This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2014-01-15 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| Anent Land Bank's contention that the determination of whether the CA erred in retroactively applying the 2008 MORB poses a legal question, the same deserves scant consideration. True, the CA included in its ratio decidendi a discussion on the 2008 MORB to give emphasis to the duties of banks to keep an accurate record and regularly apprise their clients of the status of their accounts. But the issue of whether Land Bank failed to comply with those duties can be resolved even without the MORB as the same duties are also imposed on Land Bank by the IMAs, the contract that primarily governs the parties in this case. "As a general rule, a contract is the law between the parties. Thus, 'from the moment the contract is perfected, the parties are bound not only to the fulfilment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law.' Also, 'the stipulations of the contract being the law between the parties, courts have no alternative but to enforce them as they were agreed [upon] and written' x x x."[65] | |||||
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2009-09-18 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| The Court emphasizes that these are preliminary findings for the sole purpose of resolving the propriety of the subject order requiring the deposit of the monthly rentals with the trial court. The precise extent of the interest of the parties in the subject land will have to await the final determination by the trial court of the main action for partition after a trial on the merits. While ordinarily this Court does not interfere with the sound discretion of the trial court to determine the propriety and extent of the provisional relief necessitated by a given case, the afore-discussed special and compelling circumstances warrant a correction of the trial court's exercise of discretion based on the grave abuse of discretion standard. It is well to remember that the question often asked of this Court, that is, whether it is a court of law or a court of justice, has always been answered in that it is both a court of law and a court of justice.[25] When the circumstances warrant, this Court shall not hesitate to modify the order issued by a trial court to ensure that it conforms to justice. The result reached here is but an affirmation of this long held and cherished principle. | |||||
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2006-04-19 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| Ang mga nasasaad sa KASUNDUAN ito ay buong galang at puso kong sinasang-ayunan at buong sikap na pangangalagaan ng TAUHAN NG IKALAWANG PANIG ang nasabing sasakyan at gagamitin lamang ito sa paghahanapbuhay at wala nang iba pa.[51] The parties expressly agreed that petitioner, as vendor, and respondent, as vendee, entered into a contract to sell the jeepney on a daily installment basis of P550.00 payable in four years and that petitioner would thereafter become its owner. A contract is one of conditional sale, oftentimes referred to as contract to sell, if the ownership or title over the property sold is retained by the vendor, and is not passed to the vendee unless and until there is full payment of the purchase price and/or upon faithful compliance with the other terms and conditions that may lawfully be stipulated.[52] Such payment or satisfaction of other preconditions, as the case may be, is a positive suspensive condition, the failure of which is not a breach of contract, casual or serious, but simply an event that would prevent the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding force.[53] Stated differently, the efficacy or obligatory force of the vendor's obligation to transfer title is subordinated to the happening of a future and uncertain event so that if the suspensive condition does not take place, the parties would stand as if the conditional obligation had never existed.[54] The vendor may extrajudicially terminate the operation of the contract, refuse conveyance, and retain the sums or installments already received, where such rights are expressly provided for.[55] | |||||
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2005-05-06 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| For sure, these stipulations are valid and are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Neither is there anything objectionable about the inclusion in the Contract of mandatory provisions concerning the rights and obligations of the parties.[11] Being the primary law between the parties, it governs the adjudication of their rights and obligations. A court has no alternative but to enforce the contractual stipulations in the manner they have been agreed upon and written.[12] It is well to recall that courts, be they trial or appellate, have no power to make or modify contracts.[13] Neither can they save parties from disadvantageous provisions. | |||||
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2003-12-11 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| In the present case, the failure of respondents to pay the balance of the purchase price within ten years from the execution of the Deed did not amount to a substantial breach. In the Kasulatan, it was stipulated that payment could be made even after ten years from the execution of the Contract, provided the vendee paid 12 percent interest. The stipulations of the contract constitute the law between the parties; thus, courts have no alternative but to enforce them as agreed upon and written.[13] | |||||
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2001-09-05 |
PARDO, J. |
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| True, in contracts of sale, the vendor need not possess title to the thing sold at the perfection of the contract.[36] However, the vendor must possess title and must be able to transfer title at the time of delivery. In a contract of sale, title only passes to the vendee upon full payment of the stipulated consideration, or upon delivery of the thing sold.[37] | |||||
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2001-05-18 |
DE LEON, JR., J. |
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| We disagree. An examination of said Memorandum of Agreement shows that it is neither a contract of sale nor an option to purchase, but it is a contract to sell. An option is a contract granting a privilege to buy or sell at a determined price within an agreed time,[46] the specific length or duration of which is not present in the Memorandum of Agreement. In a contract to sell, the title over the subject property is transferred to the vendee only upon the full payment of the stipulated consideration.[47] Unlike in a contract of sale, the title in a contract to sell does not pass to the vendee upon the execution of the agreement or the Delivery of the thing sold.[48] The Memorandum of Agreement reads in part: | |||||