Lawyerly

You're currently signed in as:
User

SANTO TOMAS UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL v. CESAR ANTONIO Y. SURLA

This case has been cited 4 times or more.

	GR NO. 153171 2006-05-04	SPS. RODOLFO CARPIO AND REMEDIOS ORENDAIN v. RURAL BANK OF STO. TOMAS SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
The rationale of the above provisions is to curb the malpractice commonly referred to as forum shopping - "an act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition."[5]
	GR NOS. 142286-87 2005-04-15	KOREA EXCHANGE BANK v. ROGELIO C. GONZALES CALLEJO, SR., J.
The CA anchored its decision on the rulings of this Court in Santo Tomas University Hospital v. Surla[29] and Valencia v. Court of Appeals.[30] However, the CA did not order the dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No. G-3012, on its finding that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of its discretion in not ordering the dismissal of the same. Besides, the trial court had already dismissed the counterclaims of the PHDI, et al., for moral and exemplary damages in Civil Case No. G-3119.[31]
	GR NOS. 151809-12 2005-04-12	PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT v. SANDIGANBAYAN PUNO, J.
On April 22, 1991 the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying PCGG's motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005.[11] It found that the PCGG failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency between respondent Mendoza's former function as Solicitor General and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It noted that respondent Mendoza did not take a position adverse to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank during his term as Solicitor General.[12] It further ruled that respondent Mendoza's appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited period under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be Solicitor General in the year 1986. The said section prohibits a former public official or employee from practicing his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with within one year from his resignation, retirement or separation from public office.[13] The PCGG did not seek any reconsideration of the ruling.[14]
	GR No. 132362 2001-06-28	PIO BARRETTO REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. CA BELLOSILLO, J.
It is not disputed, and in fact borne by the records, that petitioner bought the disputed lots of the Drepin Estate subject matter of the Compromise Agreement ahead of Moslares and that the checks issued in payment thereof were even personally delivered by the Deputy Sheriff of the RTC-Br. 18, Manila, upon Order of respondent Judge dated 14 June 1990 after tender was refused by Moslares and the Drepin Estate. Respondent Moslares never raised the invalidity of the payment through checks either through a motion for reconsideration or a timely appeal. Hence, with the complete execution and satisfaction of the Decision dated 24 July 1986 which approved the Compromise Agreement, Civil Case No. 84-27008 became closed and terminated leaving nothing else to be done by the trial court with respect thereto.[17] As petitioner correctly contended, the Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that petitioner did not pursue the fruitful and effective implementation of the writ of execution in its favor. As already stated petitioner paid for the lots through the court-sanctioned procedure outlined above. There was no more need for the Drepin Estate, owner of the lots, to execute a deed of conveyance in petitioner's favor because it had already done so on 10 October 1980. In fact the disputed lots were already registered in petitioner's name under TCT Nos. 50539, 50540 and 50541 as a consequence thereof. That was also why in the penultimate paragraph of the Compromise Agreement it was provided that in the event respondent Moslares bought the lots ahead of petitioner Barretto Realty the latter, not the Drepin Estate, was to execute the corresponding deed of conveyance and deliver all the titles and pertinent papers to respondent Moslares. There was therefore nothing more to be done by way of fruitful and effective implementation.