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GR No. 163767

2014-03-10

REPUBLIC v. ROSARIO DE GUZMAN VDA. DE JOSON

BERSAMIN, J.

Even had the respondent's effort to insert the certification been successful, the same would nonetheless be vain and ineffectual. In Menguito v. Republic,[39] the Court pronounced that a survey conducted by a geodetic engineer that included a certification on the classification of the land as alienable and disposable was not sufficient to overcome the presumption that the land still formed part of the inalienable public domain, to wit: To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, petitioners relied on the printed words which read: "This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968," appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).

GR No. 179987

2013-09-03

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN v. REPUBLIC

BERSAMIN, J.

In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere classification of the land as alienable or disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into patrimonial property of the State. Relying on the rulings in Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos,[7] Menguito v. Republic[8] and Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,[9] they argue that the reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable opened it to acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code; that Malabanan had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco believing in good faith that Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest had been the real owners of the land with the right to validly transmit title and ownership thereof; that consequently, the ten-year period prescribed by Article 1134 of the Civil Code, in relation to Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan filed the application for registration on February 20, 1998, he had already been in possession of the land for almost 16 years reckoned from 1982, the time when the land was declared alienable and disposable by the State.

GR No. 160453

2012-11-12

REPUBLIC v. ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS III

BERSAMIN, J.

In Menguito v. Republic,[35] which we reiterated in Republic v. Sarmiento,[36] we specifically resolved the issue of whether the notation on the survey plan was sufficient evidence to establish the alienability and disposability of public land, to wit: To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, petitioners relied on the printed words which read: "This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968," appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).

GR No. 179978

2011-08-31

DCD CONSTRUCTION v. REPUBLIC

VILLARAMA, JR., J.

As to notations appearing in the subdivision plan of the lot stating that it is within the alienable and disposable area, the consistent holding is that these do not constitute proof required by the law.[24] In Menguito v. Republic,[25] the Court declared: x x x petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineer's notation x x x indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive government act validly changing the classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyor's assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared alienable.[26]

GR No. 185683

2011-03-16

UNION LEAF TOBACCO CORPORATION v. REPUBLIC

CARPIO MORALES, J.

The Advance Plans and Consolidated Plans are hardly the competent pieces of evidence that the law requires. The notation by a geodetic engineer on the survey plans that properties are alienable and disposable does not suffice to prove these lands' classification.[14]

GR No. 176885

2010-07-05

REPUBLIC v. DOMINGO ESPINOSA

VILLARAMA, JR., J.

It is doctrinal that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumptively belong to the State. Public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain.[10] Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain.[11] The onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable or disposable rests with the applicant.[12]

GR No. 177797

2008-12-04

SPS. PEDRO TAN AND NENA ACERO TAN v. REPUBLIC

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

The Court notes that Presidential Decree No. 1073, amending the Public Land Act, clarified Section 48, paragraph "b" thereof, by specifically declaring that it applied only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Thus, based on the said provision of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, the two requisites which the applicants must comply with for the grant of their Application for Registration of Title are: (1) the land applied for is alienable and disposable; and (2) the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest have occupied and possessed the land openly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely since 12 June 1945.[42]

GR No. 154953

2008-06-26

REPUBLIC V.S. T.A.N. PROPERTIES, INC.

CARPIO, J.

We agree with petitioner that while the certifications submitted by respondent show that under the Land Classification Map No. 582, the land became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1925, the blue print plan states that it became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1985. Respondent alleged that "the blue print plan merely serves to prove the precise location and the metes and bounds of the land described therein x x x and does not in any way certify the nature and classification of the land involved."[30] It is true that the notation by a surveyor-geodetic engineer on the survey plan that the land formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain is not sufficient proof of the land's classification.[31] However, respondent should have at least presented proof that would explain the discrepancy in the dates of classification. Marquez, LRA Records Officer II, testified that the documents submitted to the court consisting of the tracing cloth plan, the technical description of Lot 10705-B, the approved subdivision plan, and the Geodetic Engineer's certification were faithful reproductions of the original documents in the LRA office. He did not explain the discrepancy in the dates. Neither was the Geodetic Engineer presented to explain why the date of classification on the blue print plan was different from the other certifications submitted by respondent.

GR NO. 170015

2007-08-29

CRISOLOGO C. DOMINGO v. SEVERINO

CARPIO MORALES, J.

