This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2010-09-08 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| When it executed the performance bond, PGAI's undertaking thereunder was that of a surety to the obligation of KRDC, the principal under the construction contract. PGAI should not be allowed now to insist that it had nothing to do with the construction contract and should be viewed as a non-party. Since the liability of petitioner as surety is solidary with that of KRDC, it was properly impleaded as it would be the party ultimately answerable under the bond should KRDC be adjudged liable for breach of contract. Furthermore, it is well settled that accessory contracts should not be read independently of the main contract. They should be construed together in order to arrive at their true meaning.[20] In Velasquez v. Court of Appeals,[21] the Court labeled such rule as the "complementary contracts construed together" doctrine. It states: That the "complementary contracts construed together" doctrine applies in this case finds support in the principle that the surety contract is merely an accessory contract and must be interpreted with its principal contract, which in this case was the loan agreement. This doctrine closely adheres to the spirit of Art. 1374 of the Civil Code which states that- | |||||
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2008-09-17 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| There must be the validity of the new contract.[14] | |||||
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2007-07-03 |
GARCIA, J. |
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| Eventually, in a decision[7] dated February 3, 1999, the trial court adjudged the subject Deed of Sale with Pacto De Retro as an equitable mortgage and ordered the defendant spouses to reconvey Lot Nos. 4049 and 4035 C-4 to the plaintiff heirs for P20,000.00. We quote the fallo of the decision: | |||||
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2006-11-29 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| Since novation is effected only when a new contract has extinguished an earlier contract between the same parties, it necessarily follows that there could be no novation if the parties in the new contract are not the same parties in the old contract as is the case here.[18] | |||||
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2004-09-23 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Respondent's denials do not constitute an effective specific denial as contemplated by law. In the early case of Songco vs. Sellner,[27] the Court expounded on how to deny the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document, viz.: … This means that the defendant must declare under oath that he did not sign the document or that it is otherwise false or fabricated. Neither does the statement of the answer to the effect that the instrument was procured by fraudulent representation raise any issue as to its genuineness or due execution. On the contrary such a plea is an admission both of the genuineness and due execution thereof, since it seeks to avoid the instrument upon a ground not affecting either. In fact, respondent's allegations amount to an implied admission of the due execution and genuineness of the promissory note. The admission of the genuineness and due execution of a document means that the party whose signature it bears admits that he voluntarily signed the document or it was signed by another for him and with his authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that the document was delivered; and that any formalities required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him.[28] Also, it effectively eliminated any defense relating to the authenticity and due execution of the document, e.g., that the document was spurious, counterfeit, or of different import on its face as the one executed by the parties; or that the signatures appearing thereon were forgeries; or that the signatures were unauthorized.[29] | |||||