This case has been cited 9 times or more.
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2006-11-20 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| It appears that private complainant had filed 72 counts of qualified theft against petitioner in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Kalibo, Aklan.[29] A number of these cases were assigned to Branches 1 and 2 of the RTC, Kalibo, Aklan, while the rest were archived in Branch 3.[30] Although the judge in Branch 1 had acquitted the petitioner of qualified theft, it does not automatically follow that the judge in Branches 2 and 3 are obliged or duty-bound to acquit the petitioner for the same offense. The factual findings of each of these judges are given respect and independence. They are entitled to make their own appreciations and conclusions in accordance to what they have personally seen and heard of the witnesses and the other evidences presented during the trial. Thus, in the case of People v. Langit,[31] we ruled that:The appreciation of one judge of the testimony of a certain witness is not binding on another judge who heard the testimony of the same witness on the same matter. Each magistrate who hears the testimony of a witness is called upon to make his own appreciation of the evidence. It is, therefore, illogical to argue that because one judge made a conclusion in a certain way with respect to one or more of the accused necessarily dictates that the succeeding judge who heard the same case against the other accused should automatically make the same conclusion. | |||||
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2005-06-21 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| The rule on retroactivity states that criminal laws may be applied retroactively if favorable to the accused. This principle, embodied in the Revised Penal Code,[48] has been expanded in certain instances to cover special laws.[49] | |||||
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2002-11-13 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| [28] People v. Tomas Coca, et al., G.R. No. 133739, 29 May 2002, citing People v. Clariño, 31 July 2002, citing People v. Hilot, 342 SCRA 128 [2000] . | |||||
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2001-09-13 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| In this case, although the attack was sudden, the evidence shows that the victim was not caught completely off guard. For the fact is that the victim and accused-appellant engaged in combat that lasted for several minutes before the former was finally overpowered and then killed. This negates the existence of the first element of treachery, i.e., a sudden attack giving the victim no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate. The existence of a struggle before the fatal blow was dealt on the victim shows he was forewarned of the impending attack and that he was afforded the opportunity to put up a defense.[30] In addition, the prosecution witnesses themselves testified that a heated argument arose between accused-appellant and the victim prior to the attack. This would be sufficient to forewarn the victim against any assault which accused-appellant might launch against him.[31] | |||||
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2001-03-14 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| (T)he findings of fact of the trial court are generally respected by the appellate court, unless they are found to be clearly biased or arbitrary. We do not find any in these cases.[30] The crime of illegal possession of firearm, committed in 1992, regardless of whether the firearm is low powered or high powered, was punished with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, as provided in P.D. 1866. However, under R.A. No. 8294, which took effect on July 6, 1997,[31] the penalty was lowered to prision correcional in its maximum period and a fine of P30,000.00, if the firearm[32] is classified as low powered. In this case, the unlicensed firearm found in appellant's possession was a 9mm Walther pistol, which under the amendatory law, is considered as low powered. Inasmuch as the new law imposes a reduced penalty and is, thus, more favorable to accused-appellant, the same may be given retroactive effect.[33] Therefore, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as maximum, and a fine of P30,000.00. | |||||
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2001-02-23 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| The death indemnity of P30,000.00 was correctly increased by the appellate court to P50,000.00 in line with jurisprudence.[52] Moral damages are awarded in criminal cases involving injuries if supported by evidence on record,[53] but the stipulation of the parties in this case substitutes for the necessity of evidence in support thereof. Though not awarded below, the victim's heirs are entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 which is considered reasonable considering the pain and anguish brought by his death.[54] | |||||
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2000-12-15 |
PUNO, J. |
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| With respect to the accused Mendoza's civil liability, the accused shall pay the victim's heirs P50.000.00 as civil indemnity. The evidence on record also warrants payment of P8,000.00, not P30,000.00, in actual damages. The trial court was correct in awarding moral damages, but conformably with case law, the amount should be reduced to P50,000.00. Similarly, exemplary damages must be reduced to P50,000.00. The accused Mendoza shall also compensate the heirs of Antonio for the latter's loss of earning capacity. The following factors should be considered in determining the compensable amount of lost earnings: (1) the number of years for which the victim would have otherwise lived; and (2) the rate of loss sustained by the heirs of the deceased. Jurisprudence provides that the first factor, or life expectancy, is computed by applying the formula (2/3 x [80-age at death]) adopted in the American Expectancy Table of Mortality or the Actuarial Combined Experience Table of Mortality.[43] On the other hand, the second factor is arrived at by multiplying the life expectancy by the net earnings of the deceased, i.e., the total earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income and less living and other incidental expenses.[44] The net earning is ordinarily pegged at fifty percent (50%) of the gross earnings.[45] | |||||