This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2009-12-23 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| We disagree. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove).[8] The burden of proof that foreclosure proceedings on the subject properties were not validly conducted lies with mortgagor-party litigant claiming such. We have consistently applied the ancient rule that if a plaintiff, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner facts on which he bases his claim, the defendant is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense.[9] | |||||
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2006-05-31 |
PUNO, J. |
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| It is unprocedural to rule on the ownership of the subject property. To reiterate, the only issue in ejectment proceedings is the legality of JULAG-AY's physical possession of the premises - - - his possession de facto and not his possession de jure.[17] Thus, we have ruled that it is of no moment that at the time an action for unlawful detainer is under litigation, there is another action respecting the same property and the same parties involving the issue of ownership. The rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for are different in the two cases. Consequently, it is untenable for JULAG-AY to demand that TERESITA should first prove herself to be the true and lawful owner of the property before she asserts her right to its possession. It is settled that an action for unlawful detainer may be filed even by one who is not an owner of the property in dispute.[18] | |||||
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2004-06-03 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| The material dates to consider in determining the timeliness of the filing of the motion for extension are (1) the date of receipt of the judgment or final order or resolution subject of the petition, and (2) the date of filing of the motion for extension.[24] It is the date of the filing of the motion or pleading, and not the date of execution, that determines the timeliness of the filing of that motion or pleading. Thus, even if the motion for extension bears no date, the date of filing stamped on it is the reckoning point for determining the timeliness of its filing. | |||||
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2003-08-25 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| In sum, we do not agree with the finding of the lower court that Menor's negligence concurred with the negligence of petitioner and resultantly caused damage to the latter. Menor's negligence was not sufficiently proved, considering that the only evidence presented on this score was petitioner's uncorroborated narration of the events. It is well-settled that the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation cannot take the place of evidence.[17] If the plaintiff, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner facts upon which he bases his claim, the defendant is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense.[18] | |||||
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2003-04-30 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat. He who asserts, not he who denies, must prove. We have consistently applied the ancient rule that if the plaintiff, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner facts on which he bases his claim, the defendant is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense.[31] In the instant case, the self-serving testimony of the petitioners are vague on what acts of Leopoldo Sevilla constituted fraud and undue influence and on how these acts vitiated the consent of Felisa Almirol. Fraud and undue influence that vitiated a party's consent must be established by full, clear and convincing evidence, otherwise, the latter's presumed consent to the contract prevails.[32] Neither does the fact that the donation preceded the partition constitute fraud. It is not necessary that partition should first be had because what was donated to Leopoldo was the 1/2 undivided share of Felisa in Lot No. 653. | |||||