In fine, Domingo failed to adduce incontrovertible evidence[34] showing that the lots have been declared alienable. They are thus presumed to belong to the public domain, beyond the commerce of man, and are not susceptible of private appropriation and acquisitive prescription.

GR NO. 157466

2007-06-21

REPUBLIC v. CHERYL B. BIBONIA

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

In the present case, applicants-appellees' predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive possession of the disputed land as early as 1955 (Commissioner's Report, p. 2; Record, p. 123), thus, they only stepped into the shoes of their predecessors-in-interest and by virtue thereof, acquired all the legal rights necessary to confirm what would otherwise be deemed as an imperfect title.[9] Although respondents' possession and that of their predecessors-in-interest was more than 39 years when they filed their application for registration in 1994, that period of possession will not suffice for purposes of registration of title. What is required is open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession by respondents and their predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier.[10] Much as we want to conform to the State's policy of encouraging and promoting the distribution of alienable public lands to spur economic growth and remain true to the ideal of social justice, our hands are tied by the law's stringent safeguards against registering imperfect titles.[11]

GR No. 155138

2004-06-08

REPUBLIC v. SPS. TEODORO AND DELIA KALAW

DAVIDE JR., CJ.

While it is an acknowledged policy of the State to promote the distribution of alienable public lands as a spur to economic growth and in line with the ideal of social justice, the law imposes stringent safeguards upon the grant of such resources lest they fall into the wrong hands to the prejudice of the national patrimony.[45] We must not, therefore, relax the stringent safeguards relative to the registration of imperfect titles.[46]

GR No. 150413

2003-07-01

REPUBLIC v. ALEXANDRA LAO

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

Petitioner further submits that respondent failed to show that the land subject of her application is classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Under the Regalian doctrine which is embodied in our Constitution,[14] all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land.[15] All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.[16] Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain.[17] To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.[18]

GR No. 129401

2001-02-02

FELIPE SEVILLE v. NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY

PANGANIBAN, J.

Under the Regalian doctrine, all the lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.[8] In Menguito v. Republic,[9] the court held that "[u]nless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, `occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.' To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable."

