This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2015-02-23 |
SERENO, C.J. |
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| When one uses the term "grossly disadvantageous to the government," the allegations in support thereof must reflect the meaning accorded to the phrase. "Gross" means glaring, reprehensible, culpable, flagrant, and shocking.[120] It requires that the mere allegation shows that the disadvantage on the part of the government is unmistakable, obvious, and certain. | |||||
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2009-08-05 |
BRION, J. |
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| The Sandiganbayan further observed that the audit team followed a flawed procedure in reaching its overpricing conclusion. The audit team merely relied on the AFP Supply Issuance and did not conduct any actual canvass of the gun prices. Thus, to the Sandiganbayan, the comparison made between the PNP price and the AFP quoted cost was substantially deficient under the prevailing rules that indispensably required an actual canvass done on different and identified suppliers to show exactly the variances in the prices of similar articles to firm up, for evidentiary purposes and to a reliable degree of certainty, a finding of overpricing. The requirement of actual canvass, according to the Sandiganbayan, was settled law as applied by this Court in Arriola v. Commission on Audit[5] and in National Center for Mental Health Management v. COA.[6] The Sandiganbayan added that Commission on Audit Memorandum No. 97-012 dated March 31, 1997 imposed stricter requirements on the process of evidence-gathering to support any audit finding of overpricing; it now required that the initial findings be supported by canvass sheets and/or price quotations indicating: (1) the identities/names of the suppliers or sellers; (2) the availability of stock sufficient in quantity to meet the requirements of the procuring agency; (3) the specifications of the items that should match those involved in the overpricing; and (4) the purchase/contract terms and conditions that should be the same as those of the questioned transaction. The Sandiganbayan cited in this regard our ruling in Sajul v. Sandiganbayan[7] where we ruled that a basis for comparison had to be established to support a conclusion of overpricing; otherwise, the conclusion would be unfair. | |||||
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2005-12-16 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| 1) that the accused are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; 2) that the prohibited act/s were done in the discharge of the public officer's official, administrative or judicial, functions; 3) that they cause undue injury to any party, whether Government or a private person; 4) that such injury is caused by giving any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such party; and 5) that the public officers acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. To be indicted of the offense under Section 3(g) of Rep. Act No. 3019, the following elements[16] must be present: 1) that the accused is a public officer; 2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and 3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. Tested against the foregoing elements, it is readily apparent that being a crony of the late President Marcos is neither an indispensable criterion nor an element for the indictment and conviction of the said offenses. In fact, the eighteen (18) Informations subject of the controversy did not allege that petitioner and his co-accused were cronies. The nine (9) indictments[17] for violation of Section 3(e), Rep. Act No. 3019, are similarly worded as follows: | |||||
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2001-11-19 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them;[6] much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law. | |||||