Lawyerly

GR No. 184681

2013-02-25

VELASCO JR., J.

It must be shown that the person concerned has performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.[134] In fact, mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act, without the cooperation or approval to cooperate, is not sufficient to prove conspiracy.[135] There must be positive and conclusive factual evidence indicating the existence of conspiracy,[136] and not simple inferences, conjectures and speculations[137] speciously sustained because "[i]t cannot be mere coincidence."[138]

GR No. 168446

2009-09-18

PEOPLE v. ERNESTO CRUZ

PERALTA, J.

Judge Learned Hand once called conspiracy "the darling of the modern prosecutor's nursery."[44] There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it.[45] Conspiracy as a mode of incurring criminal liability must be proven separately from and with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence. After all, secrecy and concealment are essential features of a successful conspiracy. Conspiracies are clandestine in nature. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose and design.[46] Paraphrasing the decision of the English Court in Regina v. Murphy,[47] conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other, were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment.[48] To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.[49] There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.[50]

GR No. 173791

2009-04-07

PEOPLE v. PABLO AMODIA

BRION, J.

In People v. Elijorde,[104] we said:The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly or intentionally rendered which cannot exist without previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to be executed. It is therefore required in order to be liable either as a principal by indispensable cooperation or as an accomplice that the accused must unite with the criminal design of the principal by direct participation.

GR Nos. 138874-75

2004-02-03

PEOPLE v. FRANCISCO JUAN LARRA×AGA

PER CURIAM

Clearly, the argument of Rowen, Ariel and Alberto that they were not part of the "conspiracy" as they were merely present during the perpetration of the crimes charged but not participants therein, is bereft of merit. To hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.[146] There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.[147] Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended.[148] As shown by the evidence for the prosecution, Rowen, Ariel and Alberto were not merely present at the scene of the crime.

GR Nos. 139474-75

2003-12-11

PEOPLE v. EDUARDO PABILLARE Y VARONA

PER CURIAM

To hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.[20] There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.[21] Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended.[22] The following acts of appellants Cañada and Pabillare lead us to conclude that they conspired to commit the crime: (a) Cañada who was driving the car suddenly chased and overtook the motorcycle driven by the victim causing him to fall; (b) at such unsuspecting state, Pabillare and Johnny forcibly took and dragged him inside the car; (c) Pabillare and Johnny beat the victim and compelled him to produce money for his release; (d) Cañada never showed any opposition to such acts, instead he obeyed every instruction of Pabillare and Johnny; (e) while Johnny was negotiating for the ransom money, Cañada was left with the victim, closely guarding him; (f) Cañada brought the victim to the place where the pay-off would take place; and (g) Pabillare took the ransom money.

GR No. 142447

2001-12-21

PEOPLE v. CARMELITO VICENTE Y FIGO

BELLOSILLO, J.

But we agree with the trial court that there was no conspiracy among accused-appellants. Conspiracy transcends companionship and the fact alone that Carlos and Carmelito fought against the deceased moments before the fatal stabbing cannot support a conclusion that they shared in the criminal intent of Rey. Beyond cavil, in the absence of any previous plan or agreement to commit a crime, the criminal responsibility arising from different acts directed against one and the same person is individual and not collective.[20] It is clear from the evidence presented that neither Carmelito nor Carlos knew that Rey would purposedly run after their victims with the intent of slaying Melvyn. Only a conspiracy would qualify Carmelito's and Carlos' act of boxing the deceased to homicide but such a conspiracy was not proved as indubitably as the killing itself.

GR No. 132330

2000-11-28

PEOPLE v. VS.SPO1 JOSE BANGCADO

BELLOSILLO, J.

In the absence of any previous plan or agreement to commit a crime, the criminal responsibility arising from different acts directed against one and the same person is individual and not collective, and that each of the participants is liable only for his own acts.[34] Consequently, Banisa must be absolved from criminal responsibility for the assault on the victims. It is clear that neither the victims nor Banisa could have anticipated Bangcado's act of shooting the victims since the attack was sudden and without any reason or purpose. Thus, the criminal design of Bangcado had not yet been revealed prior to the killings.

GR Nos. 97138-39

2000-09-28

PEOPLE v. EFREN TEMANEL

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

Further, the increase of compensatory damages from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 is in order.[31] When death occurs as a result of a crime, an award of P50,000.00 is proper, without need of proof or evidence of damages.[32]

GR Nos. 100801-02

2000-08-25

PEOPLE v. DONATO B. CONTINENTE

DE LEON, JR., J.

following requisites must concur: (a) community of design, i.e., knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (b) he cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts; and (c) there must be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice.[72] The prosecution failed to establish, either directly or by circumstantial evidence, that appellant Donato Continente was privy to any conspiracy to carry out the ambush on Col. James Rowe and his driver on that fateful morning of April 21, 1989. The evidence adduced disclose

GR No. 115182

2000-04-06

PEOPLE v. RESTITUTO ROCHE Y NICANOR

MENDOZA, J.

