This case has been cited 25 times or more.
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2008-12-17 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| We, thus, sustain the conviction of accused-appellant for the crime of consummated simple rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(a) of the Revised Penal Code. The penalty of reclusion perpetua was likewise correctly imposed as the special qualifying circumstance of relationship had not been specifically alleged in the information. Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353,[32] qualified rape is committed when, among others, "the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim." It is well-settled that these attendant circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender are special qualifying circumstances which must be specifically alleged in the information and proved with certainty in order to warrant conviction for the crime of qualified rape and the imposition of the death penalty.[33] | |||||
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2008-06-27 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Settled is the rule that the date of the occurrence of the rape is not an essential element of the commission of rape.[33] Inconsistencies and discrepancies in details which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime are not grounds for acquittal.[34] As long as the inaccuracies concern only minor matters, the same do not affect the credibility of witnesses. Truth-telling witnesses are not always expected to give error-free testimonies considering the lapse of time and treachery of human memory. Inaccuracies may even suggest that the witnesses are telling the truth and have not been rehearsed.[35] | |||||
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2008-01-28 |
TINGA, J, |
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| Although AAA's testimony was allegedly marked by confusion as to the date of the rape, the supposed inconsistency merely touched on a minor detail so inconsequential that it cannot affect the credibility of the testimony as a whole.[57] On the contrary, instead of weakening AAA's testimony, the lapses do tend to bolster it inasmuch as rape victims are not expected to be errorless and accurate in recounting the details of an utterly harrowing and humiliating experience.[58] Besides, the exact date of the commission of the crime of rape is extraneous to and is not an element of the offense such that any inconsistency or discrepancy as to the same is irrelevant and is not to be taken as a ground for acquittal. Testimonial discrepancies must affect the facts constitutive of the crime charged or those facts crucial to the guilt or innocence of the accused in order to warrant an acquittal on the ground thereof.[59] | |||||
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2008-01-28 |
TINGA, J, |
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| Although AAA's testimony was allegedly marked by confusion as to the date of the rape, the supposed inconsistency merely touched on a minor detail so inconsequential that it cannot affect the credibility of the testimony as a whole.[57] On the contrary, instead of weakening AAA's testimony, the lapses do tend to bolster it inasmuch as rape victims are not expected to be errorless and accurate in recounting the details of an utterly harrowing and humiliating experience.[58] Besides, the exact date of the commission of the crime of rape is extraneous to and is not an element of the offense such that any inconsistency or discrepancy as to the same is irrelevant and is not to be taken as a ground for acquittal. Testimonial discrepancies must affect the facts constitutive of the crime charged or those facts crucial to the guilt or innocence of the accused in order to warrant an acquittal on the ground thereof.[59] | |||||
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2007-09-05 |
TINGA, J. |
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| That appellant had sexual intercourse with his daughter in 1994 was sufficiently proven. That he forced her into sexual congress in 1998 was likewise proven. The courts below correctly found that appellant had indeed employed threats and intimidation in order to subject AAA to his evil desires. Threats to kill her and her siblings who lived with a drunkard of a father under one roof coupled with his moral ascendancy and influence over her are sufficient factors to build a climate of psychological terror. It was observed in People v. Melivo,[41] that in incestuous rapes, "[t]he rapist perverts whatever moral ascendancy and influence he has over his victim in order to intimidate and force the latter to submit to repeated acts of rape over a period of time. In many instances, he succeeds and the crime is forever kept on a lid. In a few cases, the victim suddenly finds the will to summon unknown sources of courage to cry out for help and bring her depraved malefactor to justice."[42] That ascendancy or influence flows from the father's parental authority over his children and from the latter's correlative duty of reverence and respect towards the former.[43] Although we have subsequently held that the moral ascendancy of the accused in incestuous rapes, alone, does not lead to the conclusion that sufficient intimidation was present,[44] it may be considered a contributing factor when coupled with other threatening circumstances such as those in this case. | |||||
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2006-11-29 |
TINGA, J. |
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| Furthermore, being AAA's step-father, accused possessed moral ascendancy over her which should be considered a factor in her failure to struggle against him and to immediately report rape incidents. It was observed in People v. Melivo,[57] that, in incestuous rapes, "[t]he rapist perverts whatever moral ascendancy and influence he has over his victim in order to intimidate and force the latter to submit to repeated acts of rape over a period of time. In many instances, he succeeds and the crime is forever kept on a lid. In a few cases, the victim suddenly finds the will to summon unknown sources of courage to cry out for help and bring her depraved malefactor to justice."[58] That ascendancy or influence flows from the father's parental authority over his children and from the latter's correlative duty of reverence and respect towards the former.[59] Although we have subsequently held that the moral ascendancy of the accused in incestuous rapes, alone, does not lead to the conclusion that sufficient intimidation was present,[60] it may be considered a contributing factor when coupled with other threatening circumstances such as those in this case. | |||||
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2004-07-07 |
