Lawyerly

GR No. 183102

2013-02-27

SERENO, C.J.

This Court has said that it does not sanction the piecemeal interpretation of its decisions.[19] Much less does it sanction the carelessly and absolutely incorrect interpretation and application of its rulings. To understand our ruling in Hulst or in any other decision for that matter and get its true intent and meaning, no specific portion of our Decision should be read in isolation, but must be mulled in the context of the whole. While we understand that the ethics of the profession requires that lawyers do their best in advocating the cause of their clients, we frown upon the clear misapplication and misuse of our rulings, as in the present case, whether deliberate or not.

GR No. 157086

2013-02-18

LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY v. LEPANTO CAPATAZ UNION

BERSAMIN, J.

x x x [T]he office of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court requires that it shall raise only questions of law. The factual findings by quasi-judicial agencies, such as the Department of Labor and Employment, when supported by substantial evidence, are entitled to great respect in view of their expertise in their respective field. Judicial review of labor cases does not go far as to evaluate the sufficiency of evidence on which the labor official's findings rest. It is not our function to assess and evaluate all over again the evidence, testimonial and documentary, adduced by the parties to an appeal, particularly where the findings of both the trial court (here, the DOLE Secretary) and the appellate court on the matter coincide, as in this case at bar. The Rule limits that function of the Court to review or revision of errors of law and not to a second analysis of the evidence. Here, petitioners would have us re-calibrate all over again the factual basis and the probative value of the pieces of evidence submitted by the Company to the DOLE, contrary to the provisions of Rule 45. Thus, absent any showing of whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment, and unless lack of any basis for the conclusions made by the appellate court may be amply demonstrated, we may not disturb such factual findings.[33]

GR No. 159460

2010-11-15

SOLIDBANK CORPORATION v. ERNESTO U. GAMIER

VILLARAMA, JR., J.

The Second Division ruled that the mass action held by the bank employees on April 3, 2000 infront of the Office of the Secretary of Labor was not a legitimate exercise of the employees' freedom of speech and assembly. Such was a strike as defined under Article 212 (o) of the Labor Code, as amended, which does not distinguish as to whom the action of the employees is directed against, nor the place/location where the concerted action of the employees took place. Complainants Gamier, Condevillamar, Arriola and De Guzman did not report for work and picketed the DOLE premises on April 3, 2000; they continuously refused to report back to work until April 7, 2000 when they were issued a Notice of Termination. It was stressed that the mass action of the bank employees was an incident of a labor dispute, and hence the concerted work abandonment was a prohibited activity contemplated under Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended, upon assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary of Labor. Citing this Court's ruling in the case of Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union-FFW v. Court of Appeals,[21] the Second Division found there was just and valid cause for the dismissal of complainants.[22]

GR No. 155125

2009-12-04

YSS EMPLOYEES UNION - PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT v. YSS LABORATORIES

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

The grant of these plenary powers to the Secretary of Labor makes it incumbent upon him to bring about soonest, a fair and just solution to the differences between the employer and the employees, so that the damage such labor dispute might cause upon the national interest may be minimized as much as possible, if not totally averted, by avoiding stoppage of work or any lag in the activities of the industry or the possibility of those contingencies that might cause detriment to the national interest.[21]

GR NO. 137884

2008-03-28

INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

dispositive part of a decision must find support from the decision's ratio decidendi. Findings of the court are to be considered in the interpretation of the dispositive portion of the judgment.[45] Indeed, to grasp and delve into the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be resorted to - the decision must be considered in its entirety.[46] The Court may resort to the pleadings of the parties, its findings of fact

GR No. 167345

2007-11-23

E PACIFIC GLOBAL CONTACT CENTER v. MA. LOURDES CABANSAY

NACHURA, J.

We have consistently ruled in a plethora of cases that, in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised,[37] except if the factual findings of the appellate court are mistaken, absurd, speculative, conjectural, conflicting, tainted with grave abuse of discretion, or contrary to the findings culled by the court of origin.[38] As the findings and conclusions of the LA and the NLRC, in this case, starkly conflict with those of the CA, we are constrained to delve into the records and examine the questioned findings.

GR No. 156668

2007-11-23

KIMBERLY-CLARK v. SECRETARY OF LABOR

NACHURA, J.

