This case has been cited 12 times or more.
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2015-02-09 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| While this Court agrees with the CA that the exact date of the commission of rape is not an essential element of said crime, it cannot, however, convince itself that "AAA" committed any inconsistencies in declaring that the third rape occurred on August 21, 2003. From the time "AAA" executed her sworn Affidavit[33] dated September 16, 2003 up to the time she took the witness stand on July 6, 2004,[34] "AAA" never wavered and has consistently declared that her father ravished her for the third time on August 21, 2003. On the other hand, it is obvious that the mistake was a mere typographical error committed by the prosecution in the preparation of the Information dated February 9, 2004. Ideally, said Information should have been consistent on every detail with "AAA's" earlier sworn Affidavit. In any case, an Information is valid as long as it distinctly states the elements of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. It is not necessary to state therein the precise date the offense was committed, except when it is a material ingredient of the offense.[35] And as earlier mentioned, in rape cases the date or time of commission of the offense is not an essential ingredient of said crime.[36] "In fact, the precise time when the rape takes place has no substantial bearing on its commission."[37] | |||||
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2009-12-04 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| In rape cases, failure to specify the exact dates or times when the rapes occurred does not ipso facto make the information defective on its face. The reason is obvious. The date or time of the commission of rape is not a material ingredient of the said crime because the gravamen of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman through force and intimidation. The precise time when the rape took place has no substantial bearing on its commission. As such, the date or time need not be stated with absolute accuracy. It is sufficient that the complaint or information states that the crime has been committed at any time as near as possible to the date of its actual commission.[20] In sustaining the view that the exact date of commission of the rape is immaterial, we ruled in People v. Purazo[21] that: We have ruled, time and again, that the date is not an essential element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman. As such, the time or place of commission in rape cases need not be accurately stated. As early as 1908, we already held that where the time or place or any other fact alleged is not an essential element of the crime charged, conviction may be had on proof of the commission of the crime, even if it appears that the crime was not committed at the precise time or place alleged, or if the proof fails to sustain the existence of some immaterial fact set out in the complaint, provided it appears that the specific crime charged was in fact committed prior to the date of the filing of the complaint or information within the period of the statute of limitations and at a place within the jurisdiction of the court. | |||||
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2009-02-18 |
BRION, J. |
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| Thus, we have ruled that allegations of rape in the information committed, "sometime in the year 1991 and the days thereafter,"[39] "on or about and sometime in the year 1988,"[40] or "from November 1990 up to July 21, 1994,"[41] "sometime in the year 1982 and dates subsequent thereto," and "sometime in the year 1995 and subsequent thereto,"[42] all constitute sufficient compliance with Section 11 of Rule 110. In People v. Salalima, we also ruled that the allegation that the sexual assaults were committed, "sometime during the month of March 1996 or thereabout," or "sometime during the month of April 1996 or thereabout," and also, "sometime during the month of May 1996 or thereabout" substantially informed the accused of the crimes charged since all the elements of rape were stated in the informations. [43] | |||||
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2008-04-09 |
REYES, R.T., J. |
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| Indeed, this Court has ruled that allegations that rapes were committed "before and until October 15, 1994,"[36] "sometime in the year 1991 and the days thereafter,"[37] and "on or about and sometime in the year 1988"[38] constitute sufficient compliance with Rule 110, Section 11 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure. | |||||
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2007-11-22 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| In rape cases, failure to specify the exact dates or times when the rapes occurred does not ipso facto make the information defective on its face. The reason is obvious. The date or time of the commission of rape is not a material ingredient of the said crime because the gravamen of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman through force and intimidation. The precise time when the rape took place has no substantial bearing on its commission. As such, the date or time need not be stated with absolute accuracy. It is sufficient that the complaint or information states that the crime has been committed at any time as near as possible to the date of its actual commission.[30] In sustaining the view that the exact date of commission of the rape is immaterial, we held in People v. Purazo[31] that:We have ruled, time and again that the date is not an essential element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman. As such, the time or place of commission in rape cases need not be accurately stated. As early as 1908, we already held that where the time or place or any other fact alleged is not an essential element of the crime charged, conviction may be had on proof of the commission of the crime, even if it appears that the crime was not committed at the precise time or place alleged, or if the proof fails to sustain the existence of some immaterial fact set out in the complaint, provided it appears that the specific crime charged was in fact committed prior to the date of the filing of the complaint or information within the period of the statute of limitations and at a place within the jurisdiction of the court. This Court has upheld complaints and informations in prosecutions for rape which merely alleged the month and year of its commission.[32] In People v. Magbanua,[33] we sustained the validity of the information for rape which merely alleged the year of its commission, thus: | |||||
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2004-07-06 |
TINGA, J, |
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| However, it is not necessary for the information to allege the date and time of the commission of the crime with exactitude unless time is an essential ingredient of the offense.[34] Failure to specify the exact dates or time when the rapes occurred does not ipso facto make the information defective on its face. The date or time of the commission of the rape is not a material ingredient of the said crime[35] because the gravamen of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman through force and intimidation. In fact, the precise time when the rape takes places has no substantial bearing on its commission.[36] As such, the date or time need not be stated with absolute accuracy. It is sufficient that the complaint or information states that the crime has been committed at any time as near as possible to the date of its actual commission. [37] | |||||
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2001-10-23 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| It should be noted that juxtaposed against the prosecution evidence, appellant's defense is inherently weak. He interposed denial, which like alibi, cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime.[36] Such weak and self-serving negative defense cannot claim more weight or worth than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who present clear and positive evidence.[37] | |||||
