This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2014-11-25 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| In the 1999[15] and 2011[16] cases of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, the Court, in said separate instances, reversed the ruling of the Ombudsman that the prescriptive period therein began to run at the time the behest loans were transacted and instead, it should be counted from the date of the discovery thereof. | |||||
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2013-09-11 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| The ruling on the issue of prescription in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto[30] is also enlightening, viz:Generally, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day the crime is committed. That an aggrieved person "entitled to an action has no knowledge of his right to sue or of the facts out of which his right arises," does not prevent the running of the prescriptive period. An exception to this rule is the "blameless ignorance" doctrine, incorporated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326. Under this doctrine, "the statute of limitations runs only upon discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which will support a cause of action. In other words, the courts would decline to apply the statute of limitations where the plaintiff does not know or has no reasonable means of knowing the existence of a cause of action." It was in this accord that the Court confronted the question on the running of the prescriptive period in People v. Duque which became the cornerstone of our 1999 Decision in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130149), and the subsequent cases which Ombudsman Desierto dismissed, emphatically, on the ground of prescription too. Thus, we held in a catena of cases, that if the violation of the special law was not known at the time of its commission, the prescription begins to run only from the discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts. | |||||