As to Kimberly's assertions that some of the employees were already recalled, reassigned or replaced by the RANK Manpower Services, and that some did not return to work, the Court notes that these are questions of fact. Basic is the rule that, in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised,[12] except, if the factual findings of the appellate court are mistaken, absurd, speculative, conjectural, conflicting, tainted with grave abuse of discretion, or contrary to the findings culled by the court of origin,[13] which is not so in the instant case. The DOLE and the appellate court herein are uniform in their findings.

GR NO. 156364

2007-09-03

JACOBUS BERNHARD HULST v. PR BUILDERS

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

The Court does not sanction the piecemeal interpretation of a decision. To get the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be isolated and resorted to, but the decision must be considered in its entirety.[66]

GR NO. 167347

2007-01-31

CHUAYUCO STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION v. BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA SA CHUAYUCO STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION

CARPIO MORALES, J.

At the outset, it bears emphasis that a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should raise only questions of law.[18] It is a settled rule that in the exercise of this Court's power of review, it does not inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence presented, consistent with the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts.[19] A fortiori, this rule applies in labor cases.[20] As long as the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies are supported by substantial evidence, they are entitled to great respect in light of their expertise in their respective fields.[21]

GR NOS. 148500-01

2006-11-29

TIMES TRANSPORTATION CO. INC. v. NLRC

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

Time and again we reiterate that the office of a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court requires that it shall raise only questions of law. Judicial review of labor cases does not go as far as to evaluate the sufficiency of evidence upon which the labor official's findings rest. It is not our function to assess and evaluate all over again the evidence, testimonial or documentary, adduced to by the parties to an appeal, particularly when the findings of the quasi-judicial body was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, as in the case at bar.[17]

GR NO. 147993

2006-07-21

ENRIQUEZ SECURITY SERVICES

CORONA, J.

Third. It is a well-entrenched doctrine that the Supreme Court does not pass upon questions of fact in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45.[12] It is not our function to assess and evaluate the evidence all over again[13] where the findings of the quasi-judicial agency and the appellate court on the matter coincide.

GR NO. 150437

2006-07-17

SUKHOTHAI CUISINE v. CA

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

This Court has held that strikes staged in violation of agreements providing for arbitration are illegal, since these agreements must be strictly adhered to and respected if their ends are to be achieved.[10] The rationale of the prohibition under Article 264 is that once jurisdiction over the labor dispute has been properly acquired by competent authority, that jurisdiction should not be interfered with by the application of the coercive processes of a strike.[11] Indeed it is among the chief policies of the State to promote and emphasize the primacy of free collective bargaining and negotiations, including voluntary arbitration, mediation, and conciliation, as modes of settling labor, or industrial disputes.[12] In Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor,[13] Chief Justice Fernando declared that the principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by law. Relations between private employers and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis, subject to the minimum requirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation.[14]

GR NO. 167813

2006-06-27

BENJAMIN L. SAROCAM v. INTERORIENT MARITIME ENT.

CALLEJO, SR., J.

It must be stressed that in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised.[23] The Court is not a trier of facts and is not to reassess the credibility and probative weight of the evidence of the parties and the findings and conclusions of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC as affirmed by the appellate court. Moreover, the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are accorded respect and finality when supported by substantial evidence, which means such evidence as that which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The Court does not substitute its own judgment for that of the tribunal in determining where the weight of evidence lies or what evidence is credible.[24]

GR Nos. 158190-91

2006-06-21

NISSAN MOTORS PHILIPPINES v. SECRETARY OF LABOR

GARCIA, J.

and Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union-FFW vs. Court of Appeals.[28] There, we held that any worker who participates in a strike or otherwise engages in any prohibited act in defiance of the assumption order may be meted the penalty of loss of employment status. But as correctly pointed out by the public respondent Secretary, however, the law itself authorizes the graduation of penalties, Article 264 of the Labor Code making, as it were, a distinction between union officers and its members or any other workers, the main differing line contextually being that the latter do not necessarily lose their job by mere participation in an illegal strike absent proof that they committed illegal acts. Thus in Association of Independent Union in the Philippines vs. NLRC,[29] we held that the responsibility of union officers, as main players in an illegal strike, is greater than that of the members and, therefore, limiting the penalty of dismissal only for the former for participation in an illegal strike is in order. Of the same tenor, albeit formulated a bit differently is our holding in Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc. vs. NLRC.[30] Certainly not lost on the Court is the fact that the cited cases are not on all fours applicable, Filipro, St. Scholastica and Telefunken involving as they do the staging of actual strikes, resulting in work stoppage and complete abandonment of employment. There lies

GR NO. 159354

2006-04-07

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES v. DIOSCORO D. SEDAN

QUISUMBING, J.

