This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2011-10-05 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| In that light, the failure of Judge Infante to conduct a hearing prior to the grant of bail in capital offenses was inexcusable and reflected gross ignorance of the law and the rules as well as a cavalier disregard of its requirement.[27] He well knew that the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong was a matter of judicial discretion,[28] and that the discretion lay not in the determination of whether or not a hearing should be held, but in the appreciation and evaluation of the weight of the Prosecution's evidence of guilt against the accused.[29] His fault was made worse by his granting bail despite the absence of a petition for bail from the accused.[30] Consequently, any order he issued in the absence of the requisite evidence was not a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness.[31] | |||||
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2009-06-05 |
PUNO, J. |
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| However, the second paragraph of Rule 137, Section 1 does not give judges unfettered discretion to decide whether to desist from hearing a case.[61] The inhibition must be for just and valid causes, and in this regard, we have noted that the mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition, especially when the charge is without basis.[62] This Court has to be shown acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before it can brand them with the stigma of bias or partiality.[63] Moreover, extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself.[64] The only exception to the rule is when the error is so gross and patent as to produce an ineluctable inference of bad faith or malice.[65] | |||||
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2005-06-08 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Kinship alone does not establish bias and partiality.[22] Bias and partiality cannot be presumed. In administrative proceedings, no less than substantial proof is required.[23] Mere allegation is not equivalent to proof.[24] Mere suspicion of partiality is not enough. There should be hard evidence to prove it, as well as manifest showing of bias and partiality stemming from an extrajudicial source or some other basis.[25] Thus, in the case at bar, there must be convincing proof to show that the members of the fact-finding committee unjustifiably leaned in favor of one party over the other. In addition to palpable error that may be inferred from the decision itself, extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias.[26] The petitioner miserably failed to substantiate her allegations. In effect, the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty prevails.[27] | |||||
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2004-02-13 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| . . . The Judge must maintain and preserve the trust and faith of the parties litigants. He must hold himself above reproach and suspicion. At the very first sign of lack of faith and trust to his actions, whether well grounded or not, the Judge has no other alternative but inhibit himself from the case. A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation, but when circumstances appear that will induce doubt to his honest actuations and probity in favor of either party, or incite such state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the Courts of Justice is not impaired. The better course for the Judge under such circumstances is to disqualify himself. That way, he avoids being misunderstood, his reputation for probity and objectivity is preserved. What is more important, the ideal of impartial administration of justice is lived up to. (Underscoring supplied) In the case at bar, the consistency and regularity with which respondent judge issued the assailed directives gives rise, not to a fanciful suggestion or to a superficial impression of partiality, but to a clear and convincing proof of bias and prejudice. While we are not unmindful of this Court's previous pronouncements that to warrant the judge's inhibition from the case, bias or prejudice must be shown to have stemmed from an extra-judicial or extrinsic source,[20] this rule does not apply where the judge, as in the instant case, displays an inordinate predisposition to deviate from established procedural precepts that demonstrate obvious partiality in favor of one party. It is also true that the Supreme Court, on several occasions, ruled that the issuance of the complained orders and decision that pertain to the judge's judicial functions may not be proper considerations to charge a judge of bias though these acts may be erroneous.[21] However, where said complained orders, taken not singly but collectively, ineluctably show that the judge has lost the cold neutrality of an impartial magistrate, due process dictates that he voluntarily inhibits himself from the case. | |||||
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2004-01-16 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Kinship alone, even if proven, does not establish bias and partiality. There must be convincing proof to show that the fact-finding committee was indeed biased. In addition to palpable error that may be inferred from the decision itself, extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias.[24] This, petitioner failed to adduce. Hence, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty prevails.[25] | |||||