This case has been cited 9 times or more.
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2015-06-16 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| Material to the case at bar is the concept and scope of local fiscal autonomy. In Pimentel v. Aguirre,[23] fiscal autonomy was defined as “the power [of LGUs] to create their own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national taxes released by the national government, as well as the power to allocate their resources in accordance with their own priorities. It extends to the preparation of their budgets, and local officials in turn have to work within the constraints thereof.” | |||||
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2015-02-17 |
LEONEN, J. |
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| Fiscal autonomy entails "the power to create . . . own sources of revenue."[51] In turn, this power necessarily entails enabling local government units with the capacity to create revenue sources in accordance with the realities and contingencies present in their specific contexts. The power to create must mean the local government units' power to create what is most appropriate and optimal for them; otherwise, they would be mere automatons that are turned on and off to perform prearranged operations. | |||||
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2014-04-08 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| (2) Petition for Prohibition,[6] filed by the Alliance for the Family Foundation Philippines, Inc., through its president, Atty. Maria Concepcion S. Noche[7] and several others[8] in their personal capacities as citizens and on behalf of the generations unborn (ALFI); | |||||
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2011-10-18 |
BRION, J. |
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| In any case, despite the President's certification, the two-fold purpose that underlies the requirement for three readings on separate days of every bill must always be observed to enable our legislators and other parties interested in pending bills to intelligently respond to them. Specifically, the purpose with respect to Members of Congress is: (1) to inform the legislators of the matters they shall vote on and (2) to give them notice that a measure is in progress through the enactment process.[23] | |||||
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2011-02-15 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| As this Court has ruled, the equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification, provided that it: (1) rests on substantial distinctions; (2) is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) applies equally to all members of the same class.[12] | |||||
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2008-02-13 |
CORONA, J. |
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| Under our present system of government, executive power is vested in the President. The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos. As such, they are subject to the power of control of the President, at whose will and behest they can be removed from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed. In contrast, the heads of political subdivisions are elected by the people. Their sovereign powers emanate from the electorate, to whom they are directly accountable. By constitutional fiat, they are subject to the President's supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers. By the same token, the President may not withhold or alter any authority or power given them by the Constitution and the law.[166] | |||||
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2004-12-01 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| Indeed, this CMP entry brings to fore that the real issue in this case is whether paragraph 4 of Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution is contravened by RA 7942 and DAO 96-40, not whether it was violated by specific acts implementing RA 7942 and DAO 96-40. "[W]hen an act of the legislative department is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, settling the controversy becomes the duty of this Court. By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act."[28] This ruling can be traced from Tañada v. Angara,[29] in which the Court said:"In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. | |||||
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2004-09-27 |
TINGA, J, |
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| The controlling provision on the issues at hand is Section 4, Article X of the Constitution, which reads in part: Sec. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions uniformly differentiate the President's power of supervision over local governments and his power of control of the executive departments bureaus and offices.[81] Similar to the counterpart provisions in the earlier Constitutions, the provision in the 1987 Constitution provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control.[82] | |||||
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2004-01-21 |
DAVIDE JR., CJ. |
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| Petitioner's reliance on Pimentel v. Aguirre[19] is misplaced because the non-observance of the hierarchy-of-courts rule was not an issue therein. Besides, what was sought to be nullified in the petition for certiorari and prohibition therein was an act of the President of the Philippines, which would have greatly affected all local government units. We reiterated therein that when an act of the legislative department is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, settling the controversy becomes the duty of this Court. The same is true when what is seriously alleged to be unconstitutional is an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is coequal with Congress. | |||||