This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2007-08-15 |
VELASCO, JR., J. |
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| PD 3-A is a law issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos under his martial law powers on September 23, 1972. It provided that "[t]he provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the reclamation of areas, underwater, whether foreshore or inland, shall be limited to the National Government or any person authorized by it under the proper contract." It repealed, in effect, RA 1899 which previously delegated the right to reclaim lands to municipalities and chartered cities and revested it to the National Government.[68] Under PD 3-A, "national government" can only mean the Executive Branch headed by the President. It cannot refer to Congress as it was dissolved and abolished at the time of the issuance of PD 3-A on September 23, 1972. Moreover, the Executive Branch is the only implementing arm in the government with the equipment, manpower, expertise, and capability by the very nature of its assigned powers and functions to undertake reclamation projects. Thus, under PD 3-A, the Executive Branch through the President can implement reclamation of lands through any of its departments, agencies, or offices. | |||||
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2004-07-08 |
TINGA, J, |
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| All in all, there are two condition precedents that must be satisfied before the DTI Secretary may impose a general safeguard measure on grey Portland cement. First, there must be a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission that a product is being imported into the country in increased quantities (whether absolute or relative to domestic production), as to be a substantial cause of serious injury or threat to the domestic industry. Second, in the case of non-agricultural products the Secretary must establish that the application of such safeguard measures is in the public interest.[89] As Southern Cross argues, Section 5 is quite clear-cut, and it is impossible to finagle a different conclusion even through overarching methods of statutory construction. There is no safer nor better settled canon of interpretation that when language is clear and unambiguous it must be held to mean what it plainly expresses:[90] In the quotable words of an illustrious member of this Court, thus: [I]f a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. The verba legis or plain meaning rule rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or will and preclude the court from construing it differently. The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute.[91] Moreover, Rule 5 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the SMA,[92] which interprets Section 5 of the law, likewise requires a positive final determination on the part of the Tariff Commission before the application of the general safeguard measure. | |||||
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2004-03-03 |
VITUG, J. |
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| Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima Recopilacion, promulgated in Spain on 16 July 1805 but as to whether the law was extended to the Philippines remained to be the subject of differing views among experts;[15] however, three royal decrees were undisputably made applicable to Spaniards in the Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14 August 1841,[16] the Royal Decree of 23 August 1868 specifically defining the political status of children born in the Philippine Islands,[17] and finally, the Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was expressly made applicable to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13 July 1870.[18] | |||||
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2003-05-06 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| In its Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration, Amari argues that the Decision should be made to apply prospectively, not retroactively to cover the Amended JVA. Amari argues that the existence of a statute or executive order prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal consequences are attached, citing De Agbayani v. PNB,[4] thus:x x x. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have changed their positions. What could be more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done while such legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication. | |||||