This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2009-03-13 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| In light of the positive identification of appellant by the prosecution witnesses and since no ill motive on their part or on that of their families was shown that could have made either of them institute the case against the appellant and falsely implicate him in a serious crime he did not commit, appellant's defense of alibi must necessarily fail. It is settled in this jurisdiction that the defense of alibi, being inherently weak, cannot prevail over the clear and positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime.[45] Moreover, in order to justify an acquittal based on this defense, the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence that (a) he was in another place at the time of the commission of the offense; and (b) it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed.[46] These, appellant miserably failed to show. | |||||
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2001-10-26 |
PER CURIAM |
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| In the light of this positive and direct evidence of appellant's culpability, the trial court correctly discarded his defense of denial and alibi. It is an elementary rule that alibi cannot prevail over the clear and positive identification of the appellant as the very person who committed the crime. Moreover, in order to justify an acquittal based on this defense, the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence that (a) he was in another place at the time of the commission of the offense; and, (b) it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed.[41] This, appellant miserably failed to do. It was not physically impossible for appellant to have been at the crime scene in Project 7, Quezon City, considering that he claimed to have been a mere tricycle ride away in his house in San Jose del Monte, Quezon City around the time of the commission of the crime. | |||||
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2001-10-26 |
PER CURIAM |
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| The matter of assigning values to the declarations of witnesses is best and most competently performed by the trial court who had the unmatched opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while testifying, and to assess their credibility using various indicia available but not reflected in the records. Hence, the court a quo's appraisal on the matter is entitled to the highest respect, and will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would affect the result of the case. There is no compelling reason in the present case to depart from this rule.[43] | |||||
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2001-10-26 |
PER CURIAM |
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| The trial court also ordered appellant to pay the victim P200,000.00 as moral damages. Ordinarily, the victims of rape are awarded a minimum of P50,000.00 as moral damages. However, the factual circumstances of the case at bar calls for a stiffer penalty. After robbing and raping the victim, appellant subjected the victim to physical harm like biting her nipples and vagina; banging her head on the hood of the taxi and on the wall; and subjecting her to indignities like holding and massaging his penis and worst of all, forcing her to put his foul-smelling penis into her mouth. The trial court was correct in ordering the appellant to pay his victim the amount P200,000.00 as moral damages for all of these repulsive acts and P9,500.00 as actual damages for the money and valuables taken from her. We also hold that the victim is entitled to P50,000.00 for civil indemnity, as it is mandatory upon a conviction of rape. Such indemnity is distinct from moral damages and based on different jural foundations.[53] Furthermore, under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code, exemplary damages may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.[54] Hence, We find an award of exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 proper. | |||||
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2001-09-28 |
PARDO, J. |
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| In her testimony, Francisca Magdangal said that she saw the face of accused-appellant when she instructed him where to find her jewelry in the cabinet. Avelina Andrade also saw accused-appellant's face because of the light in the laundry area near her room and the light from the dresser of her mistress, Francisca. Thus, the two witnesses were able to see the facial features of accused-appellant enabling them to identify him later on. Indeed, the natural reaction of victims of a crime is to try to look at the features of their assailants. "Victims of criminal violence naturally strive to know the identity of their assailants and observe the manner the crime was perpetrated, creating a lasting impression which may not be erased easily in their memory."[23] Moreover, there was no showing that the prosecution witnesses were actuated by improper motive to impute a false charge against accused-appellant. Therefore, we believe that the victims' identification of the accused-appellant as their assailant deserves full faith and credit. | |||||
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2001-07-20 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| We find the appeal to be meritorious. We begin with the basic presupposition of our constitutional system that the burden of proving that an accused is guilty of the offense charged lies upon the prosecution. That burden must be discharged and the prosecution must rely on its own evidence, whatever may be the reputation of the accused. For the law presumes the accused innocent unless shown otherwise by proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence is not sufficient to support a conviction.[12] | |||||
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2001-07-17 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Furthermore, the inconsistencies adverted to between PO3 Salas' sworn statement and his testimony are mere trifles which do not detract from the straightforward manner in which he narrated the manner in which he arrested accused-appellant. Restating what had been said earlier "[T]rivial inconsistencies do not shake the pedestal upon which the complainant's credibility rests. On the contrary, they are taken as badges of truth rather than as indicia of falsehood for they manifest spontaneity and erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony."[27] | |||||