law.[75] | |||||
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2006-07-21 |
VELASCO, JR., J. |
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| An amount subtracted from an individual's or entity's tax liability to arrive at the total tax liability. A tax credit reduces the taxpayer's liability x x x, compared to a deduction which reduces taxable income upon which the tax liability is calculated. A credit differs from deduction to the extent that the former is subtracted from the tax while the latter is subtracted from income before the tax is computed.[16] The interpretation of an administrative government agency, which is tasked to implement the statute, is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the courts.[17] Be that as it may, the definition laid down in the questioned Revenue Regulations can still be subjected to scrutiny. Courts will not hesitate to set aside an executive interpretation when it is clearly erroneous. There is no need for interpretation when there is no ambiguity in the rule, or when the language or words used are clear and plain or readily understandable to an ordinary reader.[18] The definition of the term "tax credit" is plain and clear, and the attempt of Revenue Regulations No. 2-94 to define it differently is the root of the conflict. | |||||
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2000-12-01 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| The Court was even more explicit in the case of Melendres, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, et al.[22] where it pointedly said: Stated differently, when an administrative agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law and the administrative interpretation is at best advisory for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means.[23] Thus, an action by an administrative agency may be set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with the letter and spirit of the law.[24] (Emphasis provided). | |||||
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2000-05-05 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| proclamation; (4) the filing of a quo warranto petition or an election protest was expressly made without prejudice to the pre-proclamation controversy or was made ad cautelam; and (5) the proclamation was null and void. Petitioner's argument that the filing of a motion to dismiss in an election contest filed with a regular court is not a prohibited pleading is well taken. As we pointed out in Melendres, Jr. v. COMELEC: [45] | |||||