This case has been cited 4 times or more.
|
2007-11-28 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
||||
| Section 101. All actions for the reversion to the government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Commonwealth [now Republic] of the Philippines. In fine, the RTC acted without jurisdiction when it entertained the Second Amended Complaint of respondents even when the latter was not a real party-in-interest. The February 23, 2000 Decision rendered by the RTC was an utter nullity, without legal effect or binding force whatsoever, even upon defendant Cebu City which does not appear on record to have appealed from it.[40] | |||||
|
2005-05-16 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
||||
| Clearly then, a suit filed by one who is not a party-in-interest must be dismissed. In this case, the petitioner, not being the owner of the disputed property but a mere applicant for a free patent, cannot thus be considered as a party-in-interest with personality to file an action for reconveyance. The Court, citing several of its holdings, expounded on this doctrine in Tankiko v. Cezar[33] as follows:... Thus, in Lucas v. Durian [102 Phil. 1157 (1957)], the Court affirmed the dismissal of a Complaint filed by a party who alleged that the patent was obtained by fraudulent means and, consequently, prayed for the annulment of said patent and the cancellation of a certificate of title. The Court declared that the proper party to bring the action was the government, to which the property would revert. Likewise affirming the dismissal of a Complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the Court in Nebrada v. Heirs of Alivio [104 Phil. 126 (1958)] noted that the plaintiff, being a mere homestead applicant, was not the real party-in-interest to institute an action for reconveyance. ... | |||||
|
2004-02-24 |
TINGA, J. |
||||
| All other party members representing themselves to be candidates of the party shall not be deprived of their right to file their respective certificates of candidacy and run for office, if so qualified, but that they shall not be accorded the rights and privileges reserved by election laws for official nominees of registered political parties. Instead, they shall be treated as independent candidates.[38] From the foregoing, it is plain that the COMELEC misapplied equity in the present case. For all its conceded merits, equity is available only in the absence of law and not as its replacement.[39] Equity is described as justice without legality, which simply means that it cannot supplant, although it may, as often happens, supplement the law.[40] The COMELEC should have decided the case on the basis of the party constitution and election laws. It chose not to because of its irrational fear of treading, as respondent Aquino put it, on "unchartered" territories.[41] But, as shown above, these territories have long been charted by jurisprudence and, in any case, the COMELEC need not have sailed far from the shore to arrive at the correct conclusion. In truth, the COMELEC Resolution is indecision in the guise of equity. | |||||
|
2004-02-11 |
CARPIO, J. |
||||
| Finally, DBP invokes justice and equity on behalf of its affected employees. Equity cannot supplant or contravene the law.[63] Further, as evidenced by the letter of former DBP Chairman Zalamea, the DBP Board of Directors was well aware of the proscription against the partial release of retirement benefits when it confirmed the SLP. If DBP wants "to enhance and protect the value of xxx (the) gratuity benefits" of its employees, DBP must do so by investing the money of the Fund in the proper and sound investments, and not by circumventing restrictions imposed by law and the Gratuity Plan itself. | |||||