In the case at bar, Rogelio Rossel testified that he did not see Restituto Roche at the time Dorico Caballes was stabbing Roderick Ferol.[30] Apart from Helen Amarille and Rodel Ferol, whose testimonies are highly suspect, no other witness was presented to prove that accused-appellant directly participated in the commission of the offense or performed an act which would show community of purpose with Dorico Caballes. Even if it is assumed as true that accused-appellant was responsible for telling Dorico Caballes it was Roderick Ferol who had tripped him (Restituto), this would not suffice to find accused-appellant in conspiracy with Dorico Caballes. As we ruled in People v. Elijorde:[31]

GR No. 125688

2000-04-03

PEOPLE v. IGNACIO CUPINO

PANGANIBAN, J.

We agree with the court a quo that treachery qualified the slaying to murder. By diverting the attention of Valliente to the approaching Dejoras and Cupino, Galos was obviously making sure that the victim could not defend himself. When Valliente turned his back, Galos began his attack, which eventually led to the stabbing of the former. Treachery was not necessarily precluded by either the occurrence of a tussle before the victim was killed[23] or by the frontal nature of the attack.[24] We also agree with the lower court that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength was absorbed by alevosia.[25]

GR No. 125688

2000-04-03

PEOPLE v. IGNACIO CUPINO

PANGANIBAN, J.

In People v. Elijorde,[29] a case with similar facts, we said:"Indeed, with respect to accused Reynaldo Punzalan, the Court cannot assert with moral certainty that he is guilty of murder. Conspiracy must be proved as indubitably as the crime itself through clear and convincing evidence, not merely by conjecture. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. Hence, conspiracy exists in a situation where at the time the malefactors were committing the crime, their actions impliedly showed unity of purpose among them, a concerted effort to bring about the death of the victim. In a great majority of cases, complicity was established by proof of acts done in concert, i.e., acts which yielded the reasonable inference that the doers thereof were acting with a common intent or design. Therefore, the task in every case is determining whether the particular acts established by the requisite quantum of proof do reasonably yield that inference." (Footnotes omitted)

GR No. 125688

2000-04-03

PEOPLE v. IGNACIO CUPINO

PANGANIBAN, J.

Dejoras cannot be held liable as an accomplice, either.[32] In Elijorde,[33] we said:"The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly or intentionally rendered which cannot exist without previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to be executed. It is therefore required in order to be liable either as a principal by indispensable cooperation or as an accomplice that the accused must unite with the criminal design of the principal by direct participation."

GR No. 125688

2000-03-31

PEOPLE v. IGNACIO CUPINO

PANGANIBAN, J.

We agree with the court a quo that treachery qualified the slaying to murder. By diverting the attention of Valliente to the approaching Dejoras and Cupino, Galos was obviously making sure that the victim could not defend himself. When Valliente turned his back, Galos began his attack, which eventually led to the stabbing of the former. Treachery was not necessarily precluded by either the occurrence of a tussle before the victim was killed[23] or by the frontal nature of the attack.[24] We also agree with the lower court that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength was absorbed by alevosia.[25]

GR No. 125688

2000-03-31

PEOPLE v. IGNACIO CUPINO

PANGANIBAN, J.

In People v. Elijorde,[29] a case with similar facts, we said:"Indeed, with respect to accused Reynaldo Punzalan, the Court cannot assert with moral certainty that he is guilty of murder. Conspiracy must be proved as indubitably as the crime itself through clear and convincing evidence, not merely by conjecture. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. Hence, conspiracy exists in a situation where at the time the malefactors were committing the crime, their actions impliedly showed unity of purpose among them, a concerted effort to bring about the death of the victim. In a great majority of cases, complicity was established by proof of acts done in concert, i.e., acts which yielded the reasonable inference that the doers thereof were acting with a common intent or design. Therefore, the task in every case is determining whether the particular acts established by the requisite quantum of proof do reasonably yield that inference." (Footnotes omitted)

GR No. 125688

2000-03-31

PEOPLE v. IGNACIO CUPINO

PANGANIBAN, J.

Dejoras cannot be held liable as an accomplice, either.[32] In Elijorde,[33] we said:"The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly or intentionally rendered which cannot exist without previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to be executed. It is therefore required in order to be liable either as a principal by indispensable cooperation or as an accomplice that the accused must unite with the criminal design of the principal by direct participation."

