This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2015-01-13 |
LEONEN, J. |
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| The temporary restraining order is not moot. The acts sought to be enjoined are not fait accompli. For an act to be considered fait accompli, the act must have already been fully accomplished and consummated.[232] It must be irreversible, e.g., demolition of properties,[233] service of the penalty of imprisonment,[234] and hearings on cases.[235] When the act sought to be enjoined has not yet been fully satisfied, and/or is still continuing in nature,[236] the defense of fait accompli cannot prosper. | |||||
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2013-07-03 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Note that for a writ of preliminary injunction to issue, the following essential requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the invasion of the right is material and substantial; (2) that the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable; and, (3) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.[8] In the present case, the right of respondents cannot be said to be clear and unmistakable, because the prevailing jurisprudence is that the penalty of dismissal from the service meted on government employees or officials is immediately executory in accordance with the valid rule of execution pending appeal uniformly observed in administrative disciplinary cases. In Facura v. Court of Appeals,[9] the Court fully threshed out this matter, thus: The issue of whether or not an appeal of the Ombudsman decision in an administrative case carries with it the immediate suspension of the imposed penalty has been laid to rest in the recent resolution of the case of Ombudsman v. Samaniego, where this Court held that the decision of the Ombudsman is immediately executory pending appeal and may not be stayed by the filing of an appeal or the issuance of an injunctive writ, to wit: | |||||