This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2009-12-01 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| We also do not find convincing the arguments that after-hours campaigning will drain the energy of the public employee to the extent that he is incapable of performing his job effectively and that inevitable on-the-job campaigning and discussion of his candidacy will disrupt the work of others. Although it is indisputable that the city has a compelling interest in the performance of official work, the exclusion is not well-tailored to effectuate that interest. Presumably the city could fire the individual if he clearly shirks his employment responsibilities or disrupts the work of others. Also, the efficiency rationale common to both arguments is significantly underinclusive. It applies equally well to a number of non-political, extracurricular activities that are not prohibited by the Cranston charter. Finally, the connection between after-hours campaigning and the state interest seems tenuous; in many cases a public employee would be able to campaign aggressively and still continue to do his job well.[38] | |||||
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2008-11-27 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The writ of prohibition, as the name imports, is one which commands the person to whom it is directed not to do something which, by suggestion of the relator, the court is informed he is about to do. If the thing be already done, it is manifest the writ of prohibition cannot undo it, for that would require an affirmative act; and the only effect of a writ of prohibition is to suspend all action and to prevent any further proceeding in the prohibited direction.[38] Prohibition, as a rule, does not lie to restrain an act that is already a fait accompli.[39] | |||||