This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2014-06-04 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| It is also a well-known doctrine that the issue as to whether the title was procured by falsification or fraud as advanced by Spouses Paulino can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for the purpose. A Torrens title can be attacked only for fraud, within one year after the date of the issuance of the decree of registration. Such attack must be direct, and not by a collateral proceeding. The title represented by the certificate cannot be changed, altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding.[31] | |||||
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2014-06-04 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| In Lagrosa v. Court of Appeals,[10] it was stated that it is a well-known doctrine that the issue as to whether title was procured by falsification or fraud as advanced by petitioner can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for the purpose. A Torrens title can be attacked only for fraud, within one year after the date of the issuance of the decree of registration. Such attack must be direct, and not by a collateral proceeding. The title represented by the certificate cannot be changed, altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding. | |||||
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2009-10-23 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| There having been no previous foreclosure of the Real Estate Mortgage on the subject property, respondent Sychinghos' ownership thereof remained intact. Indeed, a mortgage does not affect the ownership of the property as it is nothing more than a lien thereon serving as security for a debt. The mortgagee does not acquire title to the mortgaged real estate unless he purchases it at a public auction, and it is not redeemed within the period provided for by the Rules of Court.[17] This applies a fortiori to the present case where only 1/3, not the whole, of the subject property was actually encumbered to FEBTC. | |||||
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2005-06-08 |
TINGA, J. |
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| For a person to validly constitute a valid mortgage on real estate, he must be the absolute owner thereof as required by Article 2085 of the New Civil Code.[39] The mortgagor must be the owner, otherwise the mortgage is void.[40] In a contract of mortgage, the mortgagor remains to be the owner of the property although the property is subjected to a lien.[41] A mortgage is regarded as nothing more than a mere lien, encumbrance, or security for a debt, and passes no title or estate to the mortgagee and gives him no right or claim to the possession of the property.[42] In this kind of contract, the property mortgaged is merely delivered to the mortgagee to secure the fulfillment of the principal obligation.[43] Such delivery does not empower the mortgagee to convey any portion thereof in favor of another person as the right to dispose is an attribute of ownership.[44] The right to dispose includes the right to donate, to sell, to pledge or mortgage. Thus, the mortgagee, not being the owner of the property, cannot dispose of the whole or part thereof nor cause the impairment of the security in any manner without violating the foregoing rule.[45] The mortgagee only owns the mortgage credit, not the property itself.[46] | |||||
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2005-01-31 |
TINGA, J. |
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| It is a well-known doctrine that the issue as to whether title was procured by falsification or fraud can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for the purpose. A Torrens title can be attacked only for fraud, within one year after the date of the issuance of the decree of registration. Such attack must be direct, and not by a collateral proceeding. The title represented by the certificate cannot be changed, altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding.[33] The certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein.[34] | |||||
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2004-09-09 |
TINGA, J. |
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| In essence, petitioner would want this Court to review the factual conclusions reached by the appellate court. The cardinal rule adhered to in this jurisdiction is that a petition for review must raise only questions of law,[3] and judicial review under Rule 45 does not extend to an evaluation of the sufficiency of evidence unless there is a showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the record or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion.[4] This Court, while not a trier of facts, may review the evidence in order to arrive at the correct factual conclusion based on the record especially so when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are at variance with those of the trial court, or when the inference drawn by the Court of Appeals from the facts is manifestly mistaken.[5] | |||||
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2004-07-27 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Petitioner's allegations are better ventilated in a full-blown trial, and not in an action for quieting of title, which operates under the rules on declaratory relief. Petitioner's charge that the proceedings and decision of RTC-Branch 138 were void because of alleged due process violations cannot be resolved in a suit to quiet title. The issue of whether a title was procured by falsification or fraud should be raised in an action expressly instituted for the purpose.[54] | |||||
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2003-04-29 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| In ejectment cases the question is limited to which party among the litigants is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises, that is to say, who should have possession de facto.[15] Settled is the rule, however, that in an ejectment case, the assertion by a defendant of ownership over the disputed property does not serve to divest an inferior court of its jurisdiction.[16] When the defendant raises the defense of ownership and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved for the purpose only of determining the issue of possession.[17] Said judgment shall be conclusive with respect to the possession only, and shall in no wise bind the title of the realty, or affect the ownership thereof. It shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the real property.[18] Only with this understanding of that well-entrenched principle can we accept the ruling of the municipal court in Civil Case No. 6367 that "the case is dismissed for want of jurisdiction."[19] | |||||