VITUG, J. |
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| That will be all for the witness."[19] Far from detracting from her veracity, the minor discrepancies or lapses that might have been committed by X X X X, just to the contrary, would tend to bolster her testimony.[20] Indeed, her narration was corroborated, not only by Noralyn Orense (Grace Anne's mother) but, significantly, by the medical report presented by the prosecution; i.e., that blood samples of X X X X, belonging to blood type "B," matched with the bloodstains found in appellant's shirt which, according to X X X X, appellant used to wipe off the blood from her; that the results of the urinalysis showed that X X X X had urinary tract infection; that the hymenal lacerations found could have been caused by the insertion of an object like a penis or a finger; and that X X X X showed manifestations of an abused child who had undergone a traumatic event. The fact that there were no signs of physical violence would not militate against the occurrence of rape, proof of external injuries not being indispensable in a prosecution for rape. Clearly, appellant took advantage of his moral ascendancy over his defenseless daughter. Neither would the presence of spermatozoa be essential to prove rape.[21] | |||||
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2003-08-12 |
VITUG, J. |
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| The bare denial of appellant and his defense of alibi cannot overcome the evidence adduced by the prosecution. Denial by itself is an intrinsically weak defense.[17] Neither can the claim of alibi be given weight. For alibi to prosper, not only must the person invoking it prove being in another place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it would have been impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the appointed time.[18] Appellant himself has confirmed that the public market in Cadiz City where he claims to have been with his wife is only about five meters away from the scene of the crime, i.e., the reclamation area in Hitalon Bridge, Cadiz City. The house of appellant, upon the other hand, is within the same barangay where the killing has occurred. | |||||
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2003-06-26 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| A I told him that I did not want to go but he said that if I will not go he will come back to Marikina and ruin my life. x x x Q Before doing what you said he did to you did he not tell you that he wanted to do it? A No he did not ask me. Q So you mean without talking to you at all he just started undressing you? A He told me if I will shout he will kill me. Q And what did you answer him if any? A I can not talk then because he was covering my mouth.[21] Danly was five years old when appellant started living with her mother.[22] Appellant and her mother have been living as husband and wife for seven years.[23] Since appellant was Danly's father figure when she was growing up, appellant's moral ascendancy and influence over Danly can even take the place of threat or intimidation.[24] | |||||
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2002-02-15 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Though appellants' defense of denial is intrinsically weak,[51] we are unable to convict beyond a shadow of doubt. The prosecution evidence must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[52] | |||||
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2001-11-20 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| In resolving cases of rape, this Court is guided by the following principles: (a) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but even more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove; (b) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; (c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense;[19] and (d) the evaluation of the trial court judges regarding the credibility of witnesses deserves utmost respect on the ground that they are in the best position to observe the demeanor, act, conduct, and attitude of the witnesses in court while testifying.[20] | |||||
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2001-11-16 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| In resolving cases of rape, this Court is guided by the following principles: (a) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but even more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove; (b) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[10] In general, the evaluation of the trial court judges regarding the credibility of witnesses deserves utmost respect on the ground that they are in the best position to observe the demeanor, act, conduct, and attitude of the witnesses in court while testifying.[11] | |||||
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2000-09-28 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Accused-appellants further point out some inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses which they alleged impair their credibility.[16] These inconsistencies, upon closer scrutiny, are inconsequential and insignificant. They do not touch on significant facts crucial to the guilt or innocence of accused-appellants. They are irrelevant to the elements of the crime and are thus not grounds for acquittal.[17] For instance, it is not relevant who threw the stone at the petromax,[18] or how many or which of the robbers actually entered, or first entered, the hut.[19] What mattered is that accused-appellants were positively identified and the elements of the crime were established. | |||||
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2000-07-11 |
PER CURIAM |
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| In the Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee filed on 26 January 2000, the Office of the Solicitor General debunks the claims of TOMPONG and GUMAWA and urges us to affirm the challenged judgment, except as to the civil liabilities which, pursuant to our rulings in People vs. Victor,[14] People v. Robles,[15] and People v. Maglente,[16] should be modified: the civil indemnity in Criminal Case No. 5630 should be increased from P50,000 to P100,000, and in each of Criminal Case No. 5631 and Criminal Case No. 5632, civil indemnity of P75,000 and moral damages of P50,000 should be awarded but the exemplary damages should be vacated. | |||||
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2000-06-08 |
DE LEON, JR., J. |
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| Ultimately, we adhere to the time honored principle that between the positive and categorical testimony of a rape victim on one hand and the accused's bare denial on the other, the former generally prevails. This is especially true when, as in this case, there is no evidence of improper motive on the part of the victim to falsely testify against the appellant.[44] | |||||