	GR No. 184681 2013-02-25	GERRY A. SALAPUDDIN v. CA VELASCO JR., J.
It must be shown that the person concerned has performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.[134] In fact, mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act, without the cooperation or approval to cooperate, is not sufficient to prove conspiracy.[135] There must be positive and conclusive factual evidence indicating the existence of conspiracy,[136] and not simple inferences, conjectures and speculations[137] speciously sustained because "[i]t cannot be mere coincidence."[138]
	GR No. 168446 2009-09-18	PEOPLE v. ERNESTO CRUZ PERALTA, J.
Judge Learned Hand once called conspiracy "the darling of the modern prosecutor's nursery."[44] There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it.[45] Conspiracy as a mode of incurring criminal liability must be proven separately from and with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence. After all, secrecy and concealment are essential features of a successful conspiracy. Conspiracies are clandestine in nature. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose and design.[46] Paraphrasing the decision of the English Court in Regina v. Murphy,[47] conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other, were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment.[48] To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.[49] There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.[50]
	GR No. 173791 2009-04-07	PEOPLE v. PABLO AMODIA BRION, J.
In People v. Elijorde,[104] we said:The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly or intentionally rendered which cannot exist without previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to be executed. It is therefore required in order to be liable either as a principal by indispensable cooperation or as an accomplice that the accused must unite with the criminal design of the principal by direct participation.
	GR Nos. 138874-75 2004-02-03	PEOPLE v. FRANCISCO JUAN LARRA×AGA PER CURIAM
Clearly, the argument of Rowen, Ariel and Alberto that they were not part of the "conspiracy" as they were merely present during the perpetration of the crimes charged but not participants therein, is bereft of merit. To hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.[146] There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.[147] Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended.[148] As shown by the evidence for the prosecution, Rowen, Ariel and Alberto were not merely present at the scene of the crime.
	GR Nos. 139474-75 2003-12-11	PEOPLE v. EDUARDO PABILLARE Y VARONA PER CURIAM
To hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.[20] There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.[21] Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended.[22] The following acts of appellants Cañada and Pabillare lead us to conclude that they conspired to commit the crime: (a) Cañada who was driving the car suddenly chased and overtook the motorcycle driven by the victim causing him to fall; (b) at such unsuspecting state, Pabillare and Johnny forcibly took and dragged him inside the car; (c) Pabillare and Johnny beat the victim and compelled him to produce money for his release; (d) Cañada never showed any opposition to such acts, instead he obeyed every instruction of Pabillare and Johnny; (e) while Johnny was negotiating for the ransom money, Cañada was left with the victim, closely guarding him; (f) Cañada brought the victim to the place where the pay-off would take place; and (g) Pabillare took the ransom money.
	GR No. 142447 2001-12-21	PEOPLE v. CARMELITO VICENTE Y FIGO BELLOSILLO, J.
But we agree with the trial court that there was no conspiracy among accused-appellants. Conspiracy transcends companionship and the fact alone that Carlos and Carmelito fought against the deceased moments before the fatal stabbing cannot support a conclusion that they shared in the criminal intent of Rey. Beyond cavil, in the absence of any previous plan or agreement to commit a crime, the criminal responsibility arising from different acts directed against one and the same person is individual and not collective.[20] It is clear from the evidence presented that neither Carmelito nor Carlos knew that Rey would purposedly run after their victims with the intent of slaying Melvyn. Only a conspiracy would qualify Carmelito's and Carlos' act of boxing the deceased to homicide but such a conspiracy was not proved as indubitably as the killing itself.
	GR No. 132330 2000-11-28	PEOPLE v. VS.SPO1 JOSE BANGCADO BELLOSILLO, J.
In the absence of any previous plan or agreement to commit a crime, the criminal responsibility arising from different acts directed against one and the same person is individual and not collective, and that each of the participants is liable only for his own acts.[34] Consequently, Banisa must be absolved from criminal responsibility for the assault on the victims. It is clear that neither the victims nor Banisa could have anticipated Bangcado's act of shooting the victims since the attack was sudden and without any reason or purpose. Thus, the criminal design of Bangcado had not yet been revealed prior to the killings.
	GR Nos. 97138-39 2000-09-28	PEOPLE v. EFREN TEMANEL YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Further, the increase of compensatory damages from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 is in order.[31] When death occurs as a result of a crime, an award of P50,000.00 is proper, without need of proof or evidence of damages.[32]
	GR Nos. 100801-02 2000-08-25	PEOPLE v. DONATO B. CONTINENTE DE LEON, JR., J.
