This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2004-06-08 |
TINGA, J. |
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| The Court likewise notes that the defense opted not to cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses, except for Dr. Celino. This, taken together with the waiver of the right to present defense evidence, the failure to file a manifestation explaining such waiver or a demurrer to evidence, and the failure to file a memorandum for the appellant as ordered by the trial court, gives rise to the suspicion that the counsel de oficio assigned to the appellant did not perform her duty of protecting appellant's rights. In People v. Bermas,[44] the Court expounded on the nature of an accused's right to counsel and the corresponding duty of a lawyer for an accused:The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections. The right to counsel means that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing jurisprudence. The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by the lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it means an efficient and truly decisive legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory representation.[45] The inadequacy of the legal assistance rendered by the counsel de oficio to appellant during the course of the trial is manifest from the records. Although appellant's counsel de oficio was aware of her client's plea of "not guilty" to the offense charged, she exerted very little effort in convincing the trial court of appellant's innocence. She subjected only one out of six prosecution witnesses to cross-examination, to test their accuracy, truthfulness and freedom from bias, and to elicit facts and information relevant to the appellant's defense. Moreover, after appellant waived his right to present evidence, presumably with Atty. Palencia's assistance, or upon her advice, she did not explain to the trial court, by way of manifestation or demurrer to evidence, why they were not presenting evidence to prove that appellant is not guilty. | |||||
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2000-04-05 |
VITUG, J. |
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| The improvident plea, followed by an abbreviated proceeding, with practically no role at all played by the defense, is just too meager to accept as being the standard constitutional due process at work enough to forfeit a human life. It may be opportune to invite attention to the disquisition of the Court in People vs. Bermas,[9] thus:"x x x The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which basically means that a person must be heard before being condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a person's basic rights; it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily. | |||||