This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2015-02-11 |
LEONEN, J. |
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| Petitioner cites the actions of the respondent-employee in Philippine Industrial Security Agency Corporation v. Dapiton[116] to contrast with the actions of respondent in this case.[117] In Philippine Industrial, Virgilio Dapiton "reported to petitioner's office regularly for a new posting[,] but to no avail."[118] Virgilio Dapiton then "lost no time in filing the illegal dismissal case."[119] The immediate filing of the illegal dismissal case, therefore, constituted evidence that Virgilio Dapiton did not wish to be separated from his employment.[120] | |||||
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2009-07-30 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| We stress that Article 286 applies only when there is a bonafide suspension of the employer's operation of a business or undertaking for a period not exceeding six (6) months. In such a case, there is no termination of employment but only a temporary displacement of employees, albeit the displacement should not exceed six (6) months. The paramount consideration should be the dire exigency of the business of the employer that compels it to put some of its employees temporarily out of work. In security services, the temporary "off-detail" of guards takes place when the security agency's clients decide not to renew their contracts with the security agency, resulting in a situation where the available posts under its existing contracts are less than the number of guards in its roster.[26] (Underscoring supplied) | |||||
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2008-02-29 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Private respondent's failure to report for work despite the August 8, 1998 letter sent by Apduhan to private respondent advising the latter to report for work is not sufficient to constitute abandonment. It is a settled rule that failure to report for work after a notice to return to work has been served does not necessarily constitute abandonment.[56] | |||||
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2005-12-16 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| We find it equally implausible that none of the 3 memos touched on respondent's alleged refusal to accept the posts assigned to him and the abandonment of his posts considering that such acts constitute willful disobedience and gross neglect of duty which are valid grounds for dismissal.[15] | |||||
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2004-11-25 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| In Philippine Industrial Security Agency Corp. vs. Dapiton,[25] we also noted that | |||||
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2004-11-25 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| Constructive dismissal or a constructive discharge has been defined as quitting because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank and a diminution in pay.[15] Constructive dismissal, however, does not always take the form of a diminution. In several cases, we have ruled that an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer may become so unbearable on the part of the employee so as to foreclose any choice on his part except to resign from such employment. This constitutes constructive dismissal.[16] | |||||
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2003-09-16 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| It is well-settled that the NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence, even for the first time on appeal, because technical rules of procedure are not binding in labor cases.[8] This rule applies equally to both the employee and the employer. In the interest of due process, the Labor Code directs labor officials to use all reasonable means to ascertain the facts speedily and objectively, with little regard to technicalities or formalities.[9] However, delay in the submission of evidence should be clearly explained and should adequately prove the employer's allegation of the cause for termination.[10] | |||||