This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2003-01-28 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| In previous cases, the Court has held that a witness is not incompetent to give testimony simply because he or she is of tender age. The requirements of a child's competence as a witness are: (1) capacity of observation; (2) capacity of recollection; and (3) capacity of communication.[40] It is the degree of a child's intelligence that determines the child's competence as a witness. If the witness is sufficiently mature to receive correct impressions by his senses, to recollect and narrate intelligently, and to appreciate the moral duty to tell the truth, he is competent [41] to testify. A minor's testimony will suffice to convict a person accused of a crime so long as it is credible.[42] | |||||
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2000-05-09 |
GONZAGA-REYES, J. |
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| As regards the civil liability, the amount of P50,000.00 for civil indemnity is upheld as it conforms with prevailing jurisprudence.[28] Actual damages cannot be awarded since the records show that the prosecution failed to substantiate the bare testimony of the widow, Paulino Ygot, with other corroborative evidence. The Court can only grant such amount for expenses if they are supported by receipts.[29] Moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00 awarded by the trial court is reasonable considering the pain[30] suffered by the victim's widow. Moral damages, which include mental anguish, serious anxiety and wounded feelings, may be recovered in criminal offenses resulting in the victim's death.[31] However, the award of exemplary damages should be deleted. Exemplary damage is awarded in criminal offenses when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.[32] There is none in this case. | |||||
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2000-02-10 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| Clearly, the evidence proves that appellant killed the victim, and that he did so without risk to himself. A killing is qualified by treachery when the accused employs means, methods or forms in the execution thereof without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.[14] To repeat, there was no more reason for appellant to shoot; that he did so was unexpected and surprising. Furthermore, Lacson was unarmed and a mere minor then. Because he had no weapon, there was no risk at all that appellant would be harmed. We stress that the former was only fourteen years old at the time, and that he could not have put up an effective defense.[15] | |||||