This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2008-09-04 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| The fact that a power is subject to the concurrence of another entity does not make such power less executive. "Quintessential" is defined as the most perfect embodiment of something, the concentrated essence of substance.[24] On the other hand, "non-delegable" means that a power or duty cannot be delegated to another or, even if delegated, the responsibility remains with the obligor.[25] The power to enter into an executive agreement is in essence an executive power. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.[26] Now, the fact that the President has to secure the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, which shall submit to Congress a complete report of its decision before contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans, does not diminish the executive nature of the power. | |||||
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2004-03-10 |
DAVIDE JR., CJ. |
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| Worth noting also is the case of Cañas v. Castigador.[15] In that case, an Isuzu trailer truck involved in a vehicular mishap was ordered impounded in an Order of 11 September 1996 of the trial court where the criminal case against its driver was pending. That order was addressed to the Chief of Police of General Trias, Cavite, or any officer of the law. In an earlier order of 14 August 1996, the vehicle owner was required to surrender the truck to the court. Subsequently, on motion of the prosecutor, the trial court declared the vehicle owner guilty of indirect contempt for continued defiance of the 11 September 1996 Order. However, upon the vehicle owner's petition, we found respondent's order holding the petitioner therein guilty of indirect contempt to be highly improper for several reasons. But we did not pass upon the issue of the legality of the impounding of the vehicle involved in the vehicular accident. We did not declare the order for the impounding of the vehicle to be illegal or unauthorized. If it were so, it could have been one of the several reasons for admonishing the respondent Judge therein. | |||||
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2003-04-29 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| In Cañas v. Castigador,[15] we held:Observance of the law which he is bound to know and sworn to uphold is required of every judge. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; anything less than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. In short, when the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. | |||||