So now we come to the grant of financial assistance by the appellate court. We are not unmindful of the rule that financial assistance is allowed only in instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character.[20] Neither are we unmindful of this Court's pronouncements in Arc-Men Food Industries Corporation v. NLRC,[21] and Lemery Savings and Loan Bank v. NLRC,[22] where the Court ruled that when there is no dismissal to speak of, an award of financial assistance is not in order.

GR No. 149629

2004-10-04

ALAN D. GUSTILO v. WYETH PHILIPPINES

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

Similarly, in Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union-FFW vs. Court of Appeals,[9] we ruled:"The same view holds with respect to the award of financial assistance or separation pay. The assumption for granting financial assistance or separation pay, which is, that there is an illegally dismissed employee and that illegally dismissed employee would otherwise have been entitled to reinstatement, is not present in the case at bench. Here, the striking workers have been validly dismissed 'Where the employee's dismissal was for a just cause, it would be neither fair nor just to allow the employee to recover something he has not earned or could not have earned. This being so, there can be no award of backwages, for it must be pointed out that while backwages are granted on the basis of equity for earnings which a worker or employee has lost due to his illegal dismissal, where private respondent's dismissal is for just cause, as in the case herein, there is no factual or legal basis to order the payment of backwages; otherwise, private respondent would be unjustly enriching herself at the expense of petitioners.' (Cathedral School of Technology vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 214 SCRA 551). Consequently, granting financial assistance to the strikers is clearly a 'specious inconsistency' (supra). We are of course aware that financial assistance may be allowed as a measure of social justice in exceptional circumstances and as an equitable concession. We are likewise mindful that financial assistance is allowed only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character (Zenco Sales, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 234 SCRA 689). x x x."

