This case has been cited 4 times or more.
|
2005-10-20 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
||||
| We do not doubt Joseph�s identification of Joey Guiyab. Even if he did not know the name of the petitioner prior to the incident, he was able to identify him in open court. Besides, Joseph maintained that although he did not know the name of the petitioner, he knew him by his face.[9] There is nothing in law or jurisprudence which requires, as a condition sine qua non, that, for a positive identification of a felon by a prosecution witness to be good, the witness must first know the former personally.[10] The witness need not have to know the name of the accused for so long as he recognizes his face.[11] We ruled that �knowing the identity of an accused is different from knowing his name. Hence, the positive identification of the malefactor should not be disregarded just because his name was supplied to the eyewitness. The weight of the eyewitness account is premised on the fact that the said witness saw the accused commit the crime, and not because he knew his name.�[12] | |||||
|
2000-06-08 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
||||
| Appellant Mittu argues that the failure of the prosecution to identify the ransom money in court is tantamount to the prosecution's failure to prove the corpus delicti of the crime. We find this assigned error not only without factual basis but also legally infirm. The records show that the one hundred peso (P100) bills amounting to P27,000.00 were offered in evidence, and over the objections the defense, admitted by the court.[24] More importantly, the corpus delicti in the crime of kidnapping for ransom does not pertain to the ransom money itself. Corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime which may be proved by the testimony of the witnesses who saw it.[25] The fact of kidnapping has been duly proved by the categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses who pointed to appellants as the perpetrators. | |||||
|
2000-03-09 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
||||
| However, the presence of abuse of superior strength qualifies the crime to murder. Armando and Eduardo Gaviola were both armed when they attacked the defenseless victim. The victim was older than his assailants. Plainly, there was great disparity between the relative strengths of the protagonists. The assailants deliberately took advantage of their superior strength in attacking the victim. Accused-appellant first hacked Antonio Fernandez while Eduardo stood guard. When Antonio had already fallen to the ground, Eduardo Gaviola took his turn in stabbing Antonio on different parts of his body. The assailants used excessive force out of proportion to the means available to Antonio.[9] | |||||
|
2000-01-31 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
||||
| To overcome this positive identification by the two (2) witnesses, the defense offered the alibi that they were drinking at Josefa San Juan's store when the incident happened. Alibi as a defense is inherently weak, more so when the defense fails to satisfy its requirements, namely: (a) that the accused were not at the scene of the crime; and, (b) that it was physically impossible for them to have been there when the crime was committed.[46] Accused-appellants themselves admitted that they were only around forty (40) meters away when the crime occurred thus failing to satisfy the requisites of a solid alibi. | |||||