This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2003-03-18 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| Assuming that Hubines had a gun and pulled it, however, records show that he did not manifest any aggressive act which may have imperiled the life and limb of herein appellant. It is axiomatic that the mere thrusting of one's hand into his pocket as if for the purpose of drawing a weapon is not unlawful aggression.[9] Even the cocking of a rifle without aiming the firearm at any particular target is not sufficient to conclude that one's life was in imminent danger.[10] Hence, a threat, even if made with a weapon, or the belief that a person was about to be attacked, is not sufficient. It is necessary that the intent be ostensibly revealed by an act of aggression or by some external acts showing the commencement of actual and material unlawful aggression.[11] | |||||
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2000-10-04 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| The prosecution failed to adduce sufficient evidence to completely establish the existence of conspiracy among the three accused. The acts of Illescas vis-à-vis those of his co-accused failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the presence of conspiracy. It bears stressing that conspiracy must be proved as convincingly and indubitably as the crime itself.[15] Nonetheless, the failure of the prosecution to prove the existence of conspiracy does not eliminate any criminal liability on the part of Illescas. Although he could not be convicted as a co-principal by reason of the conspiracy he could still be held liable as an accomplice, thus:We have previously held that the liability of one whose participation in a crime was limited to driving for the killers x x x is only that of an accomplice. The rationale for these rulings is that where the quantum of proof required to establish conspiracy is lacking, the doubt created as to whether accused acted as principal or accomplice will always be resolved in favor of the milder form of criminal liability, that of a mere accomplice. | |||||
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2000-02-15 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Unquestionably, and appellants do not allege otherwise, conspiracy attended the killing of the victim. Conspiracy to exist does not require an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence.[23] From the legal standpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution.[24] In this case, the presence of appellants, both armed with deadly weapons, at the locus criminis indubitably shows their complicity in the criminal design of Reynaldo Danao to kill the victim. | |||||