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2001-02-15 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| This Court agrees with the observation of the Office of the Solicitor General that the allegation of Mercelinda in her Complaint that sometime in 1990 accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of her sufficiently informed him of the nature of the charge against him. The date of the commission of the rape is not an essential element of the crime as it is not determinative of its commission nor has it any substantial bearing thereof, especially since the specific month the crime was perpetrated in the present case is not material to the defense, which is a mere denial that accused-appellant committed the acts imputed to him.[15] Similarly, in the recent case of People v. Magbanua,[16] this Court said that the allegation in the Information that the acts of sexual intercourse were committed "on (sic) the year 1991 and the days thereafter" substantially apprised accused-appellant of the crime he was charged with, since all the essential elements thereof were stated therein. Moreover, the objection to the Complaint of Mercelinda at this stage is too late.[17] Perhaps accused-appellant should have moved to quash the Complaint at any time before he entered his plea[18] if he believed that the Complaint did not conform substantially to the prescribed form. In other words, his failure to do so is deemed a waiver of such ground.[19] | |||||
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2000-12-08 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Indeed, this Court has held that the allegation that rapes were committed "before and until October 15, 1994,"[18] "sometime in the year 1991 and the days thereafter,"[19] and "on or about and sometime in the year 1988"[20] constitute sufficient compliance with Rule 110, Section 11. In any event, even if the information failed to allege with certainty the time of the commission of the rapes, the defect, if any, was cured by the evidence presented during trial and any objection based on this ground must be deemed waived as a result of accused-appellant's failure to object before arraignment. Accused-appellant's remedy was to move either for a bill of particulars[21] or for the quashal of the information on the ground that it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form.[22] | |||||
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2000-11-29 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| We have consistently adhered to the rule that where the culpability or innocence of an accused would hinge on the issue of credibility of witnesses and the veracity of their testimonies, findings of the trial court are given the highest degree of respect. These findings will not ordinarily be disturbed by an appellate court absent any clear showing that the trial court has overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight or substance which could very well affect the outcome of the case. The reason for the rule is an excellent chance on the part of the trial court, an opportunity that is not equally open to an appellate court, of being able to personally observe the expression of declarants on the witness stand and their demeanor under questioning. And the Court agrees with the observation of the trial court that the testimony of Maricris was straightforward, guileless and credible. She gave a plain and candid account of her harrowing experience in a manner reflective of honest and unrehearsed testimony. The rule is well settled that when the question of credence as to which of the conflicting versions of the prosecution and the defense where a rape as committed is in issue, the trial court's answer is generally viewed as correct. Third. Accused-appellant claims that he was denied his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him for failure of the information to indicate the approximate time of the commission of the offense. This claim is not tenable. The phrase in the information, "that sometime in 1995. . ." has sufficiently apprised accused-appellant of the crime which he allegedly committed in 1995. It bears stressing that, in the case of rape, the date of commission is not an essential element of the offense, what is material being the occurrence thereof and not the time of its commission. In the case at bar, a reading of the information would readily reveal satisfactory compliance with the rules and that appellant unquestionably has been properly apprised of the charges proffered against him. Thus, in People v. Isug Magbanua,[36] it was held:Although the information did not state with particularity the dates when the sexual attacks took place, we believe that the allegations therein that the acts were committed "on (sic) the year 1991 and the days thereafter" substantially apprised appellant of the crime he was charged with since all the essential elements of the crime of rape were stated in the information. As such, appellant cannot complain that he was deprived of the right to be informed of the nature of the case filed against him. An information can withstand the test of judicial scrutiny as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. The above ruling was reiterated in the case of People v. Pambid,[37] where it was held that, under Rule 110, §§6 and 11 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, an information is sufficient as long as it states the statutory designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constituting the same, since in rape cases, the time of commission of the crime is not a material ingredient of the offense. It is thus sufficient if it is alleged that the crime took place as near to the actual date at which the offense(s) are committed as the information or complaint will permit. In this connection, this Court also ruled that in rape cases, victims of rape hardly retain in their memories the dates, number of times, and manner they were violated. In the same vein, to be material, discrepancies in the testimony of the victim should refer to significant facts which are determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused, not to mere details which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime, such as the exact time of its commission in a case of rape. | |||||
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2000-11-29 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| In any event, it is now too late in the day to question the form or substance of the information because when he entered his plea at his arraignment, accused-appellant did not object to the sufficiency of the information against him. The rule is that, at any time before entering his plea, the accused may move to quash the information on the ground that it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form. The failure of accused-appellant to assert any ground for a motion to quash before he pleads to the information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds for a motion to quash, except when the grounds are that no offense was charged, the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged, the offense or penalty has been extinguished, and the accused would be twice put in jeopardy.[38] | |||||
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2000-03-13 |
KAPUNAN, J. |
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| Time and again, the Court has declared that alibi is an inherently weak defense.[139] Unless an accused can prove that he was in another place where it would be physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed, the positive identification made by a witness will prevail over his defense of alibi.[140] In the present case, it was not physically impossible for accused-appellants to be at the scene of the crime. With regard to Cariño, his house is only less than a kilometer away from the scene of the crime. On the other hand, Geguira did not show adequate proof, except for his own testimony, that he was indeed in Malolos, Bulacan at the time the incident took place. Moreover, it is not physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. The said area is relatively near the North Luzon Expressway which is the route taken by those coming from the central and northern Luzon provinces like Bulacan. | |||||