This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2010-02-16 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| And third, Garcia should be read along with Mathay, Jr. v. Court of Appeals[15] and National Appellate Board of the National Police Commission v. Mamauag (Mamauag),[16] in which this Court qualified and clarified the exercise of the right of a government agency to actively participate in the appeal of decisions in administrative cases. In Mamauag, this Court ruled: RA 6975 itself does not authorize a private complainant to appeal a decision of the disciplining authority. Sections 43 and 45 of RA 6975 authorize `either party' to appeal in the instances that the law allows appeal. One party is the PNP member-respondent when the disciplining authority imposes the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service. The other party is the government when the disciplining authority imposes the penalty of demotion but the government believes that dismissal from the service is the proper penalty. | |||||
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2004-11-17 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| A real party in interest is one who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or one entitled to the avails of the suit.[34] "Interest" within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved or a mere incidental interest.[35] Otherwise stated, the rule refers to a real or present substantial interest as distinguished from a mere expectancy; or from a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest.[36] As a general rule, one who has no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a party-plaintiff in an action.[37] | |||||
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2003-08-14 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| Respondent filed in her own behalf a Comment claiming that the CSC cannot be a party-petitioner in a case where its decision is the subject of review, citing Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals.[9] As to whether respondent actually assumed the duties of Director II, she referred not only to the finding of the Court of Appeals that she had assumed office and worked for MSU as early as June 1995 but also to the voluminous records of MSU showing that she reported for work until her illegal dismissal in September 1998.[10] She also manifested that she was reinstated to her job on 18 September 2002 while the proceedings before the Court of Appeals were ongoing although she was not paid her salary and other benefits. In another Manifestation before this Court, she affirmed that her salary as well as RATA and other benefits for the month of September 2002 were paid on 23 April 2003. | |||||