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2000-05-05 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| Under Article 335, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, "[w]henever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon x x x the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death." Under Article 63 of the same Code, reclusion perpetua is the appropriate penalty imposable upon accused-appellant for the crime of rape, inasmuch as no aggravating circumstance was proven. Pursuant to current jurisprudence, the award of P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape.[45] Moral damages may additionally be awarded to the victim in such amount as the Court deems just, without the need of pleading or proof of the basis thereof.[46] In rape cases, it is recognized that the victim's moral injury is concomitant with and necessarily results from the odiousness of the crime to warrant the grant of moral damages.[47] In the instant case, we deem it appropriate to grant Amy de Guzman P30,000 as moral damages. However, since no aggravating circumstance attended the rape, no exemplary damages may be awarded.[48] | |||||
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2000-04-12 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| The test is whether the threat or intimidation produces a reasonable fear in the mind of the victim that if she resists or does not yield to the desires of the accused, the threat would be carried out. Where resistance would be futile, offering none at all does not amount to consent to the sexual assault.[24] It is not necessary that the victim should have resisted unto death or sustained physical injuries in the hands of the rapist. It is enough if the intercourse takes place against her will or if she yields because of genuine apprehension of harm to her if she did not do so.[25] Indeed, the law does not impose upon a rape victim the burden of proving resistance.[26] Slx | |||||
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2000-03-31 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Appellant contends that private complainant's testimony is inconsistent as to who were her actual companions during the pasyon. In her sworn statement she stated that there were other people during the pasyon while in her testimony, she stated that only the members of the Baltazar family were present. This matter, to our mind, does not pertain to the commission of the crime of rape. Discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness referring to minor details, and not in actuality touching upon the central fact of the crime, do not impair her credibility.[22] | |||||
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2000-03-02 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Anent the first issue, the well-entrenched rule is that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court, because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor, conduct, and attitude, especially under cross-examination.[16] Appellate courts are bound by the findings of the trial court in this respect, unless it is shown that the trial court has overlooked, misunderstood, or misappreciated certain facts and circumstances which if considered would have altered the outcome of the case.[17] Our own review of the victimÕs testimony confirms the conclusion of the trial court that "her testimony deserves full faith and credence."[18] The alleged inconsistency in her testimony pertaining to the pain she felt during the rape is only a minor detail and should detract from the weight and credibility of her testimony.[19] Errorless recollection of a harrowing incident cannot be expected of a witness especially when she is recounting details of an experience so humiliating and so painful as rape.[20] | |||||
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2000-02-23 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| We note, however, that the trial court awarded only P50,000.00 as indemnity and moral damages. Pursuant to current jurisprudence, the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape.[31] In addition, moral damages amounting to P50,000.00 at the least should be imposed in rape cases involving young and immature girls between the ages of thirteen and nineteen, without need of further proof.[32] | |||||
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2000-02-03 |
PER CURIAM |
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| This contention is without merit. The perceived discrepancies in the testimony of Bermalyne as to the number of times she was raped are inconsequential. Inconsistencies of this nature can be expected of a young girl whose harrowing experience she is called upon to recall.[12] They tend to buttress, rather than weaken, her credibility, since they indicate that her testimony was not contrived.[13] Indeed, victims of rape hardly retain in their memories the dates, number of times and manner they were violated. For this reason, it has been held that the exact date of the commission of the rape is not an essential element of the crime.[14] What is material is that the commission of the rape by accused-appellant against complainant is sufficiently proven. Discrepancies should refer to significant facts which are crucial to the guilt or innocence of an accused. Inconsistencies and discrepancies in details which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime, such as the exact time of the commission of the crime, are not grounds for acquittal.[15] | |||||
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2000-02-01 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| With regard to the civil liability, however, the trial court's award of damages should be modified. Under controlling case law, an award of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape.[37] This is exclusive of the award of moral damages of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) without need of further proof.[38] The victims' injury is now recognized as inherently concomitant with and necessarily proceeds from the appalling crime of rape which per se, warrants an award for moral damages.[39] | |||||
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2000-01-28 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Finally, in line with current jurisprudence, the civil indemnity to be awarded to the victim for each count of rape has been increased to P50,000.00.[35] Thus the award here of P30,000.00 by the trial court should be increased to P50,000.00 for each count. Moreover, we find it proper to award the further sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages, without need of further proof,[36] for every count of rape. | |||||