This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2006-12-13 |
GARCIA, J. |
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| Besides, for alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the accused to prove that he was elsewhere when the crime was committed. He must further demonstrate that it would have been physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.[20] This, the appellant failed to do. In fact, the locus criminis of the Wise Hotel in Pasay City is only about three (3) kilometers away from Villamor Air Base, and can be negotiated by public transport in just few minutes. As correctly observed by the trial court:Accused avers that he was working at Villamor Air Base at the time of the crime, but failed to show that it was physically impossible for him to be at Baclaran. The Court takes judicial notice that the distance between Villamor Air Base and Baclaran is approximately three (3) kilometers and would take just about fifteen (15) minutes of travel time. With such a distance, it is not impossible for the accused to be present at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission especially with the availability of motorized transport. When there is the least chance for the accused to be present at the locus criminis, the defense of alibi will not hold water. More importantly, alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime.[21] Here, XXX clearly and positively identified appellant as the very man who raped her on that fateful day of August 4, 1998 inside a room at Wise Hotel in Pasay City. | |||||
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2003-05-29 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| Under Section 37 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the requisites for the admissibility of ante mortem statements are: (1) the statement concerns the crime and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (2) at the time it was made, the declarant was under the consciousness of an impending death; (3) the declarant would have been competent as a witness had he survived; and (4) the declaration was offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide in which the declarant was the victim.[10] | |||||
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2001-12-14 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| As to the penalty to be imposed on appellant, however, the appropriate penalty is not life imprisonment as imposed by the trial judge but reclusion perpetua as provided for in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity should be awarded to the victim's heirs without need of further proof other than the death of the victim.[42] In addition, his heirs are also entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000 in accordance with recent rulings.[43] | |||||
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2001-11-26 |
PARDO, J. |
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| The fact that Federico Acero failed to identify the kind and caliber of the gun used in the killing was also raised as an issue. Accused-appellant posits that "the three (3) slugs recovered from the victim's body were irrelevant pieces of evidence for it was not traced from what particular gun these slugs were fired."[40] Again, this contention must fail. The presentation and identification of the weapon used are not indispensable to prove the guilt of the accused-appellant.[41] | |||||
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2000-04-27 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| Indemnity for Death and Actual Damages. Art. 2206 of the Civil Code provides for the payment of indemnity for death caused by a crime. Initially fixed in Art. 2206 at P3,000.00, the amount of indemnity for death has, through the years, been gradually increased in view of the declining value of the peso. It is presently fixed at P50,000.00.[41] Hence, the trial court correctly awarded indemnity for death to the heirs of Igmidio in this amount. | |||||
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2000-02-15 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| As to the defense of alibi, the trial court dismissed his version of the story as a "rehearsed scenario" and "tailored to fit and suit the defense of alibi." The trial court did not find it physically impossible for appellant to be at the locus criminis since there were vehicles plying the eight-kilometer road between Malis and Samariniana. For alibi to be considered, it is not enough to prove that appellant was somewhere else when the offense was committed. It must likewise be shown that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.[22] Thus while appellant testified that he was at Samariniana at the time of the commission of the offense, his testimony is bereft of any explanation that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the scene of the crime. Further, prosecution witness Medina practically demolished appellant's alibi when he testified that appellant was at the locus criminis on the night of the incident. In view of appellant's positive identification as the assailant, his alibi holds no water. The rule is that the positive and categorical assertions of witnesses generally prevail over bare denials.[23] | |||||
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2000-01-31 |
PARDO, J. |
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| As heretofore stated, accused-appellant Casimiro Jose interposed the defenses of denial and alibi. For the defense of alibi to prosper, "it must be established by positive, clear and satisfactory proof that (1) the accused was somewhere else when the offense was committed, and (2) it was physically impossible for the accused to have been present at the scene of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission."[23] The requirement of time and place must be strictly met.[24] | |||||