This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2015-11-10 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| Given that Block 494 has been used as an open space over the years, however, HATVI argues that J.M. Tuason and THI should be considered estopped from claiming the contrary on the strength of this Court's rulings in the White Plains Association, Inc. and the Anonuevo cases. Aside from the fact, however, that estoppel is an equitable principle rooted on natural justice[44] which can be invoked only in highly exceptional and justifiable cases,[45] HATVI loses sight of the fact that, on the third time that the case was presented for its review, this Court ruled in White Plains Association v. CAA[46] that, absent a deed of donation or legitimate acquisition thereof by the government, the area claimed to have been reserved for public use and/or as an open space still pertained to the subdivision developer. Unlike in the Anonuevo case where there was no record of an. approved subdivision plan, it is moreover clear that the parties in this case are in agreement that Talayan Village was covered by Subdivision Plan PSD-52256 which identified Block 503 as the required open space. In contrast.to the subdivision developer in said latter case who appears not to have segregated any other lot for the open space required under the law, furthermore, J.M. Tuason had already done so to an excess 48,679.040 square meters. | |||||
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2006-10-30 |
GARCIA, J. |
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| Procedural rules setting the period for perfecting an appeal or filing an appellate petition are generally inviolable. It is doctrinally entrenched that appeal is not a constitutional right but a mere statutory privilege. Hence, parties seeking to avail of the privilege must comply with the statutes or rules allowing it. The requirements for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period specified in the law must, as a rule, be strictly followed. Such requirements are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and are necessary for the orderly discharge of judicial business. For sure, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period set by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional as well. Failure to perfect an appeal renders the judgment appealed from final and executory.[6] | |||||
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2006-09-19 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the Decision of the Office of the President that reversed a final and executory judgment of the HLURB. Noteworthy is that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process, except where it is granted by statute in which case it should be exercised in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.[20] In other words, appeal is a right of statutory and not of constitutional origin.[21] The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional[22] and the failure of a party to conform to the rules regarding appeal will render the judgment final and executory and, hence, unappealable,[23] for it is more important that a case be settled than it be settled right.[24] Furthermore, it is axiomatic that final and executory judgments can no longer be attacked by any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest court of the land.[25] Just as the losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, so also the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case.[26] | |||||
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2006-03-28 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| As for the invocation of estoppel against respondents in light of their execution, together with petitioner, of the Salaysay, the following pronouncement of the Court is instructive. The doctrine of estoppel is predicated on, and has its origin in equity which, broadly defined, is justice according to natural law and right. It is a principle intended to avoid a clear case of injustice. The term is hardly distinguishable from a waiver of right. Estoppel, like its counterpart, must be unequivocal and intentional for, when misapplied, it can easily become a convenient and effective means of injustice. Estoppel is not understood to be a principal that, as a rule, should prevalently apply but, as it concededly is, a mere exception from the standard legal norms of general application that can be invoked only in highly exceptional and justifiable cases.[24] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) | |||||
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2005-04-12 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| The records are bereft of any proposition that petitioner waived its right of first refusal under the contract such that it is now estopped from exercising the same. In a letter dated June 17, 1991, petitioner wrote to Fausto asking for a renewal of the term of lease.[34] Petitioner cannot be faulted for merely seeking a renewal of the lease contract because obviously, it was working on the assumption that title to the property is still in Fausto's name and the latter has the sole authority to decide on the fate of the property. Instead, it was respondent who replied, advising petitioner to remove all the improvements on the property, as the lease is to expire on the 1st of August 1991. Respondent also informed petitioner that her mother has already sold the property to her.[35] In order to resolve the matter, a meeting was called among petitioner's stockholders, including respondent, on July 27, 1991, where petitioner, again, proposed that the lease be renewed. Respondent, however, declined. While petitioner may have sought the renewal of the lease, it cannot be construed as a relinquishment of its right of first refusal. Estoppel must be intentional and unequivocal.[36] | |||||
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2004-12-10 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| Under Section 2(a) in relation to Section 3, of Rule 41, petitioner is required to file a record on appeal within thirty days from November 15, 2001,[19] her date of receipt of the October 25, 2001 order. Considering that no record on appeal was filed, the Court of Appeals correctly sustained the order of the trial court dismissing her appeal for failure to perfect the same within the reglementary period. A fundamental precept is that the reglementary periods under the Rules are to be strictly observed for being considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and an orderly discharge of judicial business. The strict compliance with such periods has more than once been held to be imperative, particularly and most significantly in respect to the perfection of appeals. Upon expiration of the period without an appeal having been perfected, the assailed order or decision becomes final and executory and the court loses all jurisdiction over the case.[20] | |||||
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2001-06-28 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| The principle of laches does not attach when the judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction.[20] The fact that petitioner invoked par. 3 of the Order of 11 February 1994 praying that its P1,000,000.00 check still in Moslares' possession be considered sufficient payment of the disputed lots, could not be cited against it. For one thing, petitioner from the very start had always consistently questioned and assailed the jurisdiction of the trial court to entertain respondent's motion for execution filed three (3) years after the case had in fact been executed. Secondly, estoppel being an equitable doctrine cannot be invoked to perpetuate an injustice.[21] | |||||