	GR No. 183102 2013-02-27	MACARIO DIAZ CARPIO v. CA SERENO, C.J.
This Court has said that it does not sanction the piecemeal interpretation of its decisions.[19] Much less does it sanction the carelessly and absolutely incorrect interpretation and application of its rulings. To understand our ruling in Hulst or in any other decision for that matter and get its true intent and meaning, no specific portion of our Decision should be read in isolation, but must be mulled in the context of the whole. While we understand that the ethics of the profession requires that lawyers do their best in advocating the cause of their clients, we frown upon the clear misapplication and misuse of our rulings, as in the present case, whether deliberate or not.
	GR No. 157086 2013-02-18	LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY v. LEPANTO CAPATAZ UNION BERSAMIN, J.
x x x [T]he office of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court requires that it shall raise only questions of law. The factual findings by quasi-judicial agencies, such as the Department of Labor and Employment, when supported by substantial evidence, are entitled to great respect in view of their expertise in their respective field. Judicial review of labor cases does not go far as to evaluate the sufficiency of evidence on which the labor official's findings rest. It is not our function to assess and evaluate all over again the evidence, testimonial and documentary, adduced by the parties to an appeal, particularly where the findings of both the trial court (here, the DOLE Secretary) and the appellate court on the matter coincide, as in this case at bar. The Rule limits that function of the Court to review or revision of errors of law and not to a second analysis of the evidence. Here, petitioners would have us re-calibrate all over again the factual basis and the probative value of the pieces of evidence submitted by the Company to the DOLE, contrary to the provisions of Rule 45. Thus, absent any showing of whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment, and unless lack of any basis for the conclusions made by the appellate court may be amply demonstrated, we may not disturb such factual findings.[33]
	GR No. 159460 2010-11-15	SOLIDBANK CORPORATION v. ERNESTO U. GAMIER VILLARAMA, JR., J.
The Second Division ruled that the mass action held by the bank employees on April 3, 2000 infront of the Office of the Secretary of Labor was not a legitimate exercise of the employees' freedom of speech and assembly. Such was a strike as defined under Article 212 (o) of the Labor Code, as amended, which does not distinguish as to whom the action of the employees is directed against, nor the place/location where the concerted action of the employees took place. Complainants Gamier, Condevillamar, Arriola and De Guzman did not report for work and picketed the DOLE premises on April 3, 2000; they continuously refused to report back to work until April 7, 2000 when they were issued a Notice of Termination. It was stressed that the mass action of the bank employees was an incident of a labor dispute, and hence the concerted work abandonment was a prohibited activity contemplated under Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended, upon assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary of Labor. Citing this Court's ruling in the case of Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union-FFW v. Court of Appeals,[21] the Second Division found there was just and valid cause for the dismissal of complainants.[22]
	GR No. 155125 2009-12-04	YSS EMPLOYEES UNION - PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT v. YSS LABORATORIES CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
The grant of these plenary powers to the Secretary of Labor makes it incumbent upon him to bring about soonest, a fair and just solution to the differences between the employer and the employees, so that the damage such labor dispute might cause upon the national interest may be minimized as much as possible, if not totally averted, by avoiding stoppage of work or any lag in the activities of the industry or the possibility of those contingencies that might cause detriment to the national interest.[21]
	GR NO. 137884 2008-03-28	INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
dispositive part of a decision must find support from the decision's ratio decidendi. Findings of the court are to be considered in the interpretation of the dispositive portion of the judgment.[45] Indeed, to grasp and delve into the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be resorted to - the decision must be considered in its entirety.[46] The Court may resort to the pleadings of the parties, its findings of fact
	GR No. 167345 2007-11-23	E PACIFIC GLOBAL CONTACT CENTER v. MA. LOURDES CABANSAY NACHURA, J.
We have consistently ruled in a plethora of cases that, in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised,[37] except if the factual findings of the appellate court are mistaken, absurd, speculative, conjectural, conflicting, tainted with grave abuse of discretion, or contrary to the findings culled by the court of origin.[38] As the findings and conclusions of the LA and the NLRC, in this case, starkly conflict with those of the CA, we are constrained to delve into the records and examine the questioned findings.
	GR No. 156668 2007-11-23	KIMBERLY-CLARK v. SECRETARY OF LABOR NACHURA, J.
As to Kimberly's assertions that some of the employees were already recalled, reassigned or replaced by the RANK Manpower Services, and that some did not return to work, the Court notes that these are questions of fact. Basic is the rule that, in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised,[12] except, if the factual findings of the appellate court are mistaken, absurd, speculative, conjectural, conflicting, tainted with grave abuse of discretion, or contrary to the findings culled by the court of origin,[13] which is not so in the instant case. The DOLE and the appellate court herein are uniform in their findings.
	GR NO. 156364 2007-09-03	JACOBUS BERNHARD HULST v. PR BUILDERS AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
The Court does not sanction the piecemeal interpretation of a decision. To get the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be isolated and resorted to, but the decision must be considered in its entirety.[66]
	GR NO. 167347 2007-01-31	CHUAYUCO STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION v. BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA SA CHUAYUCO STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION CARPIO MORALES, J.
At the outset, it bears emphasis that a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should raise only questions of law.[18] It is a settled rule that in the exercise of this Court's power of review, it does not inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence presented, consistent with the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts.[19] A fortiori, this rule applies in labor cases.[20] As long as the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies are supported by substantial evidence, they are entitled to great respect in light of their expertise in their respective fields.[21]