	GR No. 163767 2014-03-10	REPUBLIC v. ROSARIO DE GUZMAN VDA. DE JOSON BERSAMIN, J.
Even had the respondent's effort to insert the certification been successful, the same would nonetheless be vain and ineffectual. In Menguito v. Republic,[39] the Court pronounced that a survey conducted by a geodetic engineer that included a certification on the classification of the land as alienable and disposable was not sufficient to overcome the presumption that the land still formed part of the inalienable public domain, to wit: To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, petitioners relied on the printed words which read: "This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968," appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).
	GR No. 179987 2013-09-03	HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN v. REPUBLIC BERSAMIN, J.
In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere classification of the land as alienable or disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into patrimonial property of the State. Relying on the rulings in Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos,[7] Menguito v. Republic[8] and Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,[9] they argue that the reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable opened it to acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code; that Malabanan had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco believing in good faith that Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest had been the real owners of the land with the right to validly transmit title and ownership thereof; that consequently, the ten-year period prescribed by Article 1134 of the Civil Code, in relation to Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan filed the application for registration on February 20, 1998, he had already been in possession of the land for almost 16 years reckoned from 1982, the time when the land was declared alienable and disposable by the State.
	GR No. 160453 2012-11-12	REPUBLIC v. ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS III BERSAMIN, J.
In Menguito v. Republic,[35] which we reiterated in Republic v. Sarmiento,[36] we specifically resolved the issue of whether the notation on the survey plan was sufficient evidence to establish the alienability and disposability of public land, to wit: To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, petitioners relied on the printed words which read: "This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968," appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).
	GR No. 179978 2011-08-31	DCD CONSTRUCTION v. REPUBLIC VILLARAMA, JR., J.
As to notations appearing in the subdivision plan of the lot stating that it is within the alienable and disposable area, the consistent holding is that these do not constitute proof required by the law.[24] In Menguito v. Republic,[25] the Court declared: x x x petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineer's notation x x x indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive government act validly changing the classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyor's assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared alienable.[26]
	GR No. 185683 2011-03-16	UNION LEAF TOBACCO CORPORATION v. REPUBLIC CARPIO MORALES, J.
The Advance Plans and Consolidated Plans are hardly the competent pieces of evidence that the law requires. The notation by a geodetic engineer on the survey plans that properties are alienable and disposable does not suffice to prove these lands' classification.[14]
	GR No. 176885 2010-07-05	REPUBLIC v. DOMINGO ESPINOSA VILLARAMA, JR., J.
It is doctrinal that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumptively belong to the State. Public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain.[10] Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain.[11] The onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable or disposable rests with the applicant.[12]
	GR No. 177797 2008-12-04	SPS. PEDRO TAN AND NENA ACERO TAN v. REPUBLIC CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
The Court notes that Presidential Decree No. 1073, amending the Public Land Act, clarified Section 48, paragraph "b" thereof, by specifically declaring that it applied only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Thus, based on the said provision of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, the two requisites which the applicants must comply with for the grant of their Application for Registration of Title are: (1) the land applied for is alienable and disposable; and (2) the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest have occupied and possessed the land openly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely since 12 June 1945.[42]
	GR No. 154953 2008-06-26	REPUBLIC V.S. T.A.N. PROPERTIES, INC. CARPIO, J.
We agree with petitioner that while the certifications submitted by respondent show that under the Land Classification Map No. 582, the land became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1925, the blue print plan states that it became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1985. Respondent alleged that "the blue print plan merely serves to prove the precise location and the metes and bounds of the land described therein x x x and does not in any way certify the nature and classification of the land involved."[30] It is true that the notation by a surveyor-geodetic engineer on the survey plan that the land formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain is not sufficient proof of the land's classification.[31] However, respondent should have at least presented proof that would explain the discrepancy in the dates of classification. Marquez, LRA Records Officer II, testified that the documents submitted to the court consisting of the tracing cloth plan, the technical description of Lot 10705-B, the approved subdivision plan, and the Geodetic Engineer's certification were faithful reproductions of the original documents in the LRA office. He did not explain the discrepancy in the dates. Neither was the Geodetic Engineer presented to explain why the date of classification on the blue print plan was different from the other certifications submitted by respondent.
	GR NO. 170015 2007-08-29	CRISOLOGO C. DOMINGO v. SEVERINO CARPIO MORALES, J.
In fine, Domingo failed to adduce incontrovertible evidence[34] showing that the lots have been declared alienable. They are thus presumed to belong to the public domain, beyond the commerce of man, and are not susceptible of private appropriation and acquisitive prescription.
	GR NO. 157466 2007-06-21	REPUBLIC v. CHERYL B. BIBONIA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
In the present case, applicants-appellees' predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive possession of the disputed land as early as 1955 (Commissioner's Report, p. 2; Record, p. 123), thus, they only stepped into the shoes of their predecessors-in-interest and by virtue thereof, acquired all the legal rights necessary to confirm what would otherwise be deemed as an imperfect title.[9] Although respondents' possession and that of their predecessors-in-interest was more than 39 years when they filed their application for registration in 1994, that period of possession will not suffice for purposes of registration of title. What is required is open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession by respondents and their predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier.[10] Much as we want to conform to the State's policy of encouraging and promoting the distribution of alienable public lands to spur economic growth and remain true to the ideal of social justice, our hands are tied by the law's stringent safeguards against registering imperfect titles.[11]
	GR No. 155138 2004-06-08	REPUBLIC v. SPS. TEODORO AND DELIA KALAW DAVIDE JR., CJ.
While it is an acknowledged policy of the State to promote the distribution of alienable public lands as a spur to economic growth and in line with the ideal of social justice, the law imposes stringent safeguards upon the grant of such resources lest they fall into the wrong hands to the prejudice of the national patrimony.[45] We must not, therefore, relax the stringent safeguards relative to the registration of imperfect titles.[46]
	GR No. 150413 2003-07-01	REPUBLIC v. ALEXANDRA LAO YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Petitioner further submits that respondent failed to show that the land subject of her application is classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Under the Regalian doctrine which is embodied in our Constitution,[14] all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land.[15] All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.[16] Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain.[17] To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.[18]
	GR No. 129401 2001-02-02	FELIPE SEVILLE v. NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY PANGANIBAN, J.
Under the Regalian doctrine, all the lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.[8] In Menguito v. Republic,[9] the court held that "[u]nless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, `occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.' To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable."

SUSANA MENGUITO v. REPUBLIC