following requisites must concur: (a) community of design, i.e., knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (b) he cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts; and (c) there must be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice.[72] The prosecution failed to establish, either directly or by circumstantial evidence, that appellant Donato Continente was privy to any conspiracy to carry out the ambush on Col. James Rowe and his driver on that fateful morning of April 21, 1989. The evidence adduced disclose
	GR No. 115182 2000-04-06	PEOPLE v. RESTITUTO ROCHE Y NICANOR MENDOZA, J.
In the case at bar, Rogelio Rossel testified that he did not see Restituto Roche at the time Dorico Caballes was stabbing Roderick Ferol.[30] Apart from Helen Amarille and Rodel Ferol, whose testimonies are highly suspect, no other witness was presented to prove that accused-appellant directly participated in the commission of the offense or performed an act which would show community of purpose with Dorico Caballes. Even if it is assumed as true that accused-appellant was responsible for telling Dorico Caballes it was Roderick Ferol who had tripped him (Restituto), this would not suffice to find accused-appellant in conspiracy with Dorico Caballes. As we ruled in People v. Elijorde:[31]
	GR No. 125688 2000-04-03	PEOPLE v. IGNACIO CUPINO PANGANIBAN, J.
We agree with the court a quo that treachery qualified the slaying to murder. By diverting the attention of Valliente to the approaching Dejoras and Cupino, Galos was obviously making sure that the victim could not defend himself. When Valliente turned his back, Galos began his attack, which eventually led to the stabbing of the former. Treachery was not necessarily precluded by either the occurrence of a tussle before the victim was killed[23] or by the frontal nature of the attack.[24] We also agree with the lower court that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength was absorbed by alevosia.[25]
	GR No. 125688 2000-04-03	PEOPLE v. IGNACIO CUPINO PANGANIBAN, J.
In People v. Elijorde,[29] a case with similar facts, we said:"Indeed, with respect to accused Reynaldo Punzalan, the Court cannot assert with moral certainty that he is guilty of murder. Conspiracy must be proved as indubitably as the crime itself through clear and convincing evidence, not merely by conjecture. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. Hence, conspiracy exists in a situation where at the time the malefactors were committing the crime, their actions impliedly showed unity of purpose among them, a concerted effort to bring about the death of the victim. In a great majority of cases, complicity was established by proof of acts done in concert, i.e., acts which yielded the reasonable inference that the doers thereof were acting with a common intent or design. Therefore, the task in every case is determining whether the particular acts established by the requisite quantum of proof do reasonably yield that inference." (Footnotes omitted)
	GR No. 125688 2000-04-03	PEOPLE v. IGNACIO CUPINO PANGANIBAN, J.
Dejoras cannot be held liable as an accomplice, either.[32] In Elijorde,[33] we said:"The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly or intentionally rendered which cannot exist without previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to be executed. It is therefore required in order to be liable either as a principal by indispensable cooperation or as an accomplice that the accused must unite with the criminal design of the principal by direct participation."
	GR No. 125688 2000-03-31	PEOPLE v. IGNACIO CUPINO PANGANIBAN, J.
We agree with the court a quo that treachery qualified the slaying to murder. By diverting the attention of Valliente to the approaching Dejoras and Cupino, Galos was obviously making sure that the victim could not defend himself. When Valliente turned his back, Galos began his attack, which eventually led to the stabbing of the former. Treachery was not necessarily precluded by either the occurrence of a tussle before the victim was killed[23] or by the frontal nature of the attack.[24] We also agree with the lower court that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength was absorbed by alevosia.[25]
	GR No. 125688 2000-03-31	PEOPLE v. IGNACIO CUPINO PANGANIBAN, J.
In People v. Elijorde,[29] a case with similar facts, we said:"Indeed, with respect to accused Reynaldo Punzalan, the Court cannot assert with moral certainty that he is guilty of murder. Conspiracy must be proved as indubitably as the crime itself through clear and convincing evidence, not merely by conjecture. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. Hence, conspiracy exists in a situation where at the time the malefactors were committing the crime, their actions impliedly showed unity of purpose among them, a concerted effort to bring about the death of the victim. In a great majority of cases, complicity was established by proof of acts done in concert, i.e., acts which yielded the reasonable inference that the doers thereof were acting with a common intent or design. Therefore, the task in every case is determining whether the particular acts established by the requisite quantum of proof do reasonably yield that inference." (Footnotes omitted)
	GR No. 125688 2000-03-31	PEOPLE v. IGNACIO CUPINO PANGANIBAN, J.
Dejoras cannot be held liable as an accomplice, either.[32] In Elijorde,[33] we said:"The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly or intentionally rendered which cannot exist without previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to be executed. It is therefore required in order to be liable either as a principal by indispensable cooperation or as an accomplice that the accused must unite with the criminal design of the principal by direct participation."

PEOPLE v. GILBERT ELIJORDE Y DE LA CRUZ