	GR NOS. 148500-01 2006-11-29	TIMES TRANSPORTATION CO. INC. v. NLRC CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Time and again we reiterate that the office of a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court requires that it shall raise only questions of law. Judicial review of labor cases does not go as far as to evaluate the sufficiency of evidence upon which the labor official's findings rest. It is not our function to assess and evaluate all over again the evidence, testimonial or documentary, adduced to by the parties to an appeal, particularly when the findings of the quasi-judicial body was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, as in the case at bar.[17]
	GR NO. 147993 2006-07-21	ENRIQUEZ SECURITY SERVICES CORONA, J.
Third. It is a well-entrenched doctrine that the Supreme Court does not pass upon questions of fact in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45.[12] It is not our function to assess and evaluate the evidence all over again[13] where the findings of the quasi-judicial agency and the appellate court on the matter coincide.
	GR NO. 150437 2006-07-17	SUKHOTHAI CUISINE v. CA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
This Court has held that strikes staged in violation of agreements providing for arbitration are illegal, since these agreements must be strictly adhered to and respected if their ends are to be achieved.[10] The rationale of the prohibition under Article 264 is that once jurisdiction over the labor dispute has been properly acquired by competent authority, that jurisdiction should not be interfered with by the application of the coercive processes of a strike.[11] Indeed it is among the chief policies of the State to promote and emphasize the primacy of free collective bargaining and negotiations, including voluntary arbitration, mediation, and conciliation, as modes of settling labor, or industrial disputes.[12] In Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor,[13] Chief Justice Fernando declared that the principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by law. Relations between private employers and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis, subject to the minimum requirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation.[14]
	GR NO. 167813 2006-06-27	BENJAMIN L. SAROCAM v. INTERORIENT MARITIME ENT. CALLEJO, SR., J.
It must be stressed that in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised.[23] The Court is not a trier of facts and is not to reassess the credibility and probative weight of the evidence of the parties and the findings and conclusions of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC as affirmed by the appellate court. Moreover, the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are accorded respect and finality when supported by substantial evidence, which means such evidence as that which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The Court does not substitute its own judgment for that of the tribunal in determining where the weight of evidence lies or what evidence is credible.[24]
	GR Nos. 158190-91 2006-06-21	NISSAN MOTORS PHILIPPINES v. SECRETARY OF LABOR GARCIA, J.
and Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union-FFW vs. Court of Appeals.[28] There, we held that any worker who participates in a strike or otherwise engages in any prohibited act in defiance of the assumption order may be meted the penalty of loss of employment status. But as correctly pointed out by the public respondent Secretary, however, the law itself authorizes the graduation of penalties, Article 264 of the Labor Code making, as it were, a distinction between union officers and its members or any other workers, the main differing line contextually being that the latter do not necessarily lose their job by mere participation in an illegal strike absent proof that they committed illegal acts. Thus in Association of Independent Union in the Philippines vs. NLRC,[29] we held that the responsibility of union officers, as main players in an illegal strike, is greater than that of the members and, therefore, limiting the penalty of dismissal only for the former for participation in an illegal strike is in order. Of the same tenor, albeit formulated a bit differently is our holding in Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc. vs. NLRC.[30] Certainly not lost on the Court is the fact that the cited cases are not on all fours applicable, Filipro, St. Scholastica and Telefunken involving as they do the staging of actual strikes, resulting in work stoppage and complete abandonment of employment. There lies
	GR NO. 159354 2006-04-07	EASTERN SHIPPING LINES v. DIOSCORO D. SEDAN QUISUMBING, J.
So now we come to the grant of financial assistance by the appellate court. We are not unmindful of the rule that financial assistance is allowed only in instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character.[20] Neither are we unmindful of this Court's pronouncements in Arc-Men Food Industries Corporation v. NLRC,[21] and Lemery Savings and Loan Bank v. NLRC,[22] where the Court ruled that when there is no dismissal to speak of, an award of financial assistance is not in order.
	GR No. 149629 2004-10-04	ALAN D. GUSTILO v. WYETH PHILIPPINES SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
Similarly, in Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union-FFW vs. Court of Appeals,[9] we ruled:"The same view holds with respect to the award of financial assistance or separation pay. The assumption for granting financial assistance or separation pay, which is, that there is an illegally dismissed employee and that illegally dismissed employee would otherwise have been entitled to reinstatement, is not present in the case at bench. Here, the striking workers have been validly dismissed 'Where the employee's dismissal was for a just cause, it would be neither fair nor just to allow the employee to recover something he has not earned or could not have earned. This being so, there can be no award of backwages, for it must be pointed out that while backwages are granted on the basis of equity for earnings which a worker or employee has lost due to his illegal dismissal, where private respondent's dismissal is for just cause, as in the case herein, there is no factual or legal basis to order the payment of backwages; otherwise, private respondent would be unjustly enriching herself at the expense of petitioners.' (Cathedral School of Technology vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 214 SCRA 551). Consequently, granting financial assistance to the strikers is clearly a 'specious inconsistency' (supra). We are of course aware that financial assistance may be allowed as a measure of social justice in exceptional circumstances and as an equitable concession. We are likewise mindful that financial assistance is allowed only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character (Zenco Sales, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 234 SCRA 689). x x x."

TELEFUNKEN SEMICONDUCTORS EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW v. VS.