This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2014-06-04 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| In determining age for purposes of exemption from criminal liability, Section 6 clearly refers to the age as determined by the anniversary of one's birth date, and not the mental age as argued by accused-appellant Roxas. When the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. Only when the law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning may the court interpret or construe its true intent.[19] | |||||
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2012-12-05 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| In Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[73] the Court disallowed the foreclosure of the debtor company's property after the latter had filed a Petition for Rehabilitation and Declaration of Suspension of Payments with the SEC. We ruled that whenever a distressed corporation asks the SEC for rehabilitation and suspension of payments, preferred creditors may no longer assert preference but shall stand on equal footing with other creditors. Foreclosure shall be disallowed so as not to prejudice other creditors, or cause discrimination among them. In 1999, the Court qualified this ruling by stating that preferred creditors of distressed corporations shall stand on equal footing with all other creditors only after a rehabilitation receiver or management committee has been appointed.[74] More importantly, the Court laid the guidelines for the treatment of claims against corporations undergoing rehabilitation: 1. All claims against corporations, partnerships, or associations that are pending before any court, tribunal, or board, without distinction as to whether or not a creditor is secured or unsecured, shall be suspended effective upon the appointment of a management committee, rehabilitation receiver, board, or body in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 902-A. | |||||
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2009-01-20 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| Petitioners assert that there two kinds of receivers that can be appointed: a rehabilitation receiver or an interim receiver. A rehabilitation receiver under PD 902-A, Sec. 6 may only be appointed when there is a showing that (1) the receiver is necessary in order to preserve the rights of the parties-litigants; and/or (2) in order to protect the interest of the investing public and creditors. In contrast, the appointment of an interim receiver is automatic from the time the petition for rehabilitation is filed; there are no other standards that need to be met. According to Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court, a petition for rehabilitation does not necessarily result in the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver.[20] Prior to the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver or management committee, as the case may be, the right of secured creditors to foreclose mortgages cannot be denied. Also, since PD 902-A does not provide for the appointment of an interim receiver, then the Rules of Procedure on Corporate Recovery, an administrative issuance, went beyond the law it seeks to implement. | |||||
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2008-12-10 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[41] promulgated by the Court en banc before the effectivity of the Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation, is still valid case law up to the present. It enumerates the guidelines in the treatment of claims involving corporations undergoing rehabilitation, viz.: All claims against corporations, partnerships, or associations that are pending before any court, tribunal, or board, without distinction as to whether or not a creditor is secured or unsecured, shall be suspended effective upon the appointment of a management committee, rehabilitation receiver, board, or body in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 902-A. | |||||
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2008-08-26 |
AZCUNA, J. |
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| As to when the suspension commences, as held in Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court[45]: All claims against corporations, partnerships, or associations that are pending before any court, tribunal, or board, without distinction as to whether or not a creditor is secured or unsecured, shall be suspended effective upon the appointment of a management committee, rehabilitation receiver, board, or body in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 902-A.[46] (italics supplied) | |||||
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2008-02-04 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| Section 6 provides that the petition must be "sufficient in form and substance." In Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[7] this Court held that under Section 6(c) of P.D. No. 902-A,[8] receivers may be appointed whenever: (1) necessary in order to preserve the rights of the parties-litigants; and/or (2) protect the interest of the investing public and creditors. The situations contemplated in these instances are serious in nature. There must exist a clear and imminent danger of losing the corporate assets if a receiver is not appointed. Absent such danger, such as where there are sufficient assets to sustain the rehabilitation plan and both investors and creditors are amply protected, the need for appointing a receiver does not exist. Simply put, the purpose of the law in directing the appointment of receivers is to protect the interests of the corporate investors and creditors. | |||||
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2007-02-27 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| As we stressed in Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[19] such suspension "shall not prejudice or render ineffective the status of a secured creditor as compared to a totally unsecured creditor," for what P.D. No. 902-A merely provides is that all actions for claims against the distressed corporation, partnership or association shall be suspended. This arrangement provided by law is intended to give the receiver a chance to rehabilitate the corporation if there should still be a possibility for doing so, without being unnecessarily disturbed by the creditors' actions against the distressed corporation. However, in the event that rehabilitation is no longer feasible and the claims against the distressed corporation would eventually have to be settled, the secured creditors, like petitioner bank, shall enjoy preference over the unsecured creditors. | |||||
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2007-02-19 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The all too-familiar rule in statutory construction, in this case, an administrative rule[9] of procedure, is that when a statute or rule is clear and unambiguous, interpretation need not be resorted to.[10] Since Section 7 of the subject circular clearly and categorically directs the DOJ to dismiss outright an appeal or a petition for review filed after arraignment, no resort to interpretation is necessary. | |||||