This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2007-09-14 |
VELASCO, JR., J. |
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| In Pepito v. CA,[27] the victim, before the killing, had challenged the accused's family with a bolo and an "indian pana." After this attack, the victim went home. The accused thereafter grabbed a bolo, pursued the victim, and killed him. The Court did not consider the victim's act as an unlawful aggression for the purpose of self-defense. However, such was considered a provocation sufficient to mitigate the crime. People v. Ubaldo[28] had likewise disregarded the violent act of the victim before the shooting incident as an unlawful aggression, but appreciated it as a mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation. | |||||
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2002-01-30 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| In the same vein, the circumstance of incomplete defense of a relative is unavailing. It is settled that a person making a defense has no more right to attack an aggressor when the unlawful aggression has ceased.[15] In the instant case, accused-appellant was not justified in attacking the deceased as the latter had his hands raised and was no longer poised to attack accused-appellant's father at the time he was shot. | |||||
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2001-06-20 |
BUENA, J. |
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| In criminal prosecutions, the identification of the offender is crucial to defeat the defense of alibi. Positive identification must nonetheless be established beyond reasonable doubt. Absent such clear and positive identification, the doctrine that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over positive identification of the accused must yield to the constitutional presumption of innocence. As every crime must be established beyond reasonable doubt, it is also paramount to prove, with the same quantum of evidence, the identity of the perpetrator. Necessarily, courts should not precipitately conclude that a person is guilty when his alibi appears weak[37] for it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. A guilty verdict must depend on the weight of the evidence for the prosecution and should not be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. Our legal culture demands the presentation of proof beyond reasonable doubt before any person may be convicted of any crime and deprived of his life, liberty or even property. The hypothesis of his guilt must flow naturally from the facts proved and must be consistent with all of them.[38] | |||||
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2000-05-31 |
GONZAGA-REYES, J. |
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| In their tenth assigned error, the accused-appellants fault the RTC for not appreciating as mitigating circumstances accused RICARDO's physical disability, the accused-appellant's lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong and the victim's provocation, which preceded the act. After a careful assessment of the established facts, we find that these circumstances cannot be appreciated in their favor. The limp allegedly suffered by RICARDO has not been shown to restrict his means of action, defense or communication with his fellow beings as required by Article 13(8) of the Revised Penal Code as no evidence was presented in relation thereto other than the bare allegation that he suffered from such a physical defect. Neither can the circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong be appreciated considering that SERAFIN was stabbed on his torso while ARIEL was stabbed in his stomach with the use of a bladed weapon. The location of the stab wounds manifest accused-appellants' intention to kill and belies their claim that they did not intend to commit so grave a wrong as that committed.[37] Finally, the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party cannot be considered absent proof that the same immediately preceded the act and that it was adequate to excite a person to commit a wrong, which must accordingly be proportionate in gravity.[38] While ARIEL's act of hitting or kicking EFREN may have provoked the accused-appellants, we find that the retaliation of the accused-appellants was grossly disproportionate to the provocation made by ARIEL. At any rate, evidence reveals that if there was in fact any provocation, it was EFREN who started it when he spat at ARIEL several times. | |||||
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2000-04-06 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| [33] Pepito v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119942, July 8, 1999. | |||||