This case has been cited 3 times or more.
|
2011-08-24 |
PEREZ, J. |
||||
| This Court has consistently held that "a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction."[43] The Supreme Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction if adverse.[44] If a party invokes the jurisdiction of a court, he cannot thereafter challenge the court's jurisdiction in the same case. To rule otherwise would amount to speculating on the fortune of litigation, which is against the policy of the Court.[45] | |||||
|
2010-06-29 |
ABAD, J. |
||||
| But in the cases where this principle has been applied, the taxes which were stricken down were in the nature of business taxes. The reasoning behind those cases was that the incidental activity could not be treated as a business separate and distinct from the main business of the taxpayer. Here the tax is an excise tax imposed on the privilege of extracting sand and gravel. And it is settled that provincial governments can levy excise taxes on quarry resources independently from the national government.[8] | |||||
|
2005-01-19 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
||||
| We stressed in Marie Antoinette R. Soliven vs. Fastforms Philippines, Inc.[32] that while it is a settled rule that jurisdictional questions may be raised at any time, an exception arises where estoppel has supervened,[33] as in this case. We reiterate that it is only now, before this Court, that petitioner is questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court. After submitting its cause voluntarily to its jurisdiction by actively participating in all stages of the proceedings before it and invoking its authority by asking for an affirmative relief, petitioner is estopped from challenging its jurisdiction, especially when an adverse judgment has been rendered.[34] In PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,[35] we held:"Moreover, we note that petitioner did not question at all the jurisdiction of the lower court x x x in its answers to both the amended complaint and the second amended complaint. It did so only in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of the lower court after it had received an adverse decision. As this Court held in Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 105180, July 5, 1993, 224 SCRA 477, 491), participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, that included invoking its authority in asking for affirmative relief, effectively barred petitioner by estoppel from challenging the court's jurisdiction. Notably, from the time it filed its answer to the second amended complaint on April 16, 1985, petitioner did not question the lower court's jurisdiction. It was only on December 29, 1989 when it filed its motion for reconsideration of the lower court's decision that petitioner raised the question of the lower court's lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner thus foreclosed its right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by its own inaction." (underscoring ours) | |||||