This case has been cited 15 times or more.
2016-01-18 |
PERALTA, J. |
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Murder is defined under Article 248[10] of the Revised Penal Code as the unlawful killing of a person, which is not parricide or infanticide, attended by circumstances such as treachery or evident premeditation.[11] The essence of treachery is the sudden attack by the aggressor without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor.[12] Two conditions must concur for treachery to exist, namely, (a) the employment of means of execution gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means or method of execution was deliberately and consciously adopted.[13] In People v. Biglete,[14] the Court ruled:x x x Indeed, the victim had no inkling of any harm that would befall him that fateful night of August 27, 2001. He was merely plying his regular [jeepney] route. He was unarmed. The attack was swift and unexpected. The victim's arms were on the steering wheel; his focus and attention on the traffic before him. All these showed that the victim was not forewarned of any danger; he also had no opportunity to offer any resistance or to defend himself from any attack.[15] | |||||
2015-12-09 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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To begin with, "acting under an impulse of uncontrollable fear" is not among the mitigating circumstances enumerated in Article 13 of the RPC, but is an exempting circumstance provided under Article 12 (6) of the same Code. Moreover, for such a circumstance to be appreciated in favor of an accused, the following elements must concur: (a) the existence of an uncontrollable fear; (b) that the fear must be real and imminent; and (c) the fear of an injury is greater than, or at least equal to, that committed.[29] For such defense to prosper, the duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough.[30] | |||||
2014-10-13 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be established by inference.[55] It consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience.[56] Here, the circumstantial evidence consists of the testimonies of Servando and Serapion. Servando was present when Mayor Carlos, Sr. ordered his men to kill Floro. Whether this order was executed can be answered by relating it to Antipolo's eyewitness account as well as Serapion's testimony. | |||||
2014-07-30 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning a felony and decide to commit it.[7] Well-settled is the rule that in conspiracy, direct proof of a previous agreement is not necessary as it may be deduced from the mode, method, and manner by which the offense was perpetrated.[8] It may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during, or after the commission of the crime which, when taken together, would be enough to reveal a community of criminal design, as the proof of conspiracy is frequently made by evidence of a chain of circumstances.[9] | |||||
2013-07-03 |
PEREZ, J. |
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In People v. Anticamara,[49] this Court laid down the standards in the proper award of damages in criminal cases, as follows: x x x the award of civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. In People v. Quiachon, [the Court held that] even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed because of the prohibition in R.A. 9346, the civil indemnity of P75,000.00 is proper, because it is not dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the offense. As explained in People v. Salome, while R.A. No. 9346 prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the fact remains that the penalty provided for by law for a heinous offense is still death, and the offense is still heinous. Accordingly, the award of civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 is proper. | |||||
2013-07-03 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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We increase the award for mandatory civil indemnity to P75,000.00 to conform to recent jurisprudence.[41] | |||||
2013-06-03 |
REYES, J. |
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Bernardo asserts alibi and denial as defenses. He argues that he was in jail when the crime was committed. Such alibi, while corroborated by the testimonies of some of Batac District Jail guards, cannot prevail over the positive identification made by Reah pinpointing Bernardo as one of the malefactors who shot Efren to death. The identification of Bernardo as an assailant was positively and credibly established by the prosecution in this case. It has been settled that affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony especially when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness.[17] Absent clear and convincing evidence, alibi and denial are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.[18] | |||||
2013-02-20 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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In addition, for his alibi to prosper, Jaymart must prove that not only was he somewhere else when Emmanuel was killed, but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime. "Physical impossibility" refers to the distance between the place where the appellant was when the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places. Where there is the least chance for the accused to be present at the crime scene, the defense of alibi must fail.[20] Although Jaymart claimed that he was in Divisoria from 7:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m. on October 10, 2005, Jaymart himself admitted that it would only take a five-minute tricycle ride to get from Divisoria to Parola, where Emmanuel was shot.[21] | |||||
2013-01-16 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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We, however, increase the award of exemplary damages to P30,000.00[33] and the award for mandatory civil indemnity to P75,000.00[34] to conform to recent jurisprudence. | |||||
2012-11-12 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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The heirs of the victim was able to prove before the trial court, actual damages in the amount of P38,300.00. Civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 is mandatory and is granted without need of evidence other than the commission of the crime.[30] Moral damages in the sum of P50,000.00 should be awarded despite the absence of proof of mental and emotional suffering of the victim's heirs.[31] As borne out by human nature and experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim's family.[32] | |||||
2012-10-10 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning a felony and decide to commit it. It may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during or after the commission of the crime which, when taken together, would be enough to reveal a community of criminal design, as the proof of conspiracy is frequently made by evidence of a chain of circumstances. To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. Each conspirator may be assigned separate and different tasks which may appear unrelated to one another but, in fact, constitute a whole collective effort to achieve their common criminal objective. Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators. The precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.[35] | |||||
2012-03-20 |
PERALTA, J. |
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The awards for damages also need to be modified. In People v. Alberto Anticamara y Cabillo, et al.,[36] the Court held that in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence on heinous crimes where the imposable penalty is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to R.A. No. 9346, the award of moral damages should be increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00, while the award for exemplary damages, in view of the presence of aggravating circumstances, should be P30,000.00. | |||||
2012-01-18 |
PEREZ, J. |
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None of the requisites, however, is present in this case. First, the testimony of Mylene Ruiz that appellant and Dollendo looked for her husband Ruiz on 10 February 2011 and that they told her that they have a problem to settle, is insufficient to conclude that the assailants have then decided to commit the crime. Second, evidence is wanting to show when the offenders actually resolved to kill the victim. Even assuming that they clung to their determination to commit the crime after it was ascertained that Ruiz was in the house of Romines, the lapse of two (2) minutes or so from the time appellant checked on the whereabouts of Ruiz to the time Ruiz was attacked is not sufficient to afford them time to reflect on the consequences of their actions,[43] the essence of premeditation being "that the execution of the act was preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment."[44] | |||||
2011-10-04 |
PER CURIAM |
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Third. The unsubstantiated denial of respondents, therefore, falters in light of the direct and positive statements of respondent Delgado. The basic principle in Evidence is that denials, unless supported by clear and convincing evidence, cannot prevail over the affirmative testimony of truthful witnesses.[67] | |||||
2011-10-03 |
PERALTA, J. |
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In this case, appellant dragged Jomarie, a minor, to his house after the latter refused to go with him. Upon reaching the house, he tied her hands. When Jomarie pleaded that she be allowed to go home, he refused. Although Jomarie only stayed outside the house, it was inside the gate of a fenced property which is high enough such that people outside could not see what happens inside. Moreover, when appellant tied the hands of Jomarie, the former's intention to deprive Jomarie of her liberty has been clearly shown. For there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is restrained from going home.[40] Because of her tender age, and because she did not know her way back home, she was then and there deprived of her liberty.[41] This is irrespective of the length of time that she stayed in such a situation. It has been repeatedly held that if the victim is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial.[42] This notwithstanding the fact also that appellant, after more or less one hour, released Jomarie and instructed her on how she could go home. |