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JUAN DOMINO v. COMELEC

This case has been cited 9 times or more.

	GR No. 209286 2014-09-23	LINA DELA PEÑA JALOVER v. JOHN HENRY R. OSMEÑA BRION, J.
To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of this intention. It requires not only such bodily presence in that place but also a declared and probable intent to make it one's fixed and permanent place of abode.[65]
	GR No. 207264 2013-10-22	REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES v. COMELEC PEREZ, J.
In her original Petition before this Court, petitioner contends that "even granting for the sake of argument but without conceding that the 'newly discovered evidence' of Respondent Tan were admissible, it merely established the fact that Petitioner is an American citizen which does not translate to her not being a Filipino."[14] Yet, in her present Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner begs the indulgence of this Court for the belated submission of her Identification Certificate recognizing her as a citizen of the Philippines pursuant to the provisions and implementing regulations of R.A. 9225.[15]
	GR No. 193261 2012-04-24	MEYNARDO SABILI v. COMELEC SERENO, J.
To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of the intention to make it one's fixed and permanent place of abode.[53] As in all administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary in election cases is substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[54]
	GR No. 187478 2009-12-21	REPRESENTATIVE DANILO RAMON S. FERNANDEZ v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
This case must be distinguished from Aquino v. COMELEC[39] and Domino v. COMELEC,[40] where the disqualified candidate was shown to be merely leasing a residence in the place where he sought to run for office. In Aquino and Domino, there appeared to be no other material reason for the candidate to lease residential property in the place where he filed his COC, except to fulfill the residency requirement under election laws.
	GR No. 179430 2009-07-27	JAMELA SALIC MARUHOM v. COMELEC CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
It is settled that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over a petition filed under Section 78 of the OEC.[21] In the exercise of such jurisdiction, it is within the competence of the COMELEC to determine whether false representation as to material facts was made in the COC.[22]
	GR No. 180051 2008-12-24	NARDO M. VELASCO v. COMELEC BRION, J.
In Domino v. COMELEC[9] - where this Court faced the contention that the decision of the first level court in an exclusion proceeding on the issue of residence is final and conclusive on the COMELEC hearing a COC denial/cancellation proceeding under Section 78 of the OED - we ruled that the factual findings of the trial court and its resultant conclusions in the inclusion/exclusion proceedings on matters other than the right to vote in the precinct within its territorial jurisdiction are not conclusive on and do not rise to the level of a res judicata ruling with respect to the COMELEC.[10] The reason is that inclusion/exclusion proceedings, while judicial in character, are summary proceedings.[11] We further added that a decision in an inclusion/exclusion proceeding does not operate as a bar to any future action in any other election that a party may take concerning his right to be registered as a voter.[12] Otherwise stated, a ruling on the right to vote by the trial court for a specific election is binding on the COMELEC. By clear implication, the COMELEC itself does not rule on the right to vote by recognizing in a Sec. 78 COC denial/cancellation proceeding the final and executory ruling by a court, as mandated by law, in an inclusion/exclusion proceeding.
	GR No. 181097 2008-06-25	NORLAINIE MITMUG LIMBONA v. COMELEC YNARES-SATIAGO, J.
In order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.[22] A person's "domicile" once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established.[23]
	GR NO. 169106 2006-06-23	DATU ISRAEL SINSUAT v. COMELEC QUISUMBING, J.
The complaint for disqualification of Gunsi was filed before the elections but the COMELEC en banc disqualified him subsequent to the election. Thus, when the electorate voted Gunsi for mayor on May 10, 2004, it was under the belief that he was qualified. There is no presumption that the electorate agreed to the invalidation of their votes as stray votes in case of Gunsi's disqualification. The Court cannot adhere to petitioner Israel's contention that the votes cast in favor of Gunsi are stray votes. The subsequent finding of the COMELEC en banc that Gunsi is ineligible cannot retroact to the date of elections so as to invalidate the votes cast for him.[26] At the time, he was not notoriously known by the public to be ineligible to run for mayor.[27]
	GR No. 158466 2004-06-15	PABLO V. OCAMPO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
Anent the second issue, we revert back to the settled jurisprudence that the subsequent disqualification of a candidate who obtained the highest number of votes does not entitle the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner.[12] This principle has been reiterated in a number our decisions, such as Labo, Jr. vs. COMELEC,[13] Abella vs. COMELEC,[14] Benito vs. COMELEC[15] and Domino vs. COMELEC.[16] As a matter of fact, even as early as 1912, it was held that the candidate who lost in an election cannot be proclaimed the winner in the event that the candidate who won is found to be ineligible for the office for which he was elected.[17]