This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2010-07-13 |
BRION, J. |
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| Further, we would be unduly stretching the doctrine of apparent authority were we to consider the power to undo or nullify solemn agreements validly entered into as within the doctrine's ambit. Although a branch manager, within his field and as to third persons, is the general agent and is in general charge of the corporation, with apparent authority commensurate with the ordinary business entrusted him and the usual course and conduct thereof,[25] yet the power to modify or nullify corporate contracts remains generally in the board of directors.[26] Being a mere branch manager alone is insufficient to support the conclusion that Mondigo has been clothed with "apparent authority" to verbally alter terms of written contracts, especially when viewed against the telling circumstances of this case: the unequivocal provision in the mortgage contract; PCRB's vigorous denial that any agreement to release the mortgage was ever entered into by it; and, the fact that the purported agreement was not even reduced into writing considering its legal effects on the parties' interests. To put it simply, the burden of proving the authority of Mondigo to alter or novate the mortgage contract has not been established.[27] | |||||
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2007-08-28 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The petitioners must concede that they raised this issue belatedly, not having done so before the labor tribunals, but only before the appellate court. Fundamental is the rule that theories and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. However, even if this argument were to be addressed at this time, the Court still finds no reason to uphold it.[25] | |||||
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2006-08-22 |
CORONA, J. |
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| The corporation can also act through its corporate officers who may be authorized either expressly by the by-laws or board resolutions or impliedly such as by general practice or policy or as are implied from express powers.[10] The general principles of agency govern the relation between the corporation and its officers or agents.[11] When authorized, their acts can bind the corporation. Conversely, when unauthorized, their acts cannot bind it. | |||||
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2006-08-18 |
GARCIA, J. |
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| directors pursuant to Section 23 of the Corporation Code.[11] Hornbook is the rule that a corporation, like the respondent, may act only through its board of directors or, when authorized either by its by-laws or by board resolution, through its officers or agents in the normal course of business.[12] It is | |||||
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2005-08-11 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| For their part, the respondents allege that the petitioner's claim that there was lack of notice of the initial trial cannot be sustained for two reasons: first, the argument was presented only before this Court and never in the courts below; second, the records of the case, including the very documents submitted by the petitioner, would belie her allegation that there was no prior notice. The respondents cite the doctrine laid down in San Juan Structural and Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[40] where the Court ruled that no question, issue or argument will be entertained on appeal unless it was raised in the court a quo. According to the respondents, the notice of withdrawal filed by Atty. Jacobo is dated November 19, 2001, fifteen (15) days before December 3, 2001, thus, it is preposterous for the petitioner, who had affixed her conformity thereon, to say that she had no notice of the scheduled initial trial. The respondents assume that in the natural course of things, the petitioner was already informed by Atty. Jacobo as to the date of the next hearing when she signed the notice of withdrawal. Considering that she had actual knowledge of the resetting, the cited cases of People v. Pamittal and Gosiengfiao v. Hon. Nicasio Yatco are not in point. And even if such was not the case, the respondents insist that it was still incumbent upon the petitioner to update herself of the status of her case. The respondents point to the court records to prove the petitioner's laxity in the prosecution of her claims, stressing that the petitioner twice changed her counsels, who apparently withdrew their services due to her own fault. | |||||
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2005-01-21 |
TINGA, J. |
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| Sale, being a consensual contract, is perfected by mere consent[25] and from that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance.[26] The essential elements of a contract of sale, to wit: (1) consent or meeting of the minds, that is, to transfer ownership in exchange for the price; (2) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; (3) cause of the obligation which is established.[27] | |||||
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2004-11-22 |
TINGA, J, |
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| In this case, petitioner's officials exceeded the scope of their authority when they authorized FUCC to commence blasting works without an extra work order properly approved in accordance with P.D. 1594. Their acts cannot bind petitioner unless it has ratified such acts or is estopped from disclaiming them.[26] | |||||
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2004-09-09 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| A corporation, as "a juridical person separate and distinct from its stockholders,"[67] may act "through its officers or agents in the normal course of business."[68] Thus, the general principles of agency govern its relationship with its officers or agents, subject to the articles of incorporation, bylaws and other relevant provisions of law.[69] | |||||