This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2012-03-07 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| In Caramol v. National Labor Relations Commission,[15] and later reiterated in Salinas, Jr. v. National Labor Relations Commission,[16] the Court markedly stressed the importance of the employees' knowing consent to being engaged as project employees when it clarified that "there is no question that stipulation on employment contract providing for a fixed period of employment such as "project-to-project" contract is valid provided the period was agreed upon knowingly and voluntarily by the parties, without any force, duress or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent x x x." | |||||
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2008-06-26 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| In this case, petitioners did not have that kind of agreement with respondents. Neither did they inform respondents of the nature of the latters' work at the time of hiring. Hence, for failure of petitioners to substantiate their claim that respondents were project employees, we are constrained to declare them as regular employees. In Caramol v. National Labor Relations Commission, [28] and later reiterated in Salinas, Jr. v. National Labor Relations Commission,[29] the Court markedly stressed the importance of the employees' knowing consent to being engaged as project employees when it clarified that "there is no question that stipulation on employment contract providing for a fixed period of employment such as `project-to-project' contract is valid provided the period was agreed upon knowingly and voluntarily by the parties, without any force, duress or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent x x x." | |||||
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2007-06-19 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Secondly, it is a basic and irrefragable rule that in carrying out and in interpreting the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing regulations, the workingman's welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration. The interpretation herein made gives meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law enunciated in Article 4 of the Labor Code that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor."[33] | |||||
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2006-02-20 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| As the records bear out, private respondent himself seasonably realized his oversight and in no time recorded the 7:25 a.m. call after the 7:30 a.m. call. Gross negligence under Article 282 of the Labor Code, [29] as amended, connotes want of care in the performance of one's duties, while habitual neglect implies repeated failure to perform one's duties for a period of time, depending upon the circumstances.[30] Here, it is not disputed that private respondent corrected straight away the recording of the call and petitioners failed to prove the damage or injury that such inadvertence caused the company. We find, as the Labor Arbiter[31] had found, that there is no sufficient evidence on record to prove private respondent's negligence, gross or simple for that matter, in the performance of his duties to warrant a reduction of six months salary from private respondent's separation pay. Moreover, respondent missed to properly record, not two or three calls, but just a single call. It was also a first infraction on the part of private respondent, not to mention that the gaffe, if at all, proved to be innocuous. Thus, we find such slip to be within tolerable range. After all, is it not a rule[32] that in carrying out and interpreting the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing regulations, the workingman's welfare should be primordial? | |||||