This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2013-01-09 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Amistoso was specifically charged in the Information with statutory rape under Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. It is undisputed that AAA was over 12 years old on July 10, 2000, thus, Amistoso cannot be convicted of statutory rape. Nonetheless, it does not mean that Amistoso cannot be convicted of rape committed under any of the other circumstances described by Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, as long as the facts constituting the same are alleged in the Information and proved during trial. What is controlling in an Information should not be the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being, by and large, mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited.[24] In addition, the Information need not use the language of the statute in stating the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. What is required is that the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense are stated in ordinary and concise language sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know the offense charged.[25] | |||||
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2012-02-01 |
SERENO, J. |
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| The right of the accused to present evidence is guaranteed by no less than the Constitution itself.[42] Article III, Section 14(2) thereof, provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused ... shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel..." This constitutional right includes the right to present evidence in one's defense,[43] as well as the right to be present and defend oneself in person at every stage of the proceedings.[44] | |||||
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2003-03-05 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| In these cases, it was indubitably shown that the express waiver made by accused of his right to rebut the prosecution evidence was done after he had personally manifested to the trial court his belated desire to change his plea of not guilty to guilty, thus indicating his wholehearted willingness to forego reception of his evidence and uncompromised admission of complicity in the crimes charged therein;[16] or that the waiver was made only after the trial court informed accused-appellant of the consequences if he failed to present evidence in his defense, specifically that the prosecution was able to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt but accused-appellant nonetheless insisted that he had no intention of presenting evidence in his behalf;[17] or that his waiver was inferred from a valid and enforceable stipulation of facts in the pre-trial order signed by him and his counsel, which amounted to a surrender of his right to present evidence to contradict the stipulation,[18] among other situations which veritably evinced a voluntary and intelligent relinquishment of the right. None of these situations nor analogous ones obtain in the case at bar. | |||||
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2001-05-23 |
GONZAGA-REYES, J. |
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| In this regard, we have previously held that if the offender is merely a relation - not a parent, ascendant, step-parent, or guardian or common-law spouse of the mother of the victim - it must be alleged in the information that he is "a relative by consanguinity of affinity (as the case may be) within the third civil degree."[66] Thus, in the instant case, the allegation that accused-appellant is the uncle of private complainant is not specific enough to satisfy the special qualifying circumstance of relationship. The relationship by consanguinity or affinity between appellant and complainant was not alleged in the information in this case. Even if it were so alleged, it was still necessary to specifically allege that such relationship was within the third civil degree. | |||||